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The primary aim of the present research was to explain the variahility in findings 
acro~s pa~t studies regarding the effects postcvent mbmformation has on 
preschoolers' testimony amJ memory. It is argued that the appearance and 
disappearance of such effects is due to at least three limitations of past research. 
The first limitation concerns the fdlure to equate the degree to which original 
information is learned hoth across conditions within a study and across studies. 
The second concerns the failure to use analytical techniques that are sensitive to 
the different processes involved in retention (e.g., forgetting and reminiscence). 
The third limitation involves past failures to examine both the potential 
constructive and destructive effects that exposure to misinformation may have on 
testimony and memory. By addressing these limitations it was possible to 
determine whether exposure to postcvent misinformation encourages preschoolers 
to report erroneous information, as well as whether, and how, misinformation 
affects memory for a witnessed event. It was also possible to examine the effects 
of providing consistent postevent information on preschoolers' testimony and 
memory. 1\ recently developed model of long-term retention that eliminates the 
problems of differences in initial learning and analytical insensitivity is used to 
examine the effects of consistent and inconsistent information on testimony and 
memory. Preschoolers were presented with a slide sequence about a little girl 
anxious to attend a Halloween party. Half of the children received a single trial 
and the remaining half learned the material to criterion. Following acquisition, 
children received one of the following: (a) no postevent information; (b) correct 
infornwtion concerning peripheral event details three weeks after acquisition, 
presented in either narrative or questionnaire form; or (c) misleading information 
Ill 
concerning peripheral event details three weeks after acquisition. pn..'st•nt~d in 
either questionnaire or narrative form. Four weeks following acquisition. all or 
the children received 4 test trials without further study opporltrnity. The results 
indicate the following: (a) exposure to misleading information encouraged 
preschoolers to report misinformation; (b) although the cffc<.'ts of misleading 
information on memory were rare, there were more story details unavailahlt· for 
recall in one of the misled than nonmisled conditions; (c) the transient effects or 
misinformation on memory and testimony arr likely influenced by the limi lations 
of past studies mentioned above; (d) rc-cxposing preschoo!crs to story details that 
were embedded in a narrative increased recall: and (c) performance incrca!'.cd 
across test trials with the recall of original information, hut it (lid not differ as a 
function of experimental manipulation. These results demonstrate that wl1cn 
initial learning is controlled and appropriate measurement techniques arc used, 
the potential misinformation may have to impair memory could play a role in 
preschoolers' reporting of this information. 
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On the Resistance of Preschoolers' Memories to Postcvent Misinformntion 
The Salem Witch trials in JMQ marked the first ti11c in American history that 
children te...,tificu in criminal court cases. Existing documents indicate that 
uncontrolled fear anu panic at the time, along with adult suggestion, stirred young 
children's imaginations and resulted in a totally biased recollection of events on 
the part of the children (Ceci, Ross, & Toglia, 19H7b). Since these infamous trials 
1 here has he en great concern ahout chiidrcn 's competency as eyewitnesses. The 
longstanding belief, despite the lack of empirical evidence, has hccn that ym:ng 
children have limited memory capacity, arc unreliable, untrustworthy, inaccurate, 
vulnerable to suggestion, and unable to distinguish fantasy from reality; children 
arc not to he believed (e.g., Ceci et at., J9R7h; Lipmann, 1911; Stern, 1910; 
Whipple, 1909, 19 II, 11JI2, ICJIH; Yuille, I<JRg), Such opinion concerning 
children's memory and testimony can still be found today among lay people, legal 
experts, at·,d eyewitness researchers (e.g., Goodman, Golding, & Haith, 19H4; 
l .kppc & Romanczyk, 19H7; Yarmey & Jones, 19H2, !9R3). 
Beliefs such as these prompted past judicial systems to he biased against 
relying on young children's eyewitness reports and in some cases resulted in the 
banning of children's testimony from courts (Zaragoza, 1987). In fact, until 
rcCl'lltly in Canada (January, !9H8, when Bill C-15 was introduced and 
amendments were made to the "Canada Evidence Act" and the "Criminal Code"), 
it w:1s mandatory for a child's testimony to he verified hy another individual 
hl·forc it could he accepted as evidence in court (Wells, 1990). However, during 
th~ last f~w years the attitude toward children's testimouy ha!' ~tarted to change 
(l'.g., Goodman, Rudy. 13ottoms. & Aman, 1990: Saywitz, Goodman, Nicholas, & 
., 
Moan, 199 1). It is the opinion of some individuals that if children arc provided 
with appropriate preparation and proper interview methods arc utilized, tlu:11 even 
very young children can provide trustworthy testimony (Berliner & Barhic.~ri. i'JX..t; 
Yuille, 1988). 
Given the growing number of reported cases of child physical ami sexual 
abuse (see Archdiocesan Commission, 1990: Russell, 198.1; Yuille, 11JX8) and given 
that children are often the sole witnesses to such crimes, it is essential to know 
whe~'ler, and to what degree, children's testimony is trustworthy. One of the 
more common concerns regarding children's eyewitness testimony is the 
vulnerability of their memory to misleading postevcnt information (e.g., Cel'i et 
al., 1987b; King & Yuille, 1987; Whipple, 1909; Zaragoza. IWO). In fact , IIIIlCh of 
the past research concerning eyewitness testimony, in both children and adults, 
pertains to the vulnerability of memory and testimony to postevent misinformation 
{see Zaragoza, 1987). Children arc frequently exposed to different types of 
information after they witness or experience an event (e.g., questioning by parents, 
lawyers, social workers, or police; media coverage of the event). Therefore, it is 
critical to determine whether, and how, postevent information influences 
children's memory an<.! testimony for events. 
Most of the researchers who have cxmnincd how memory and testimony are 
affected by postevent information have concentrated on r.:hat has hcen termed the 
"misinformation effect" (see Zaragoza, I<JH7). The misinformation effect refers to 
the tendency individuals have to incorporate misinformation about a previou~ly 
encoded event into their later recollections of tlwt event (I lowe, J<J<J I). Thb 
effect has inexplicably appeared and disappeared across studies C)(amining 
3 
eyewitness memory in young children (see reviews in Ceci, Ross, & Toglia, 1987a; 
Cole & Loftus, 1987; Howe, 1991; JoJ,nson & Foley, 1984; Loftus & Davies, 1984; 
Zaragoza, 19H7). In addition to its now-you-see-it (e.g., Ceci et al., 1987a) now-
you-don't (e.g., Zaragoza, 1987) nature, there is little agreement across studies as 
to the role memory impairment plays in misinformatio:-t effects. That is, there is 
debate over the type of memory impairment that occurr. and whether it occurs at 
all. Due to its theoretical and practical importance, the conditions that produce 
the inconsistencies across the studies examining the effect of misinformation on 
memory and testimony must he uncovered (Howe, 1991 ). 
In the present investigation, thr~c !imitations of past research are examined to 
help explain not only the transient effects of misinformation, hut also how 
misleading information innuences memory for an event. The first limitation 
concerns the failure to control the degree to which preschoolers learn original 
information hoth ucross conditions within a study and across studies. The second 
concerns the failure to adequately operationalize and isolate storage-based and 
retrieval-based contributions to the effects of misinformation on memory. That is, 
the sensitivity of past analytical techniques has not been sufficient to measure 
storage- and retrieval-based forgetting and reminiscence of original information. 
Forgetting refers to the inability to recall information that was recalled previously 
and reminiscence typically refers to the ability to recall information that was 
previously forgotten (however, it may also refer to the enhanced recall of 
previously recalled items). The third limitation pertains to past failures to 
examine the potential that exposure to misinformation may have to reactivate and 
rcdintcgrate the original memory. That is, the primary focus has been with the 
destructive effects of mi.;information on memory and testimony. witll little or no 
concern for its possible constructive effects (also sec Ornstein. Larus. & Cluhh, 
1991 ). 
Brief literature overviews concerning the misinformation effect ami children's 
vulnerability to postevent misinformation arc presented first. The issues 
concerning initial learning confounds, analytic insensitivity, and tbc dual ctTc<:ts of 
postevent misinformation are then delineated. This is followed by a description of 
the P!cently developed trace-integrity framework and model (I lowe & Brainerd, 
1989). The framework and model arc p resented as a means of eliminating the 
pr"Jblems of initial learning n;~~ ailalytic insensitivity, so that hoth the potential 
constructive and destructive effects of misleading information can he examined. 
In the subsequent sections, an experiment is described in which the three 
limitations are addressed and the role of memory impairment in preschoolers' 
reporting of misinformation is examined. 
The "Misinformation Effect" 
The misinformation effect is presumably the laboratory equivalent of 
modifications that can occur in an individual's testimony in real-life aflcr exposure 
to misinformation. Typical investigations of misinformation effects involve IInce 
stages: (a) an encoding stage where suhjects first experience an event, either a 
staged live event, videotaped event, slide sequence, or story; (h) a postcvent 
information stage where misleading, consistent, or neutral information is 
presented either through narrative description, questions, or statements; and (c) a 
retention stage where subjects, after some time interval, arc given a test of 
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memory for the original event, typically a two-alternative forced choice 
recognition test. Loftus and her colleagues (e.g., Loftus, 1975, 1979a, 1979b, 
J97<Jc, 1980; Loftus & Loftus, 19HO; L.oftus, Milier, & Burnes, 1978) were the first 
to argue that the memory report of an original event can be impaired by 
misleading postevent information. Loftus et al.'s (1978) subjects watched a slide 
sequence of an auto-pedestrian accident that involved a stop sign. The subjects 
were then given misleading information that implied that the stop sign was a yield 
sign, and were later asked whether they saw a stop or yield sign. Subjects 
presented with the misinformation selectc<.l the yield sign significantly more than 
subjects who had not been misled. 
Since the mid- 1970's there have heen numerous studies from around the 
world tlwt demonstrate that when subjects me exposed to misinformation about 
certain details of~~ previously witnessed event, they tend to report the 
misinformation on subsequent memory tests (e.g., Bekerian & Bowers, 1983; 
Christiaanscn & Ochalek, 1983; Loftus, 1975, 1977, 1979a, 1979b, 1979c; Loftus, 
Dondcrs, lloiTman, & Schooler, 1989; Loftus & Hoffman, 1989; Loftus & Loftus, 
1980; Lofrus, Schooler, & Wagenaar, 1985; McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985b; 
Sheehan & Tilden, 1986; Wagenaar & Boer, 1987; Weinberg, Wadsworth, & 
Baron, 1983: Zaragoza & Koshmidcr, 1989; Zaragoza & McCloskey, 1989). For 
example, it has hcen shown that hammers are remembered as screwdrivers (Belli, 
191'9; McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985a), breakfast cereal is recalled as eggs (Ceci et 
al., I 987a, 1987h; Ceci, Toglia, & Ross, 1988), cans of Planter's peanuts are 
miswkcn for Coke cans (Zaragoza, McCloskey, & Jamis, 1987), a mustache is 
recallcu on a clean-shaven nmn (Gibling & Davies, 1988), anu a Mademoiselle 
magazine is mistaken for Vogue (Tversky & Tuchin. 19H9). It appears that 
postevent exposure to misleading information promotes erroneous reporting. 
Something is also known about how to produce, as well as diminish, 
misinformation effects. For example, the likelihood that subjects will report 
misleading rather than original information increases when the memory for thc 
original information is poor or nonexistent (e.g .• Loftus, 1975; Yuille, 19~4) and as 
the time between the exposure to original information and the presentation of 
misinformation increases (Loftus et al., 197H). In addition, subjects me more 
likely to report misinformation when it targets peripheral information (i.e., trivial 
or background story details) as opposed to central information (i.e., information 
relevant to the them\o! or ongoing action of an event; Dodd & Bmdshaw, 19HO; 
Goodman, Aman, & Hirschman, 19H7; King & Yuille, 19H7; Yuille, 19HO). There 
are also a number of manipulations that arc effective in preventing 
misinformation effects: (a) exposing subjects to blatant misleading information 
(i.e., information that is implausible given the context of the event, e.g., a city 
scene containing a water pump; Loftus, 1979a); (h) warning subjects that 
misinformation exists prior to its exposure (Christiaanscn & Ochalek, 19H3; 
Greene, Flynn, & Loftus, 1982); (c) informing .suhjccts that the source of tile 
misinformation is unreHahle (Dodd & Bradshaw, 19XO; Tunic & Wells, 19H7); and 
(d) excluding the misinformed items from a recognition test (McCloskey & 
Zaragoza, 1985a, 1985b). There is also evidence that the more knowledge 
subjects' have for an event and the higher their level of interest in tlw event, the 
less likely it is that misinformation effects will he observed (e.g., Powers, Andriks, 
& Loftus, 1979). 
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The predominant explanations of the misinformation effect include two 
versions of the ''memory impairment hypothesis" ([a] the single trace hypothesis 
and [h] the separate trace hypothesis) and the "no-impairment hypothesis.''1 
According to the memory impairment explanation, impairment in memory for the 
original event is the primary cause of erroneous reporting after exposure to 
misinformation. Proponents of the single trace hypothesis, led by Loftus and her 
colleagues (e.g., Loftus, 1975, 1977, 1979a, 1979b, 1979c, 1989; Loftus & Greene, 
1980; Loftus & 1-Inffman, 1989; Loftus, Korf, & Schooler, 1989; Loftus & Loftus, 
1980; Loftus ct al., 1978; Loftus et al., 1985), believe that misleading information 
is incorporated into the original trace. Misinformation then either alters (i.e., 
adds to or partially replaces) or overwrites (i.e., completely replaces) memory for 
the origimtl event. Other mechanisms involved in single trace impairment have 
also been proposed. These include a blending of misleading and original 
information (e.g., Belli, 1988; Metcalfe, 1990), an "unlearning" of original 
information (e.g., Reynolds, 1977), as well as a "disintegration" of the bonds 
integrating original trace features (e.g., Howe, 1991). The single trace version of 
the memory impairment hypothesis has not heen readily accepted because it 
opposes the popular view of memory as a permanent storage medium where 
forgetting is due to trace inaccessibility (Loftus & Hoffman, 1989). 
Supporters of the separate trace hypothesis (e.g., Bekerian & Bowers, 1983; 
Bowers & Bekcrian, 1984; Christiaansen & Ochalek, 1983; Christiaansen, 
Sweeney, & Ochalck, 1983; Morton, Ht~mmersley, & Bekerian, 1985; Piro11i & 
Mittcrcr, 1984) maintain that original information is intact and not lost from 
memory. According to this explanation, original and misleading information are 
likely stored in different traces where they compel!: with Olll~ another at nutpul. 
Although both original and misleading information coexist, the latter is rcralkd 
on a subsequent memory test because misleading information interferes with the 
recall of original information. This may either he bccuusc misin fornwtion i1.nihits 
or suppresses original information or simply hccause misinformation is more 
active in memory. It has also been argued that forgetting in the retroactive 
interference paradigm may he due to the removal of retrieval cues hy interpn!atcd 
trials (Tulving & Psotka, 1971). With the retroactive interference paradigm, 
subjects may learn, for example, a list of paired-associates, after which they learn 
a second list containing different target items, nnd then arc asked to recall the 
original list. Because of the similarity between the two paradigms, forgetting in 
the misinformation paradigm may also he due to the removal of appropriate 
retrieval cues. However, regardless of the cause, it is believed that with the 
proper retrieval support the original information will hecomc accessible again. 
Proponents of the no-impairment hypothesis (e.g., Bowman & Zaragoza, 
1989; McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985a, 1985h; Zaragoza et al., 19H7) maintain that 
misleading postevent information docs not affect memory for the original event. 
They argued that although both original and misleading information arc 
accessible, prohlems with the commonly used "Loftus Test," such as demand 
characteristics and response biases, encourage the reporting of mislcadi ng 
information. (Recall that with the Loftus Test subjects arc asked to choose 
between the original and misleading item.) That is, misinformation effects arc 
brought about by factors other than memory impairment. The critical difference 
between the no-impairment and the separate trace hypotheses is simply that with 
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the former the misleading information is claimed not to interfer with the recall of 
original information. That is, according to the separate trace version of the 
memory impairment hypothesis, misinformation is reported because this 
information intcrfcrs with the retrieval of original information. However, 
according to the no-impairment hypothesis, subjects choose to report 
misinformation either hecausc of demand characteristics or reponse bias. 
To eliminate the problems with the Loftus Test, McCloskey and Zaragoza 
(19~5a, I<JH5h) designed a "Modified Test" (for a description of a "Modified 
Modified Test" procedure see Zaragoza, 1992). The Modified Test is identical to 
the Loftus Test with the exception that test questions concerning the critical 
information ask subjects to choose hetween an original item and a new item, as 
opposed to an original item and a misled item as in the Loftus Test situation. 
The Modified Test has also been adapted for recall procedures; stimulus materials 
and test questions arc designed in such a way that the items used as misleading 
information are not appropriate responses to the critical test questions (see 
Zaragoza ct al., 1987). Using the Modified Test with both recognition 
(McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985a, 1985b) and rcca11 procedures (Zaragoza et al., 
I<JH7), Zaragoza and associates found no difference in the frequency with which 
misled and control subjects recognized or recalled the original information. 
McCloskey and Zaragoza also replicated Loftus' (e.g., Loftus et al., 1978) results 
when subjects were asked to choose between the original and misleading 
information. They concluded that the presentation of misleading information 
after an event docs not cause impairment of memory for that event. Rather, 
including misleading information in the forced-choice recognition test promotes 
response bias and conformity, prompting subjects to choose misleading 
information for reasons other than memory impairment. 
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Although Zaragoza and associates' (e.g., McCloskey & Zaragoza, WHSa, 
1985b; Zaragoza et al., 1987) methodological criticisms of the Loftus procedure 
are sound, researchers have also criticized McCloskey ami Zaragoza's ( 19X5a, 
1985b) methodology (i.e., their Modified Test) and interpretation of 
misinformation effects (e.g., Belli, 198lJ; Chandler, 1989; Green et al., l9H2; 
Lindsay & Johnson, 1987a; Loftus et ul., 1989; Loftus et al., I t>8S; Tvcrsky & 
Tuchin, 1989; Weinberg et al., 1983). For example, Loftus et al. ( 1989) found that 
when they examined only the accuracy of responding with the McCio.'\key and 
Zaragoza (1985a, 1985b) Modified Test, it appeared as if misinformation had no 
affect on performance. The frequency with which the misled and control subjects 
chose the original information was similar. However, when they examined speed 
of responding, the misled subjects took longer to select the original information. 
Loftus et a!. suggested that further research is necessary to determine why 
misinformation slows subjects' responding on tests where the misled t.letail is not 
available. It is possible that misinformation impaired memory for original 
information, hut because something of the original information still existed, 
subjects chose the more familiar odginal item over the unfamiliar new item. 
Attempts to settle the debate over the type of memory impairment that occurs 
after exposure to misinformation (i.e., impairment in availability or accessibility) 
or whether it occurs at all, constitutes most of the research in this area. llowcvcr, 
past attempts have been unsuccessful, primarily because there has been 
inadequate operationalization and isolation of storage-based anu retrieval-based 
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contrihutions to misinformation effects (Howe, 1991). Worse, the forms of 
opcrationalizations that have been used tend to confuse theoretical constructs with 
empirical manipulations (see Howe, 19HH; Howe & Brainerd, 1989, for an 
extensive description '>f this general problem}. That is, although it is possible to 
directly observe and measure memory behaviours (e.g., mean recall), it is not 
possible to directly observe the hypothetical memory subprocesses employed to 
explain behaviour (e.g., storage and retrieval). 
To achieve sufficient operationalization of memory subprocesses and to 
appropriately analyze mmlifications in these subprocesses (i.e., to allow the 
storage/retrieval locus of misinformation effects to he determined), it is necessary 
to implement formal measurement techniques (see Howe & Rabinowitz, 1989, 
1990). Such techniques make explicit the relationship between visible empirical 
results and invisible hypothetical subprocesses. Attaining this analytic precision 
will permit assessment of how well a trace is stored in memory, its level of 
retricvability, as well as determine the locus of retention differences. A formal 
measurement technique known as the trace-integrity model (Howe, 1991; Howe & 
Brainerd, 1989; Howe, Kelland, Bryant-Brown & Clark, 1992) achieves such 
analytic precision and can help determine whether misinformation effects are 
storagc-hased, retrieval-based, or hoth. Before I turn to a description of this 
model, I provide a literature overview concerning chilllren's vulnerability to 
misinformation. As well, I also provide a discussion of other limitations of past 
work that have made it impossible to determine what role memory impairment 
plays in misinformation effects. 
I~ 
Children's Vulnerability to Postcvcnl Misinformation 
Although investigations of children's suggestibility date hack to the turn of the 
century, most of these studies were methodologically flawed (sec Goodman, 19~4). 
The primary focus in the contemporary literature has hecn with the effect 
postevent misinformation has on adult eyewitness testimony and memory. 
Nonetheless, attention has recently steered toward the empirical investigation of 
children's vulnerahility to misleuuing information. llowcvcr, investigations to date 
reveal inconsistencies across studies regarding children's vulnerability to postcwnt 
misinformation. 
On the one hand, there is evidence that n young child's memory report is 
especially vulnerable to misleading information (e.g., Cohen & llarnick, 19HO; 
Dale, Loftus, & Rathburn, 1978; Goodman et al., 19H7; Goodman & Reed, 19Hll; 
King, 1984, cited in Ceci et al., 19H7b; King & Yuille, 19H6, cited in King & 
YuiUe, 1987; Sah, 1973~ cited in Ccci et al., 19H7b). For example, Ceci ct al. 
(1987a; also see Ceci et al. 1987b; Ceci ct al., 1988) presented biased information 
to children 3 to 12 yea· .i of age and to college students a day after they were 
presented with a story about a little girl's first day at school. Three days after 
story presentation the children were found to be vulnerable to misleading 
postevent information on a recognition memory test for details of the origin:tl 
story. The younger children, 3- and 4-ycar-olds, were especially vulnerable 
(however, see Brainerd & Reyna, 198H). 
On the other hand, there arc findings that indicate that a child's memory 
report is no more vulnerable to misinformation than is an older child'~ or an 
adult's (e.g., Marin, Holmes, Guth, & Kovak, 1979; Murray, ICJH3, citcu in Loftus 
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& Davies, 19H4 ). As an example, in Marin ct a I.'s ( 1979) study, subjects aged 5 to 
22 years witnessed a brief argument between a confederate and an experimenter 
over the usc of the testing room. Subjects were asked to provide a description of 
the event and to answer some questions about the incident, two of which 
contained either misleading or nonmisleading information. A subsequent memory 
test two weeks later revealed that when questions contained misleading 
information, recall was inferior; however, no developmental differences in 
vulnerability were found. 
There is al~o evidence that young children resist incorporating misleading 
information into their suhsequent recollections (e.g., Rudy & Goodman, 1991; 
Saywitz, J9H7: Yuille, Cutshall, & King, 1986, cited in King & Yuille, 1987) and 
that they may even he more resistant than older children and adults (e.g., Duncan, 
Whitney, & Kunen, 19P.2). As an example of the latter, Duncan et al. (1982) 
asked 6- to 10-year-old children and college students either leading or nonleading 
questions after they watched a slide sequence of cartoons. Children and adults 
were found to he equally innuenced by postevent information. However, when 
Duncan ct al. controlled the amount of information remembered, older subjects' 
recollections were more influenced by misinformation than were younger subjects' 
recollections. 
Just as there is disagreement as to whether young children have a tendency to 
report misinformation and whether developmental differences in erroneous 
reponing exist. there is also little agreement as to the effect (if any) that 
misinformation has on young children's memory of an original event. To 
illustrate, in a series of studies hy Zaragoza and associates (Zaragoza, 1987, 1991; 
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Zaragoza, Dahlgren, & Muench, 1992). children fmm J to 6 years of age viewed 
either a slide sequence of story-hook illustrations or a slide sequence of a live 
event. The children were then presented with neutral or mi"ilcading information 
about particular details of the original event, followed hy a test for memory of the 
event. Zaragoza and associates found no ~vidence that misinformation impaired 
memory, even when children were misled twice. Preschoolers also showed 
resistance to memory impairment across different sets of stimulus materials, 
various retention intervals, at different levels of memory for the original 
information (manipulate<.! hy varying the levels of control performance), and on 
tests of both recognition and recall. Zaragoza and associates concluded that there 
was no evidence that misinformation produced memory impairment in 
preschoolers. Children's erroneous reporting, they maintained, was due to ~ocial 
and methodological factors such as demand characteristics and response bias. 
In the Ceci et al. (19H7a) study mentioned earlier, demand characteristics 
were in fact found to play a role in erroneous reporting. Children's vulnerability 
to misleading information was greatly reduced when a 7-year-old child, as opposed 
to an adult, presented the misinformation. llowever, misinformation effects and 
developmental differences in erroneous reporting were not completely eliminated. 
Ceci et al. argued that even after demand characteristics were statistically 
controlled, preschoolers' reports were still vulnerable to misinformation (i.e., 
preschoolers incorporate<.! erroneous postevcnt information into their subsequerrl 
recollections). 
Thus, there is debate concerning the following: (a) whether young children 
have a tendency to report erroneous information after exposure to 
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mi~inforrnutian; (h) whether young children arc more likely to erroneously report 
misleading information than arc older children and adults; (c) whether the 
tendency to erroneously report misinformation (if such exists) is merely indicative 
of response hias and conformity on the part of subjects or whether it indicates 
memory impairment of original information; and (d) given that exposure to 
misinformation produces memory impairment, whether it impairs the storage or 
retrieval of original information, or hot h. Although various reasons have been 
proposed for the inconsisicncics found across studies concerning the erroneous 
reporting and memory impairing effects of misinformation, no systematic 
differences have been located (for a review see Cole & Loftus, 1987). However, 
answers may lie not so much in the differences across studies, as in the limitations 
inherent in much of the previous work in this area. I turn now to a discussion of 
some of these limltations. 
Limitations of Past "Misinformation Effect" Studies 
Three issues related to the appearance and disappearance of both 
misinformation effects and the memory impairing effects of exposure to 
misinformation were exumined in the current investigution. These issues were (a) 
initial learning confounds (i.e., failure to equate levels of learning across 
experimental conditions and studies), (h) analytic insen<;itivity (i.e., failure to 
isolate both forgetting and reminiscence processes and storage- and retrieval-
lwscd processes), and (c) the dual effects of postevent misinformation (i.e., fai1ure 
to consider both the reactivation and redintegration as well as erroneous reporting 
and memory impairing properties of misinformation presentation). These 
limitations are examined in the following sections. 
lnter(!r~tation Problems of the Misinformation Paradia:m 
Howe (1991) argued that the variation in findings across different 
misinformation effect studies may he due to problems associated with the three-
stage design typically used in such experiments (i.e., initial learning· · postcvcnt 
misinformation • • retention testing). This three-.litage structure docs not allow 
one to unequivocally attribute differences in recollection across conditions to 
processes activated during the misinformation stage. Recollection differences may 
instead result from differences in initial learning or rate of forgetting, indcpcmlc11t 
of the misinformation manipulation. 
First, consider the consequences of failing ro equate initial encoding across 
various experimental condition~ and studies, and the interpretation problems that 
result. Researchers using the typical misinformation paradigm fail to equate 
levels of learning across various experimental conditions. In such studies, suhjc<.:ls 
typically receive a fixed number of presentations of the original information, with 
a single presentation being the norm (e.g., Ccci ct al., l9H7h; Znmgoz<t, IIJH7). 
Because subjects differ in their learning ability and because they will learn easier 
items before more difficult ones, fixed-trials designs tlo not guarantee that 
learning is equated for all subject/item combinations at the end of acquisition 
(e.g., Underwood, 1964). This problem is maximized in single presentation 
designs because learning is negatively accelerated. fn addition, degree of learning 
may vary across conditions and studies, and if vulnerability to misle:.nJing 
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information depends on extent of initial encoding (e.g., Loftus, 1975; Yuille, 
I<JH4), then different outcomes across studies may result. Because it is possible 
that the degree to which original information is encoded varies across different 
items, subjects, and conditions, differences in recollection cannot be 
unambiguously attributed to the misinformation stage. As well, differences across 
studies in the initial encoding of original information only contribute further to 
the interpretation problems in this area. 
Spurious misinformation effects may also arise because of differences that can 
occur during the retention interval. Differences in forgetting. reminiscence, or 
both across items or subjects may result in differences in recollection between 
misled and nonmisled conditions that cannot he attributed to the misinformation 
stage. Suppose that exposure to misinformation does not affect memory or 
testimony for an event, but that event details differ in their forgetting or 
reminiscence mtes and that subjects differ in the rate with which they forget or 
reminisce event details. Differences across conditions in forgetting or 
reminiscence may produce what appear to he erroneous reporting or memory 
impairment effects. That is, it is possible that subjects may forget more in the 
misled condition or reminisce more in the nonmisled condition. Thus, the 
variation in outcomes across the different studies may be due to different degrees 
of forgetting, reminiscence, or hoth across items, subjects, and conditions. 
Problems with interpretation are even more pronounced when examining 
developmental differences in vulnerability to misinformation. Because younger 
subjects take longer to learn information than older suhjects (e.g., see reviews in 
I bwc & Brainerd, 1989; Howe, Kelland et at., 1992), resulting age differences in 
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recollection cannot be attributed to vulnerability differences, hut tmty instead he 
due to age differences in initial learning. In addition, studies of children's long-
term retention in which levels of learning have hecn equated demonstrate that 
forgetting declines with age (e.g., Brainerd, Kingma, & I lowe, 1 9H5; II owe, 
Kelland et al., 1992). Although there may he no developmental changes in 
vulnerability to misinformation (however sec Ceci & Bruck, 19():'\), if vulnerability 
depends on trace strength (i.e., it increases as trace strength for the original event 
decreases), then interactions of age with initial learning ami forgetting may 
produce what appear to he developmental differences in vulnerability. Therefore, 
due to the nature of the three-st~1gc design used in misinfornmtion studies, 
recollection differences should not he attributed to processes activated during the 
misinformation stage. Processes that operate at any (or all) of the stages may 
produce differences in recollection. 
Inadequate Measurement and Analysis 
Howe (1991) argued that many of the interpretation problems of the 
misinformation paradigm are directly relate<.! to issues of measurement and 
analytic insensitivity. The first measurement issue he discussed concerned the 
positive and nt:gativc suhprocesses involved in retention ami lhe importance or 
disentangling these components formally. Two opposing tendencies, forgetting 
and reminiscence, occur at an item-specific level in chilllren's long-term retention 
(e.g., Howe, Kelland et al., 1992). Recall that forgetting is defined as the failure 
to recall an item (event) that was recalled on an earlier test trial, whereas 
reminiscence is the successful recall of an item (event) that was not recalled 
previously. 
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Past studies of long-term retention in general, and misinformation effects in 
particular, have failed to satisfactorily isolate factors that weaken performance on 
long-term retention tests (forgetting) from factors that heighten performance on 
such tests (reminiscence). Whereas summary statistics used in previous studies 
(e.g., recall or n!cognition performance) combine these distinct tendencies with an 
attendant loss of precision, partitioning retention into forgetting and reminiscence 
subprocesses makes it possible to accurately interpret general retention outcomes. 
In other words, although net declines in recall may imply that forgetting surpassed 
reminiscence, reminiscence may still have occurred for some items. Similarly, 
although net increases in recall may imply that reminiscence surpassed forgetting, 
forgetting may still have occurred for some items. 
II owe ( 199 I) also pointed out that it is important to distinguish between 
forgetting and reminiscence tendencies when examining the effect of 
misinformation on original information. This is because differences between 
control and misled groups in the net recall of original information may not be due 
to differences in forgetting alone; differences in reminiscence tendencies (i.e., the 
ability to reconstruct weakened traces) may contribute to overall differences in 
recall. Similar arguments also apply when interpreting developmental differences 
in misinformation effects, where it is assumed that younger children, more so than 
older children, fail to reconstruct weakened traces (e.g., see Dent & Stevenson, 
I 979; Eugcuio, Buckout, Kostes, & Ellison, 1982; Scrivner & Safer, 1988). 
Because retention performance 1s determined hy the interaction between 
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forgetting and reminiscence, it is important that these subprocesses he segregated 
and directly measured in order to fully comprehend 111isinformation effects. 
The second measurement issue raised by Howe ( 1991) was mentioned earlier; 
it concerns the importance of adequately operationatizing and isolating storage-
based and retrieval-based contributions to misinformation effects. Recall that 
there has been considerable controversy over whether the memory impairing 
effects of misinformation (if such exist) arc due to changes in the storage of 
information, the retrievnbility of information, or both. Although the goal of most 
misinformation studies (as well as most long-term retention studies· sec the review 
in Howe & Brainerd, 1989) is to distinguish between storage-ht~sed and rctricv:tl-
based explanations, previous studies have offered only minimal operationalit.ations 
of storage and retrieval subproce!-:ses. In addition, these opcrationalizations tend 
to confuse theoretical constructs with empirical manipulations (sec I lowe, 19XX; 
Howe & Brainerd, 1989). To settle such issues, formal modelling procedures arc 
necessary (see Howe & Rabinowitz, 19H9, 1990), procedures that make explicit 
the relationship between visible empirical results and invisible hypothetical 
subprocesses (see Howe & Brainerd, 19H<J for further discussion). Such analytic 
precision will permit assessment of how well the trace is stored in memory, its 
level of retrievability, as well as determine the locus of retention differences. 
Thus, it is impossible to determine, hascd on previous research, whether 
misinformation affects forgetting, reminiscence, or both, and whether it alters 
stored information directly, interferes with retrieval, or both. (Jn terms of 
developmental studies of misinformation effects, it is impossible to determine 
whic.il factors influence age changes in vulncrahility to misinformation.) To get at 
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such issues, sufficient operationalization of the process(es) under investigation is 
necessary (sec Howe & Brainerd, 1989 for further discussion). The trace-integrity 
model (Howe, 1991; Howe & Brainerd, 1989; Howe, Kelland et al., 1992) 
achieves such analytic precision. This model can help determine whether the 
memory impairing effects of misinformation (if such exist) are due to differences 
between misled and nonmisled conditions in the tendency to reconstruct 
weakened traces (reminiscence) or in the rate of information loss (forgetting), or 
both. It can also help determine whether the memory impairing effects of 
misinformation arc storage-based. retrieval-based, or both, and whether such 
forgetting is impermanent. Before I turn to a brief description of this framework 
and model, I shall discuss the last issue believed to be related to the empirical 
discrepancies found across misinformation studies. This is the failure to consider 
the potential misinformation has to hoth constructively and destructively affect 
original information. 
Fnilurc to Consider The Dual Effects of Misinformation 
The focus of past research has been on the destructive or negative effects of 
presenting postevent misinformation (i.e., erroneous reporting and memory 
impairment); there has hccn little consideration of its positive or constructive 
effects. Because misinformation is never presented alone but is always embedded 
in n context that incorporates aspects of the original event (e.g., narrative 
description, questionnaire, or statements concerning the event), presenting 
postcvenl misinformation may remind subjects of the original event and positively 
affect recall of original information. Therefore, misinformation could have either 
,., 
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destructive or constructive effects, or both (as we11 as no effect) on memory for an 
event. Given that exposure to misinformation may have dual effects nn memory, 
variation in outcomes across different studies could result if the constructive ami 
destructive effects of misinformation, or their interaction, differ across them. 
In the following, I first discuss the potenti~1l of misinformation to rcinst:llc an 
event and refresh its trace in memory. I then describe how failure to consider the 
reinstatement properties of misinformation along with its negative effects may 
explain the transient effects of erroneous reporting and : .. emory impairment. 
The Potential of Misinformation to Reinstate. Reinstatement was first 
defined as "periodic partial repetition of an experience such that it maintains the 
effects of that experience through time" (Campbell & Jaynes, 1966, p. 47H). 
Basically, "reinsLatement" refers to any procedure in which subjects arc re·exposed 
to part or all of an original event, either during the retention interval or at 
retention testing. ~~Reinstatement effects" refer to the benefits received at lon~· 
term retention when part or all of CJrr original event JS rc·expcricnced. There is 
ample empirical evidence with infants (c.[, Greco, Rovcc·Collicr, I layne, 
Griesler, & Earley, 1986; Rovee-Collicr & Hayne, J<JH7; Rovcc-Collicr & Shyi, 
1992; Rovee-Collier, Sullivan, Enright, Luc<ts, & Fagen, 19HO), children (e.g., 
Fivush & Hammond, 1989; Hoving & Choi, 1972; lloving, Coates, Bertucci, & 
Riccio, 1972; Howe, Courage, & Bryant·13rown, in press), and adults (e.g., Fisher, 
Geiselman, Raymond, Jurkcvich, & Warhaftig, 19H7; Geiselman, l<JHH; Eich & 
Birnbaum, 1988; Kerr & Winograd, 1982; Smith, 1979; Smith, Glenherg, & Bjork, 
1978), as well as with animals (e.g., Dewccr, Sara, & J Iars, 19HO; Gatti, Pais, & 
Weeks, 1975; Hars & Hennevin, 1990; Miller, Kasprow, & Schachtman, 19H(l) that 
partially reinstating the original event either prior to or during testing enhances 
subsequent retention. 
23 
For example, in a recent series of experiments, Howe et al. (in press) asked 2-
to 3-ycar-olds to learn a series of object-location pairings to a strict criterion. 
Three weeks later the children were given postevent information that was 
consistent with the information provided at acquisition (i.e., the children were 
shown the ohjects only). One week later (four weeks after acquisition) the 
children received four test trials with no further study opportunities. 
Heinstatement significantly improved preschoolers' long-term retention; providing 
consistent information during the retention interval reactivated (i.e., primed, 
refreshed, or recycled) children's memories and served to insulate those memories 
from storage-related forgetting in particular. Therefore, forgetting can be 
alleviated hy providing reminders of an original event prior to (or during) a 
retention test. 
Thus, re-encountering some aspect of the original event (i.e., reinstatement) 
can increase availability (e.g., Howe et al., in press) and accessibility (e.g., Rovee-
Collier & Shyi, 1992~ Spear, 1973) of the original trace.2 In particular, 
reinstatement is believed to (re)activate some of the features and bonds in the 
original trace, with the result that (re)activation spreads to other features and 
honds, therchy producing an overall increase in the tntce's level of activation. 
(Rc)activation of the entire trace is likely to increase the trace 's degree of 
integration. That is, the trace becomes redintegrated (i.e., restored to its original 
state) with increased (re)activation of the trace's features and bonds (e.g., see 
Horowitz & Prytulnk, 1969: Howe, Kelland et al. 1992). Of course, increased 
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trace ;·edintegration enhances availability or accc~sihility of the original memory. 
Reinstatement, then, may explain how memories arc preserved for a long time 
after events are originally encountered.:\ 
Although reinstating a portion of an nrigimll experience may reactivate the 
entire trace. trace reactivation may do more than just increase availability or 
accessibility of the original memory, it may also alter the contents of what is 
stored in memory. Rovee-Collier and Hnyne ( 1987) have pointed out that " ... 
while memories are umloubtly reactivated 1.1~ain and again, they may he mollified 
to incorporate new information .... Thus, over sth..'~essive retrievals, the contents of 
memory may gradually change ami hecome reorganized ... " (p. 231 ). Thus, trace 
reactivation may have the opposite effect than that which is expected; it may 
diminish rather than enhance retention of one's memory for specific aspects or an 
event. 
Because misinformation is typically embedded in a context that reinstates part 
of the original event (e.g., narratives, questions, statements), correct information 
available in the postevent reminder may reactivate the corresponding information 
encoded in the original trace (i.e., the information not wrgcted hy the 
misinformation). Reactivation of the nontargetcd information may cause 
reactivation to spread to other trace features, with the result that the c ntire trace 
is reactivated. It is possible that the more the trace is reactivated, the less likely it 
is that misinformation will be incorporated into that trace. Thus, the more the 
trace is reactivated, the Jess likely it will he that misinformation will impair 
memory. However, it is also possible that reactivation of the trace may instead 
promote the incorporation of misinformation into that trace, with the result that 
25 
the retention of targeted information is attenuated rather than enhanced. 
Therefore, it :·; possible that exposure to misleading information negatively affects 
the targeted information hut prevents, rather than promotes, forgetting of the 
surrounding or nontargcted information. 
Recently, Rovcc-Collier, Borza, Adler, and Boller (1~93) have offered another 
possibility. Based on the results of their study with three-month-olds, they argued 
that once an encoded event leaves primary memory, it is protected. That is, only 
a copy can he retrieved and modified in the future. To impair original 
information, then, misinformation must be presented at a time when both types of 
information arc simultaneously active in primary memory and before original 
information leaves primary memory and is copied. Therefore, if misinformation is 
presented after original information has been stored in long-term memory, it is 
possible that misinformation reactivates and preserves the initial copy of original 
information (because this information is accessed), as well as intefers with a 
retrieved copy of the original information. 
The potential postcvent misinformation has to reinstate the original event and 
reactivate the original trace may help explain the transient effects of exposure to 
misinformation. In the following, two issues are discussed that may explain how 
the outcome of a study (i.e., whether negative, positive, or null effects are found) 
is innucnced by the potential misinformation may have to constructively and 
destructively affect memory. The first issue concerns differences in the 
reactivatinn power of various methods of presenting misinformation and how this 
intlucm:es whether, and the extent to which, memory impairment and erroneous 
reporting effects are found. The second issue concerns differences in 
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experimental design (that may interact with differences in reactivation power) anti 
how such differences may influence the outcome of a study examining the effects 
of misinformation. 
Explainin& the Inconsistencies. Consider the Zaragoza and associates 
(Zaragoza, 1987, 1991; Zaragoza et al., 1992) and Ccci et al. ( 19H7a) studies 
mentioned earlier. Both used Zaragoza's Modified Test procedure; that is, 
subjects were asked to choose between the original item and a new item on a 
recognition test. Although, Zaragoza and her colleagues found no difference in 
recall perforl1'ance between misled and control subjects, Ccci el al.'s ( 19H7a) 
misled subjects recalled less of the original uctails than did control subjects. 
Despitt the fact that Zaragoza ct al. ( 1992) examined a number of differences 
between their studies and Ceci et al.'s ( 19H7a) and that they replicated Ccci cl 
al.'s fourth experiment, they never found a difference between the control and 
misled groups when they used the Modified procedure. Zaragoza ct al. were 
especially puzzled with the results of the replication study. Both they and C'cci ct 
al. found differences, as expected, between the misled and control conditions 
when they used the Loftus Test procedure (i.e., subjects arc asked to choose 
between the original and misled item). llowevcr, Zaragoza ct al.'s misled 
performance was much higher; 63% of the original info-·· :ation was rec~JIIcd in 
Zaragoza et al.'s stu<Jy vs 46% in Ccci et al.'s stu<.Jy. In addition, <~!though 
Zaragoza used older children from higher socioeconomic classes, her cnntrol 
performance was still lower than Ccci et a I.'s (HI% vs HH%, respectively). 
In a recent study, Toglia, Hem brooke, and Ceci (cited in Toglia, Ross, Ccci, 
and Hembrooke, 1992) used a slide sequence similar to that used by Zaragoza 
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and her colleagues (e.g., Zaragoza et al., 1992) and they tested children with the 
Modified Test procedure. For approximately 50% of their stimuli, misled 
preschooiers recalled less of the original information than children in a control 
condition. That is, using stimuli that were very similar, Toglia et al. found 
preschoolers to be vulnerable to memory impairment, whereas Zaragoza and her 
col leagues did not. 
Belli et al. (19R2), in a series of experiments, appeared to resolve the 
descrepancy between studies as to whether or not the Modified Test produces 
impaired memory performance following misinformation. Belli et al. manipulated 
the delay interval between exposure to original information and misinformation 
and found that as long as the interval was three-five days, the Modified Test 
produccu the misinformation effects observed with the Original Test. When the 
interval was .-ihorter, it did not. However, Zaragoza ( 1992), in a series of 
experiments, determineu that the exposure to original information -
misinformation interval could not explain the differences observed between 
studies utilizing the Mollified Test. 
The inconsistencies found between the Zaragoza and colleagues' (e.g., 
Zaragoza, 19X7, ICJ9l ; Zaragoza ct al., I'J92) and Ceci and colleagues' (e.g., Ceci 
et al., 19H7a; Toglia ct al., cited in Toglia et al., 1992) studies may be due to 
(.t;fferenccs in the reactivation potential between their methods of presenting 
misinformation. That is, a study's outcome may depend on the degree to which 
the reminder containing misinformation reactivates the original trace. As stated 
earlier, it is possible that the more the original trace is reactivated, the less likely 
it may be that the information containcu in that trace will be impaired. However, 
it is also possible that the more reactivation power the misinformation rcmimkr 
has, the more likely it may be that misinformation is incorporated into the 
original trace and, therefore, the stronger its representation may he in that tral'C. 
The greater extent to which misinformation is represented in the original trace, 
the more likely it may be that the original trace updates itself with the 
misinformation. That is, the more likely it may he that misinformation affects 
targeted information (or nontargeted information). by either partially replm:ing,. 
blending with, or completely overwriting the original information. It is also 
possible that the more reactivation power the misinformation reminder has. the 
more likely it may he that misinformation has both effects, namely, reactivation 
and preservation of the original trace as well .a.s integration with original 
information. 
However, when the misinformation reminder promotes little or no reactivation 
of the original memory, the misleading information may be more likely encoded 
in an entirely different trace, with the result that misinforn1ation docs not 
integrate with or alter the trace containing the original event. Assuming tlwt both 
the original and misleading information arc available, output interference may 
then be a prohlem, especially if subjects arc forced to choose between the two 
types of information. However, when subjects ;tre given the opportunity to 
respond twice at recall, there should he no output interference. Thi~ docs not 
mean that misinformation will not affect access to the original trace; for cxwnple, 
misinformation may still suppress or inhibit original information, thus, affecting 
retrieval of the trace. Therefore, the potential that postcvcnt mi~information has 
to reactivate the original tra. ~ may innucnce whether erroneous reporting and 
memory impairing effects of misinformation arc found, as well as whether 
misleading i11forrnation affects trace storage, retrievahility, or both. 
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The degree of reactivation potential that postevent misinformation possibly 
has may depend on the way in which the information is presented (e.g., narrative 
description, questionnaire, statements). Presentation methods may vary in 
reinstatement strength from those that have little or no power to reactivate 
original trace features and honds, to those that have great potential to do so. For 
example, (mis)information presented in forms such as questionnaires, as opposed 
to narratives or statements, may make it more likely that subjects will access the 
original trace because answers to questions are required (Howe, 1991). This may 
incre~tsc the degree to which either the nontargeted information or the entire 
original trace is reactivated. with the result that misinformation may be strongly 
represented in the original trace when presented in questionnaire form. That i~ , 
erroneous reporting and memory impairment effects may be more prevalent when 
misinformation is en .bedded in a question answering format than when subjects 
passively listen to an additional narrative that contains the misinformation. 
In fact, differences in the reactivation potential between questionnaire and 
narrative presentation methods may explain the variation in outcomes between 
the Zaragoza and colleagues' (e.g., Zaragoza, 1987, 1991; Zaragoza et al., 1992) 
~uul Ccci and colleagues' (e.g., Ceci et al., 1987a; Toglia et al., cited in Toglia et 
~ll.. 1992) studies. For example, in Ceci et al.'s four experiments, children were 
asked questions that contained misinformation. In all hut one of Zaragoza's 
stmiu:s. misi.Jormation was embedded in a narrative. (Zanqoza et a!. stated that 
they employed the smnc materials and procedures when they replicated Ceci et 
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al.'s fourth study, however, they failed to explicitly describe the method by which 
misinformation was presented.) The reactivation capability of Ccd and 
colleagues' question answering method of presenting misinformation may have 
been greater than Zaragoza and colleagues' narrative presentation. Therefore, 
misinformation may have had a greater chance to impair original information in 
the Ceci et a1. studies. This would explain Ceci et al.'s lower misled performam.·c 
in the Loftus Test compared to that found in Zaragozn ct al.'s replication study. 
Zaragoza and colleagues (e.g., Zaragoza, 19X7, 1991; Zmagoza et ;1!., 1992) 
did consider the strength of the misinformation manipulation as a possible reason 
for the differences hetween their studies and those of Ceci and his colleagues 
(Ceci et al., 1987a; Toglia ct al., cited in Toglia ct al., 1992). For l~xamplc, 
Zaragoza ( 1987) conducted two experiments in which preschoolers were presented 
with a series of slides and then exposed to misleading information. The two 
experiments were identical with the exception that preschoolers were exposed to 
misleading information only once in the first experiment hut twice in the second 
(i.e., the synopsis of the event containing misinformation was presented twice in 
immediate succession). Although the Modified Test provided no evidence of 
memory impairment in either experiment, there was :t difference in recall levels 
between experiments. 
Following one exposure to misinformation, recall performance in the misled 
and control conditions were 74% and 7 I%, respectively. When the preschoolers 
were misled twice, performance in the misled and control conditions were (l<)';.i, 
and 70%, respectively. Although not a large difference, there was indication that 
stronger manipulations of misinformation (i.e., presenting misinformation twice) 
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were more likely to impair memory of original information (74% vs 69% correct 
with one and two presentations of misinformation, respectively). In fact, in a 
study with adults, Zaragoza (1992) found that misinformation did not impair 
memory of original details when the suhjects were misled once, but did when 
subjects were mislc . nore than once. But she noted that the observed memory 
impairment effects were small and did not replicate consistently. However, 
despite Zaragoza's small effects, there is reason to suspect that the differences 
between the Ceci et al. (e.g., Ceci et al., 1987a; Toglia et al., cited in Toglia et al., 
1992) and Zaragoza (e.g., Zaragoza, 1987, i991; Zaragoza et al., 1992) studies are 
due to differences in the strength of the misinf~>rmation manipulation. Therefore, 
the stronger reactivation potential that the questionnaire presentation method 
may have had possibly explained Ceci et al.'s lower misled performance in the 
Loftus Test compared to that found in Zaragoza ct al.'s replication study. 
But what explains the lower control performance in Zaragoza et al.'s (1992) 
study? Another factor probably contributing to the transient effects of 
misinformation concerns the type of experimental design used. Zaragoza et al. 
used a within-subjects targeted-control manipulation; that is, all subjects were 
exposed to misinformation ahout half the items and the remaining items served as 
the control. However, Ccci et al. (1987a) used a between-subjects manipulation; 
half the subjects were misled and the other half received no misinformation at all. 
It is possible, as Zaragoza et al. pointed out, that exposure to misinformation 
weakens the entire tn,cc of the event, and not solely the targeted items. In other 
words, there may he some form of negative spread from targeted to nontargeted 
items. Decmrse all of Zaragoza et al.'s subjects were exposed to misinformation 
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about half the critical items, their control items may have been negatively affected 
by the misinformation. So Zaragoza et al.'s control pcrforma111.:c may have been 
inadvertently lowered, with the result that any effects that misinformation may 
have had would not have been detected. Therefore, the outcome of a study on 
the effects of misleading information may depend on whether misinformation is 
manipulated within- or between-subjects, as well as on the degree of reactivation 
power the presentation method has. 
The above discussion illustrates the importuncc of examining reinstatement, 
trace reactivation/redintegration, and the spread of constructive and destructive 
effects among trace elements to understand the effect, if any, misinformation has 
on memory for an event. Specifically, there is a need to know whether postevcnt 
misinformation reactivates the original memory, and if so, whether this enhances 
or diminishes retention of specific details of the event. In addition, provided that 
reactivation/ redintegration or memory impairment occur, we also need to know 
what portion of the trace is affected and if these effects sprcml to other trace 
elements. If misinformation docs impair or improve certain portions of memory 
for an event, then the principle theoretical question concerns whether these 
effects occur at storage, retrieval, or hoth. In order to answer this question, a 
technique is required that will separate and measure storage- and rctricval-hasetl 
processes. As mentioned earlier, the trace-integrity theory and its nwthernatical 
implementation were used to isolate these effc<:ts in the present thesis. Before 
turning to the study itself, I provide a description of this theory ami model. 
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The Trace-Integrity Framework and Mathematical Model 
The trace-integrity framework and associated model offer a theoretical and 
mathematical fnctoring procedure that separates the forgetting and reminiscence 
tendencies at retention and determines their storage-based and retrieval-based 
origins. The framework and model are described first, followed by a comparison 
of formal modelling procedures with traditional methods of analysis. 
DcscriptiOil of (he 'frace-Jntc~:rity ThcoO' and Model 
Consistent with other theories (e.g., Ackerman, 19R7; Chechile, 1987), the 
trace-integrity framework (see Brainerd, Reyna, Howe, & Kingma, 1990; Howe, 
1991; II owe & Brainerd, 19H9; Howe, Kelland et al., 1992) regards storage and 
retrieval as lying on a continuum, where the viability of a trace is determined by 
the degree or "strength" of honding between primitive trace elements (e.g., 
features, nodes, etc.). According to this theory, as information is acquired, trace 
clements integrate to the extent that they first become formed in memory with 
some minimum probability of recall. This early stage of trace formation is 
associated with storage processes. With continued trace integration, elements 
comprising the trace hecome unified to a degree where recall occurs with 
probability I. This later stage of trace integration is associated with the process 
of learning to retrieve stored information. During the retention interval, the trace 
is believed to either remain integrated with probability of recall remaining at 1 
(nn forgetting). dissipate to a point where the trace can be recalled with some 
probability hetwcen 0 and I (retrieval-based forgetting). or weaken to a level 
where it is no longer possible to recall the trace (storage-based forgetting). 
Recall that redintegration is a process whcrehy activation of some of the 
features in a trace spreads to other features, thereby resulting in an overall 
increase in the trace's degree of integration. Rcminisl·cnce is indicative of th~: 
degree of redintegration a trace undergoes and, like forgetting, is scgrcgat~:d into 
storage-based and retrieval-based processes. The rc-cstahlishmcnt of traces in this 
manner explains the spontaneous recovery that is commonly observed on tests or 
long-term retention. Note that storage-based reminiscence is possible because the 
availability of traces docs not have to be an all-or-nonc event. Rather, it can he 
determined hy the position of the trace on the integrity continuum. That is, traecs 
that have fallen below the zero recall threshold may not have disappeared rrom 
memory, but may simply be undetectable due to background noise. Because it is 
conceivable that some degree of trace integrity may exist, ~llhcit small, it is 
possible to reactivate trace bonds and redintegrate the trace with multiple test 
opportunities. 
The mathematical implementation of the trace-integrity framework separates 
forgetting and reminiscence tender.cics, and partitions the contributions of stowgc 
and retrieval processes to these tendencies in terms of the model's pammetcrs 
(see Brainerd et al., 1990; Howe, 1991; Howe & Brainerd, 19H9; Howe, Kelland ct 
a!., 1992). This mathematical model pertains to designs where retention involves 
a sequence of four (or more) test trials with no further opporttmity for stu<.Jy. 
Analytic sensitivity is accomplished with 9 panum:tcrs that capture the retention 
data from multi-trial Ebbinghaus-likc experiments (i.e., experiments in which 
subjects are given repeated study trials, followed hy a retention interval, and then 
a testing session). Refer to Table 1 for a summary of the theoretical definitions 
of the trace-integrity model's parameters. 
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The disintegrative or forgetting processes are partitioned using two 
parameters; one parameter measures the probability of storage failure (S) and the 
other measures the probability of retrieval failure (R). Specifically, ..S provides the 
unconditional probability that an item is not available for recall after the retention 
interval. For items that are available at retention (1-..S.), R provides the 
conditional probability that the items arc inaccessible. Zero recall indicates 
.-.torage failures and recall probabilities between zero and one are indicative of 
retricvul failures. 
Redintegrative processes arc captured by seven parameters, one that measures 
the probability of storage-based reminiscence (il) and six that assess retrieval-
based reminiscence as it relates to preceding test-trial succe~ses (ri) and errors (fJ 
More precisely, the parameter .il provides the conditional probability that an item 
that was not available for recall during the first retention test trial (signified by ,.S) 
is later rcdintegrated to a point above the zero recall level. The retrieval-based 
reminiscence parameters measure the conditional probabilities of item retrieval 
across the retention test trials and only pertain after the first test trial. The 
sucl·css-contingcnt reminiscence parameters evaluate the probability that retrieval 
is successful after one, two. or three cc .1secutivc successes (!:1,.r2, and .[3, 
respectively}. The error-contingent reminiscence parameters measure the 
prolmhility that retrieval is successful after one, two. or three consecutive errors 
(.f, • .f.!, and J,, respectively). 
Table 1 






.S The probability of storage failure 
R The probability of retrieval failure of information in storage 
Reminiscence 
.i! The probability that information not in storage is red integrated 10 a 
level above zero recall 
.r1 The probability of a succc ..... following one success 
I 2 The probability of a success following two consecutive successes 
I 3 The probability of a success following three consecutive successes 
.f1 The probability of a success following one error 
.f2 The probability of a success following two consecutive errors 
.f3 The probability of a success following three consecutive errors 
Note. Adapted from Howe (1991). 
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The Advnntaecs ?f Formal Modelling Procedures 
II owe ct al. (in press; also sec Howe, 1991) discussed three advantages of 
formal modelling procedures over the more traditional analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) and covariance (ANCOVA) techniques used in memory development 
research. A reiteration of their arguments follows. The first advantage is that the 
theoretical, measurement, and statistical assumptions are clearly stated with 
formal models. In addition, statistical procedures are typically used to assess 
goodness of fit of those assumptions for each data sample before testing 
hypotheses. Traditional ANCOVA procedures arc commonly utilized to 
compensate for possihle under- or overlearning effects at long-term retention 
v:hcre for instance, errors at acquisition urc used as the covariate and errors at 
retention serve as the dependent variable. In addition to controlling for residual 
lcarni ng differences, it is also believed that AN COY A procedures control for any 
other differences that may occur at acquisition and consequently influence 
retention (e.g., age or ability differences). However, unlike formal models, 
ANCOVA assumptions arc rarely tested explicitly. That is, unlike ANOVA and 
/\NCOVA, formal models nrc assessed to determine their fit to the data. It is the 
good fit of the model to the data that generates power. 
It is because ANOVA und ANCOVA are meant to be general-purpose 
analytical tools that their power is limited in comparison with formal models. 
Formal models urc designed around particular paradigms (e.g., Ebbinghaus-like 
retention experiments) and sets of theoretical issues (e.g., the contribution of 
storage and retrieval factors to forgetting and reminiscence processes). As Riefer 
and Batchelder (1988, p. 318-319) claim, a procedure ~uch as th~: ANOVA or the 
ANCOVA " ... usually (does) not permit one 10 mea~urc directly underlying 
mental variables hut instead provides a method for assessing whether cognitive 
processes act in conjunction to create differences between conditions. In this 
approach, one's cognitive theory motivates the ~eJection of experimental 
conditions, hut the theory itself is not reflected in the statistical tools used to 
analyze the experimental data." Because formal models clearly state assumptio11s 
concerning the nature of the underlying memory process (i.e .• they arc 
theoretically driven), it is possible to determine the influence of 1 hcsc proecsscs 
on observable memory performance (also sec Bogartz, 1990; I lowe, 1991; Ricfcr 
& Batchelder, 19H8). 
The second advantage of formal analyses pertains to the way individual 
differences within a condition arc treated. In 1\NCOVA, variation across 
individuals within a condition is regarded as noise and is consigned to error 
variance. However, in formal analyses, empirical information is ohwincd from 
such variation and is employed when making theoretical inferences (sec Greeno, 
James, DaPolito, & Polson, 1978; Howe, 1991; Howe, Kelland ct al., 191J2). 
The final difference between the two methods of analysis concerns the 
richness of the information extracted from the data. When goodness-of-fit tests 
show that a particular model provides an adequate account of the datcl, it is 
possible to localize effects within specific parameters. This partitioning of the 
information in the data is much more detailed and precise than that which is 
possible with standard AN COY A techniques. Part of the reason for this is that 
any l!lobal performance statistic that is subjected to an ANCOVI\ (e.g., total 
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correct) is derived from a number of parameters that typically combine in a 
complicated (and oftentimes nonlinear) fashion. In addition, data in ANCOV A 
arc treated in a purely linear fashion, as is the relationship between the covariate 
and the dependent variable. Therefore, it is not surprising to discover that 
manipulations that produce no observable differences between conditions in an 
t\NCOVA, have clear effects on parameters in more representative formal models 
(also sec Brainerd, Howe, & Desrochers, 1982). 
I lowe et al. (in press) noted that given the many differences between the 
general purpose ANCOVA procedures and the formal models, it would be 
surprising if they did not lead to different interpretations of the data under study. 
In the present experiment, the ANCOVA was used to provide a summary of the 
general trends and a traditional interpretation of the results. The trace-integrity 
model was used to give a clearer and more precise assessment of the effects of 
misinformation on preschoolers' testimony and memory. 
The Present Study: Using the Trace-Integrity Model to Examine the Dual Effects 
of Misinformation 
The Howe (1991) study has been the only investigation to date of childreiJ':; 
vulncrahility to misinformation in which the trace-integrity model has been used 
to address limitations of past research. In his studyt the initial learning and 
analytic insensitivity issues were addressed in an examination of misinformation 
effects in young children. Kindergarten and grade 2 children were presented with 
a story about a child's hirthday party and were then given information (in either 
stntcmcnt or questionnaire form) that was either consistent or inconsistent with an 
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aspect of the story's theme. A~~ter a retention interval of either two or nine days. 
the children received four recall-buffer trials without further study opportunity 
(i.e., the children were required to recall the story and then perform a short 
distractor task four times). 
Misled subjects did not report misinformation more frequently than nonmislcd 
subjects (i.e., misinformation effects were nut found). In addition, inferior recall 
of original information in the inconsistent information conditions was quite rmc, 
occurring on only one occasion in each of Howe's ( 1991) two experiments. These 
effects were related to rate of forgetting, where higher storage failure rates 
occurred in misled than nonmisled conditions. Interestingly, memory impairment 
was not related to age, indicating in this case that kindergarten children were no 
more vulnerable to memory impairment than grade 2 children. I lowe argued that 
such findings are consistent with the belief that when memory impairment ciTccts 
occur, they impact what is stored in the original trace (e.g., Loftus, lloffman, & 
Wagenaar, 1992), and with trace blending theories of memory impairment (e.g., 
Metcalfe, 1990). 
There are three possible reasons for the ahscncc of misinformation effects and 
the small memory impairing effects found in Howe's ( 1991) study. First, the 
misinformation manipulation was directed at the theme of a suhcvcnt in a story. 
The likelihood that subjects will report misled rather than original information 
apparently increases when misinformation concerns peripheral information (i.e., 
specific details of an event that arc not essential to understanding or interpreting 
the nature of an event) as opposed to central information (i.e., information 
relevant to the theme or ongoing action of an event; e.g., Dodd & Bradshaw, 
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JCJHO; Goodman ct al., 1987; King & Yuille, 1987; Yuille, 1980). Thematic 
information is ohvil1uslv very hard to disrupt, which is important because it assures 
w; that the gist of testimony is accurate. However, memory impairment and 
erroneous reporting effects may be more likely when misinformation targets the 
peripheral details of an event. 
The second reason for the relatively small effects in Howe's (1991) study may 
be the misinformation manipulation itself. In his study, children heard only a 
single stnternent or were asked a single question (that could lead to an inference) 
that was consistent or inconsistent with an aspect of the story's theme. The 
effects of misinformation may be more prevalent when children are directly 
misled ahout many items. The final reason for Howe's scarce effects may be, of 
cmJrsc, that children are in fact highly resistant to the effects of misleading 
information. 
The present experiment is an extension of Howe's (1991) study. Preschoolers 
were presented with a narrated slide sequence. Although all to-be-remembered 
peripheral story details were visually presented in the slides, only half were 
directly mentioned in the narrative. Three weeks later, preschoolers were given 
sper:fic information about ..1Jl of the 20 to-he-remembered story details. That is, 
lwll of the to-he-remembered details were specifically targeted by the postevent 
information anu half were not. In addition, half of the targeted and nontargeted 
details were mentioned in the original narrative and half were not. The postevent 
information was l!ither consistent or inconsistent with the original information. 
After a one week retention interval (four weeks since acquisition), the children 
received four recall trials without further study opportunity. 
The principal motivation for the experiment was to usc the tral:c-intcgrity 
theory and model to examine the degree to which reinstatement effects, the dual 
effects of misinformation, and preschoolers' retention in general, were controlled 
by forgetting and reminiscence processes. In addition, the model was used to 
determine whether changes in these rrocesscs were localized at storage. rl'l rit·val. 
or both. 
Consider the questions that could he answered with the trace-integrity model 
concerning the effects of exposing preschoolers to consistent information. 
Provided that reinstatement had henefits for long-term retention, it was po~~ihll' 
to determine whether reinstatement affected forgelling (i.e., whether prt·scnting 
consistent information acted to forestall or alleviate forgetting). reminiscence (i.t· .• 
whether reinstatement helped reconstruct weakened traces), or both. Jb.:au~c 
consistent information was delivered during the retention interval and not 
immediately before the retention test, the primary effect of rein~tatement w01s 
expected to he that of forestalling forgetting (i.e., affecting the 12 or B. pararncrcrs, 
or both) rather than changing reminiscence patterns (i.e., affecting the .il. r •. or J. 
values, or a combination of the three; Howe et al., in press). Given this, and the 
fact that Howe et al. (in press) found reinstatement to affect forgetting more ~o 
than reminiscence, reinstatement effects in the present experiment were expected 
to be localized at forgetting. 
It was also possible to determine whether reinstatement affectc<..l ouly the 
retrievability of traces in memory (as mcasurcu hy the parameter H). the !-.torage 
of those traces (as measured hy the parameter .,S), or hoth. There is a great deal 
of evidence that chil<.!i en's forgetting is dominated hy storage, not retrieval, 
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failure~ (e.g., Brainerd ct al., 1990; Howe, 1991; Howe, Kelland et al., 1992). 
Moreover, I lowe ct al. (in press) found that although reinstatement affected both 
~toragc and retrieval processes, the greatest effects led to inoculating long-term 
memories against storage-related forgetting. Therefore, greater beneficial effects 
were expected with the parameter .S than R when preschoolers were presented 
with consistent information. 
It was also possible to examine whether reactivating some of the features in a 
memory structure positively affected surrounding or related trace features (i.e., 
whether spread of reactivation occurred). That is, did reinst<hement of some story 
details (i.e., those details specifically mentioned in the postevent reminder) 
produce reactivation of corresponding trace features, with the result that 
reactivation spread to surrounding trace features (i.e., those details not mentioned 
in the postcvent information)'! The idea that (rc)activation of some memory 
eleml'llts can spread to other related memory elements has beer. salient in both 
episodic (e.g., Horowitz & Pryt•llak, 1969) and semantic (e.g., Collins & Loftus, 
1975) theories of long-term memory for quite some time. Because the spread of 
reactivation from targeted to surrounding or nontargeted details would help 
explain how memories arc preserved over long retention intervals, the effects of 
reinstatement on nontargctcd details were examined in the present experiment. 
Thus. the primary reasons for exposing preschoolers \n consistent information 
were to determine whether it had the beneficial effect on retention that has bl.'!en 
reported in the literature (e.g .• sec J-lowe et al., in press) and whether spread of 
reactivation effects exist. As well, it was also of interest to compare the effects of 
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including consistent information in the postcvcnt reminder with that of induding 
misleading information. 
Consider next how the trace-integrity model can he used to exnmine the dual 
effects of misinformation. Recall that exposure to a postevent reminder 
containing misinformation was expected to reactivate the original trace, thereby 
either preventing or promoting the incorporation of misinformation into the traCl' 
(or a copy of the trace). Given that the reactivation of the original lrat·e prevents 
the incorporation of misinformation into the original lrace, beneficial effects 
similar to those outlined above for consistent information were expected. 
However, given thut the reactivation promotes the incorporation of 
misinformation into the trace, it was anticipated that this would hcnefit ret·all of 
the nontargeted information hut would have memory impairing effects for the 
targeted details. If the surrounding or nontargetcd information was positively 
affected by exposure to the misinformation reminder, then recall performance of 
the nontargeted details in the misled condition should he greater than rcc:lll of 
those same details in the control condition. Any constructive effects were 
expected to be localized at forgetting, with greater alleviation of storage- than 
retrieval-based forgetting (i.e., greater beneficial effects should he ohscrvetfwilh 
the parameter .S than R). 
If misinformation impaired memory for the targeted information, then the 
trace-integrity model could be used to answer the following questions: (a) whether 
the misleading information primarily affected the storage of original information 
or whether the effects were confined to retrieval failun.:; (h) whether storage and 
retrieval-based reminiscence of the information was possible; and (c) whether 
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impairing some of the features in a memory structure negatively (or positively) 
affected surrounding or related features (i.e., whether misinformation affected not 
only the targeted information but thr nontargeted information as well). 
To understand how the model could he used to examine these questions, 
consider the two versions of the memory impairment hypothesis discussed earlier, 
namely, the single trace and separate trace hypotheses. According to either 
hypothesis, the presentation of misinformation should decrease, whether 
temporarily or permanently (in terms of the traditional storage-impairment 
theories), the probability of recalling original information. That is, misled subjects 
should recall less of the original information than nonmisled or control subjects. 
J Jowever, these hypotheses differ with respect to the reasons they give for 
forgetting and whether reminiscence of original information is possible (see also 
Howe, 1991 ). 
Recall that according to the separate trace hypothesis, the original and 
misleading information arc stored in different traces. It is claimed that forgetting 
occurs either hecausc of competition between the two responses at output, 
because the cues at test are insufficient for retrieval, because misinformation 
inhibits or suppresses original information, or some combination of the three. 
However, whatever the mechanism, because the effects of misinformation are said 
to result from retrieval failure, the model can test the veracity of the separate 
trace hypothesis. Basically, any differences in forgetting should be expressed 
primmily in changes in the value of parameter R (not S). In addition, because 
the origirml information was never destroyed, reminiscence is possible (i.e., it is 
possible to recover original information) and reminiscence differences should he 
expressed in the parameters Ii and L (not .i!). 
According to the single trace hypothesis, misinformation may either blend with 
original information (the "trace-blending" hypothesis; e.g., Belli, llJHH; Metcalfe, 
1990) or completely overwrite original infornmtion (the "overwriting" hypothesis: 
e.g., Loftus & Loftus, 1980). Consider the scenario where both original and 
mi:;leading information are blended in one tmce. Because new bonds nrc heing 
formed, some of the bonds holding the elements of the original information 
together may loosen to a point where recall of the clements arc no longer 
possible (storage failure), others may loosen to a point where clement rc<.·all is 
possible on some occasions (retrieval failure), while others may not he Hffected at 
all by this blending pro~ess. Therefore, changes should he observed in hoth 
retrieval-based forgetting (B) and reminiscence lr; and .f;) and storagc-has<.·d 
forgetting (S) and reminiscence (!!). However, the magnitu<.le of these effects 
should not be the same at storage as at retrieval; there should he at least as much 
(if not more) storage-based forgetting and reminiscence. If original inrormation is 
completely overwritten hy misinformation, then more storage-based tlmn retrieval-
based forgetting is expected (i.e., larger S than .R values). llowcver, according to 
the traditional storage-impairment view, reminiscence hcccmcs impossible, 
because original information is supposedly I· 1st forever. 
The model also made it possihle to examine whether, and the extent to which, 
the spread of the destructive effects of misinformation occurs. That is, it was 
possib1e to determine whether exposure to misinformation dampens memory of 
the entire original event and the extent of the dampening. The potential negative 
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effects of misinformation (e.g., disintegration of trace bonds) may spread from 
those trace clements that were directly targeted by the misinformation to 
surrounding clements. If this is the case, then there should he more forgetting 
(larger .S values, R values, or both) or less reminiscence (smaller l!, Ii• or ii values, 
or ~omc combination of the three), or more forgetting and Jess reminiscencet of 
both targeted and nontargetcd information in the misleading information than 
control conditions. 
Therefore, with the usc of the model's parameters, it was possible to test the 
veracity of the single and separate trace hypotheses. According to the separate 
trace hypothesis, any differences in forgetting should be expressed primarily in 
changes in the value of parameter R (not ..S), and reminiscence differences should 
he expressed in the parameters .ri and L (not ..il). According to the trace-blending 
hypothesis, both storage- and retrieval-based forgetting and reminiscence can 
occur, hut the magnitude of forgetting differences should he larger at storage (i.e., 
larger ..S than .B. values, and smaller J! than ri and i, values). However, in terms of 
the overwriting hypotheses, only forgetting is possible, with effects greater at 
storage than retrieval (i.e., larger S than R values). 
Thus, the major aim of the present study was to use the trace-integrity theory 
and model to examine the degree to which the effects of providing consistent and 
inconsistent information arc controlled by forgetting and reminiscence processes, 
mul whether these processes arc localized at stomge, retrieval, or both. However, 
other questions of interest included the following: (a) whether differences in 
initial learning (i.e., the degree of trace integration at acquisition) produce 
differences in the degree of reinstatement, erroneous reporting and memory 
impairment effects observed; (h) whether providing a testing opportunity during 
the retention interval has beneficial effects on recollection: (c) whether 
mentioning or not mentioning story details'" U the original narr:ttive and during 
postevent information produces differences in the degree of reinstatement, 
erroneous reporting, and memory impairment effects observed; and (d) whether 
the effects of reinstatement and presenting misinformation arc more prt.'valcnt 
when misleading information is presented in question rather than narrative form. 
MethodoloJtV 
Subjects 
A total of 216 children (lOR females and lOR males; mean age = 4 years, h 
months; SO = 5 months) participated in the study. All children were enroled in a 
preschool or daycare program in the St. John's or surrounding area, and consent 
was obtained from the school directors, as well as from the parents of all 
participants. 
Materials and Procedure 
The children were visited at their prcschools/daycares and were asked if' they 
would like to hear a story and help with the experimenter's homework. With 
their consent, the children were taken individually into a room in their school, 
where they engaged in friendly conversation with the experimenter until the first 
phase of the study began. 
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Initial Lcarnin~:. During the acquisition phase, the children were presented 
with a slide sequence ahout a little girl anxious to attend a Halloween party. The 
experimenter narrated (see narrative in Appendix A) as the slides were presented 
at a rate of 4-H seconds each. The children were told that they were to see some 
pictures while the experimenter told them a story and that they must pay close 
attention to both in order to answer questions that would he asked later. Only 
lwlf of the to-he-remembered details were directly mentioned in the narrative. 
That is, while all to-he-remembered story details were visually presented, half of 
the details were presented both verbally and visually. Following the slide 
presentation, the experimenter askeu specific questions about 20 story details (see 
Appendix B). The subjects were manually recorded. The children were asked to 
answer based on what they remembered seeing in the slides and they were given 
approximately 30 seconds to answer before the next question was posed. Story 
and narrative construction, as well as target detail selection, were simply based on 
the observation of a colleague's daughter preparing for a party 
l-l<llf of the children were then quasi-randomly assig•~~ .. d (attempting to keep 
the sex ratio constant) to a one-trial condition and the rernnining half to a 
criterion condition. For children in the one-trial condition, acquisition consisted 
of only one study-recall trial. Children required to reach criterion continued 
through the sequence until all 20 questions were answered correctly on two 
consecutive tests. The procedure, dependent on the condition to which the child 
had hecn randomly preassigned, was explained to each participant before the 
acquisition phase began. 
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Neither the slide sequence nor the cued recall questions were randomly 
presented. The slides of course had to he presented in the order in which they 
occurred in the story. The cued-recalled questions were not randomized so ~\s to 
avoid confusion among preschoolers as to the story's sequence of ev~nts and. 
more importantly, to avoid spurious effects. Bckcrian :11al Bowers ( 19HJ) showed 
that if subjects are systematically taken through the to-hc-rcmcmhcred event at 
test, rather than asked questions in random order, they arc more likely to recall 
the original information. Any differences in event recall that may he found in the 
present study, then, are not likely due to a lack of overlap in external retrieval 
cues between acquisition and test. However, hecausc (at lectst) two minutes 
elapsed between the time a slide was shown and the question concerning a detail 
in the slide was asked, serial position and short term memory effects were 
prevented. 
Because less information was encoded in the one-trial than criterion condition, 
there should be more storage failure, retrieval failure, or both (i.e., larger S or B. 
values) with preschoolers' recall in the former than latter condition. llowcver, 
based on previous research (e.g., Howe, 1991), initial learning was not expected to 
innuence reminiscence rates. If mentioning story details in the original narrative 
and during postevent information increased trace strength, then recall of those 
details at retention should be superior to recall of nontargcted details with oJJc-
trial learning (i.e., smaller .S or R values, or higher J!, Ii• or L values, or both 
smaller forgetting and higher reminiscence values). llowevcr, criterion recall of 
the details targeted and not targeted at hoth acquisition and during postevcnt 
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information was expected to differ little at retention, because the trace strengths 
of hoth should be very similar at the end of acquisition. 
Postcvcnl lnrormation Presentation. Following acquisition, the children were 
quasi-randomly assigned to one of the following six conditions: (a) one of two 
control conditions, where subjects were either tested for recall of origina) details 
at three weeks ami again at four weeks (control-3/4) or at 4 weeks only (control-
4); (h) one of two consistent postevent information conditions where subjects 
received this information in either narrative or questionnaire form; and (c) one of 
two misleauing postcvent information conditions where subjects received this 
information in either narrative or questionnaire form. Three weeks after 
acquisition, children in the postevent information conditions (two-thirds of the 
children) received either consistent or misleading inform~r.ion concerning 10 of 
the 20 story details tested at acquisition. That is, half of the to-be-remembered 
details were directly targeted by the postevent information and half were not (half 
of the targeted and nontargeted details were mentioned in the original narrative).4 
This information was embedded in either questions or in a narrative (see 
Appendices C and D). Children who received postevent information were told 
that hccause it had been such a long time since their initial visit., the experimenter 
was visiting again to help them rememher the story. 
The control-3/4 condition was included for three reasons. The first reason 
was to determine the state of memory for original information at the time 
postcvcnt information was presented (i.e., to determine the extent to which 
forgetting occurred). The second was to examine whether providing an additional 
test opportunity attenuates forgetting. There is much evidence that subsequent 
."i2 
test opportunities retard forgetting of information (e.g .• Allen, Mahler, & Estes, 
1968; Richardson, 1985; Runquist, 19Hfi; Slnrnecka & Katsaiti; l9~H). Thus, the 
recall performance of preschoolers in the control-3/4 condition was expected to 
be superior to the performance of preschoolers in the control-4 condition. As for 
the third reason, it was of interest to know whether reinstatement (i.e., providing 
consistent information) slows forgetting in a way similar to additional test 
opportunities. 
In terms of the consistent postevcnt information conditions, as mentioned 
earlier, reinstatement effects were expected to he localized at forgetting, 
particularly storage-based forgetting. In other words, greater beneficial effects 
should be observed with the parameter .S. than _R. Specifically, if reinstatement 
effects occur, then there should be a greater alleviation of forgetting of targeted 
story details in the consistent information conditions than in the control-4 
condition. In addition, if reactivation of targeted details spreads activation to 
nontargeted details, then recall of nontargetcd details in the consistent 
information conditions should be superior to recall of those details in the control-
4 condition. 
As for the effects of presenting inconsistent information, if presenting 
misinformation reactivates nontargeted story details, targeted story details, or 
both, then greater alleviation of storage-based forgetting is expected with the 
recall of these details in the misled conditions than in the control-4 condition. As 
well, if presenting inconsistent information increases erroneous reporting and 
memory impairment of targeted details, then there should be more intrusions 
(e.g., misinformation), and more forgetting, less reminiscence. or hoth, in misled 
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than nonmisled conditions. If such effects are more likely when memory for the 
original information is poor or nonexistent (i.e., with one-trial learning or 
nontargctcd details), then more intrusions, and more forgetting or less 
reminiscence, is expected with the recall of nontargetcd than targeted details in 
the one-trial than criterion conditions. In addition, both misled and nonmisled 
criterion conditions arc expected to show superior recall compared to both one-
trial groups. 
I previously mentioned that information presented in questionnaire format 
may reactivate the original trace more than does narrative presentation. One 
consequence of this may he that postevent information will be more strongly 
represented in the original trace when it is embedded in questions rather than in 
a narrative. If this is the case, then there should be a greater reduction of 
storage-based forgetting of, at least, targeted details when consistent information 
is embedded in questions versus in a narrative. In addition, there should be 
either more erroneous reporting, memory impairment, or both, of at least targeted 
details with questionnaire than narrative presentation of misinformation. 
Lona:-Term Retention TestinJ:. Three weeks after acquisition for the control-
3/4 group and four weeks following acquisition for all six groups, the children 
received four recall trials without further study opportunity (see Appendix B). 
Again, serial position and short-tcrtn memory effects posed no problem given that 
(nt least) one minute elapsed between consecutive presentations of the same 
question. Preschoolers were also given an opportunity to provide a second 
response to each question during each of the four test trials. They were told that 
hccause it lmd been such u long time since they :mw the slides depicting the story, 
they would be asked the same questions four times and they would havt! two 
chances each time to answer correctly. On the first trial, the experimenter 
encouraged the children to give a second response by telling them after each 
question was asked that they may give another answer "just in case the first one 
was not right". The preschoolers were then only reminded at the beginning of 
each of the next three test trials that they may provid~~ n second answer whenever 
they were unsure of their first response. Only the first two responses were 
manually recorded. 
Although reminiscence of the original details was anticipated (sec Brainerd cl 
al., 1990), reminiscence rates were not expected to vary as a function of the 
experimental manipulations (sec I-I owe, 199 I; I-I owe, Kelland ct al., 1992). Recall 
of misinformation, as well as other intrusions, was also cxp<.~ctcd to increase across 
trials, provided that this infonn~tion was incorporated into preschoolers' memory 
structure of the original event. In terms of preschoolers' retention of original 
information, recall that Zaragoza (e.g., 19H7) argued that demand characteristics 
may operate when children are asked questions ahout a witnessed event (i.e., 
although children remember the original information, they feel pressured to 
report misinformation). If this is the case, then when the preschoolers give hoth 
responses, they should report misleading information as their first response more 
often than original information. 
Scorin2 
In terms of the analyses involving the recall of original information, responses 
were scored as correct at both acquisition and retention if subjects recalled the 
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original details presented in the story. However, two different scoring systems 
were employed at retention, strict and lenient. With strict scoring, only subjects' 
first responses were scored. With lenient scoring, both responses were examined 
(i.e., suhjccts' answers were scored as correct if either the first or second response 
was the original story detail). If the effects of misinformation are due to demand 
characteristics and not memory impairment, then erroneous reporting should be 
more evident with strict than lenient scoring. 
As fur the analyses concerning intrusion production (responses other than 
original am.l misleading information), all intrusions at acquisition and retention 
were recorded and scored for their relevance to the general story script and to the 
specific question asked. Because the results of Howe's (1991) study indicated that 
intrusions were relevant to the original story, preschoolers' intrusions in the 
present experiment were expected to be germane to the original event. In 
addition h> the general analysis of intrusions, an examination was carried out 
concerning the production of misleading information during recalt of the ten 
targeted story details. For these anulyses, responses were scored as correct if 
subjects rcc:llled the misinformation. If exposure to misinformation promotes 
crroncou~~ reporting of such information, then preschoolers in the misled 
conditions should report more misleading information that those in the nonmisled 
conditiom.. More importantly, if the strength of misinformation in memory 
inrlucnccs impairment, then there should be either less forgetting (smaller S or R 
values, or both). more reminiscence (larger.!!, Ii, or ii values, or some combination 
of the three), lH both less forgetting and more reminiscence of misinformation in 
those conditions where the recall of original information is inferior. 
Results 
Analysis of the number of story detuils correctly recalled at aC<.Juisitinn 
revealed, as expected, that there were fewer details recalled with one-trial (M = 
14.28, SD = 3.31) than criterion learning (where preschoolers fccallcd all 20 story 
details) [t(214) = -17.90, .12 < .0001]. The retention data were then examined to 
determine the effects of the experimental manipulations on the production of 
original and erroneous information. In terms of the preschoolers' recall of 
original information, analyses were carried out to determine the following: (a) 
whether, and how, misinformation impaired or enhanced memory for original 
information; (b) whether reinstatement effects occurred when pres~ ~ : mlers wert~ 
given consistent postevent information or a testing session during the retention 
interval; and (c) whether the recall of original information was innuenccd by the 
degree to which this information was learned, hy the mentioning of story details 
during the original and postevent presentation, by the method of misinformution 
presentation, and by multiple test opportunities at retention. In terms of the 
preschoolers' production of erroneous information, analyses were conducted lo 
determine the following: (d) whether exposure to misinformalion encouraged the 
reporting of erroneous information (i.e., misleading information and other 
intrusions); (e) whether there were differences across the inconsistent information 
conditions with respect to the retention of misinformation; and (f) whether the 
effects of misinformation were influenced by the extent of learning of original 
information, the method of mjsinformation presentation, and multiple test 
opportunities at retention. 
The Effects of Experimental Manipulation on Original Information Recall: A 
Glohal Analyses 
Preliminary analysis of the variable, acquisition reference to story details, 
revealed no differences at retention 11etwccn the details that were mentioned 
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(M = 16.95) :uuJ not mentioned (M = 17.15) in the narrative at acquisition. This 
variable was, therefore, excluded in the subsequent analyses. In addition, because 
the preschoolers' performance did not vary with strict or lenient scoring (as 
revealed !.,y an analysis of covariance with both types of scoring methods), only 
the genera I trends for the retention t!uta obtained with lenient scoring are 
reported (for the factors and covarjatr~s. sec hclow). Tllll~i, if subjects did not 
respond correctly the first time, they were likely to he incorrect on their second 
response as well. Results arc also reported for only the four week recall 
performance in the control-3/4 condition because a series of .1-tests indicated no 
difference in long-term retention hetwecn the third and fourth week recall 
pc rforma nee~. 
The number of story details correctly recalled at retention was analyzed using 
a 2 (initial learning: one-trial vs criterion) x 6 (condition: control-3/4 vs control-4 
vs consistent nurrativc vs mislea<.li11g narrative vs ~onsistcnt questionnaire vs 
misleading questionnaire) x 2 (postcvcnt reference to story details: targeted vs 
IHH1I:1rgetcd) .li 4 (trial) unaly·.; ~, ,)f covariance. The first two factors were between 
:.;uhjct·t~. the last two were within. and mean total number of details correctly 
recalled per trial at at·quisition ~crved as the covariate. Note that the design of 
tilL' present study did not fit with traditional linear modelling techniques. The 
within suhjct·t manipulation. postevcnt reference to story details (i.e., whether 
story details were targeted or not in postcvcnt information), applied to only four 
of the six conditions. However. it was of interest to compare the recall or the 
targeted and nontargeted story det<tils in the postcvent information conditions 
with the recall of those same details in the control conditions. Th;~t is, those story 
details that were separated in the postevcnt information conditions (i.e., the 
targeted and non targeted items) were compared to the same story de tails in the 
control conditions, although no postevent information was given concerning story 
details in the control conditions. Therefore, this manipulation was treated as 
within subjects for all six conditions, although there was no actu:1l story detail 
manipulation in either control condition:' In addition to permitting comparison 
between the recall of the targeted and nontargeted story details across groups, this 
design also provided a check to ensure that the targeted and nontargcted story 
details were not intrinsically different (i.e., the control-4 condition). It was also 
possible using this design to examine reminiscence of story details, as well as any 
effects initial learning, com.lition, and postevent reference to story details had 011 
reminiscence. 
As for the results of the analysis, the covariate was significant and was 
adjusted for both between subject factors IF( I ,203) = I 04.00, 11 < .0 I, r2 == .J4, 
eta2 = .34] and for the within subject factor, postcvcnt reference to story dct:tib 
[F( 1,203) = 21.30, n < .01, r2 = .OH, eta:! = .091''. Thus, individual differences in 
the number of story details recalled at acquisition influenced recall performance 
at rett!ntion. After the rv:..!ntion scores were adjusted for learning differences, all 
four main effects were significant: initial learning [F( 1,203) = 425.01J, 11 ..-: .01, eta l. 
= .68], condition [F(5,203) = 4.1CJ, n < .0 I, cta2 = .OIJj, pmtcvcnt reference to 
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story details [f(J,203) = 25.00,.12 < .01, eta2 = .11], and trial [F(3,612) = 19.12, .J2 
< .01 , eta2 = .09]. In addition, there was one first order interaction, initial 
learning x postevcnt reference to story details [F(1,203) = 9.97, Q < .01, eta2 = 
.05]. 
One-trial subjects (M = 15.40) recalled Jess than criterion subjects (M = 
I H.70) and the recall of targeted story details (M = 17.29) was superior to the 
recall of nontargctcd details (M = 16.H1 ). Neuman-Keuls post-hoc examination 
reveulcd that the misleading questionnaire condition (M = 16.48) differed 
~ignificantly from the control-3/4 (M = 17.48) condition. It also revealed that 
retention on trial l (M = 16.88) was significantly poorer than retention on trials 2 
(M = 17.01), 3 (M = 17.11), and 4 (M = 17.20), and as well ..-etention on trial 2 
was inferior to trial 4 reter tion. 
Further examination of the initial learning x postevent reference to story 
details interaction revealed that recall of hoth targeted (M = 15.79) and 
nont:trgeted (M = 15.01) story details in the one-trial condition was inferior to 
recall of both targeted (M = 18.79) and nontargeted (M = 18.61) details in the 
criterion condition. The interaction occurred because more targeted than 
nontargctcd details were recalled in the one-trial condition, however, there was no 
recall difference hctwecn targeted and nontargcted details 1n the criterion 
<:ondition. 
To summarize the global trends, as expected, fewer story details (both 
targctc>d ami nontargctcd) were recalled in the one-trial than criterion condition. 
Although making reference to story details in the postevent information did not 
influence criterion subjects' recall (likely because their performance was near 
(t() 
ceiling), providing specific information ~1hout story details improved recall for (Jill'-
trial subjects. As anticipated, performance improved across trials and 
reminiscence rates did not differ as a function of experimental manipulation. 
Of particular interest was the apparent Jack of memory-impairing ctTcL'ts of 
misinformation. Although the misled subjects displayed the poorest retention of 
story details, their performance was not significantly different from that of the 
control-4 subjects. However, the performance of subjects in the misleading 
questionnaire condition was different from the performance of suhjccts in the 
control-3/4 condition. This difference may simply reflect the tendency that the 
three-week retention test had to improve performance at four weeks (control-4: M 
= 16.62; control-3/4: M = 17.39) and that exposure to misinformation had to 
decrease recall in the misleading questionnaire condition (M = 16.32). To better 
understand the effect that misinformation (as well as the other experimental 
manipulations) had on memory for the original event, the trace-integrity model 
was used to localize the ANCOVA effects in terms of the storage and retrieval 
loci of changes in forgetting and reminiscence. I turn now to the trace-integrity 
analysis of original information recall. 
The Effects of Expcrimcntul Manipulation on Orieinal Information Rcc~tll: The 
Trace-lnte~rity Analysis 
Application of the Model to the Data. As this is the reader's fir:,l cncountcr 
in this dissertation with the mathematics involved when applying the trace-
integrity model to retention data, the analytical steps arc described in detail. To 
determine the effect of some manipulation on the theoretical processes me<t~uretJ 
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by the model, it is necessary to first assess the fit of the model to the data and to 
ohtain numerical estimates of the parameters. Due to the theory of maximum 
likelihood, there are clearly defined methods available for parameter estimation 
and assessment of a model's fit to data. In what follows l describe the five-step 
process involved in applying the mathematical implementation of the trace-
integrity framework to data generated in long-term retention paradigms (also see 
II owe, 1991; I-I owe & Brainerd, 19H9; Howe et al., in press). 
The data space must first he converted into an empirical probability space 
and then the empirical probability space is used to derive a function that gives the 
a posteriori probability (or likelihood) of the data. The data space for four-tr ial 
experiments such as the present one consists of 16 different performance patterns: 
.C~~~. C..C:J:&1 .... , E~~:&1, E£:£:&1, where ..C signifies a correct response, 
E signifies an error, and the sub:;cripts 1-4 signify the four retention tests for each 
item. This data space is then converted into an empirical probability space by 
dcrcrmining the probabilities of each of the outcomes in the data space: 
nLC~~.&d (the probabi'ity that an item is correctly recalled on all four trials), 
.ul£J:£;:J1] (the prohabilit} that an item i" rc\.:ailed correctly on all but the last 
trial), ... , .u[E~~~] (the probability that an item is incorrectly recalled on all hut 
the last trial), .ulli~~.&d (the probability that an item is incorrectly recalled on 
all four trials). Taking advantage of the theory of maximum likelihood, the a 
posteriori probability (likelihood) of any sample of data can be expressed in a 
function that has 15 degrees of freedom and takes the form, 
L .. ~ = nl.C~£~1~wccc·, x .nl.CJ:~:&tlr-:'nTn, x ... x .12LE&~~lN!EEECJ x 
n[E E E E ]l\'JEEEEI. (1) -¥--~3-~1 
The base of each term refers to the prohahility that the event occurred t~nd the 
exponent refers to the frequency with which the event occurred. 
The second step involves translating this empirical probability space into a 
mathematical probability space and then obtaining the theoretical likelihood 
function corresponding to the mathematical space. To achieve this, the 16 
empirical probabilities are expressed in terms of the model's parameters. (Hcfer 
to Table 2 for a display of the theoretical probabilities for each of the empirical 
events obtained with this procedure.) This mapping procedure is significant in 
that it transforms the typically unobservable theoretical events that underlie 
memory performance into observable or measurable units. To derive the 
theoretical likelihood function, the equations in Table 2 (signified hclow in 
Equation 2 by the term .h) are simply substituted for the 16 terms in Equation I. 
The resulting function has 9 degrees of freedom (because only 9 parameters 
comprise the 16 expressions) and takes the form, 
b = .h(n[.C~£~])NICC'CC( X .h(n~~£&df'\(('('('lq X ... 
x nenrnJhE~,r~w~:Eq x nwm£2LhE.1JNWI~E· ('· (2) 
The third step in applying the mndel to <.lata consists of counting the number 
of times each of the 16 events occur in the sample <.lata ami substituting tht:sc 
numbers for the corresponding exponents in Equation 2. Then a standard 
computer optimization routine (e.g., SIMPLEX) i~ usc<.! to maximize the function. 
The optimum solution produces the value of the likelihood function 1_ .. 1 as well as 
numerical estimates for the model's 9 parameters. The l"J value (which is 
typically calculated using the log transform -21nLJ) is then uscu to assess the 
goodness of the model's fit to the data (step 4) and to test hypotheses concerning 
differences between parameter estimates hoth between and within experimental 
treatments (step 5). 
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Step four consists of assessing whether the model provides a satisfactory 
representation of the sample data. To achieve this, Equation 1 is maximized 
(using the log transform -21n) with the same data as was used with Equation 2, 
producing an estimate of the likelihood of the data before the model was 
intro<.luced (i.e., with 15 degrees of freedom, L15). The estimated value of L15 will 
always be the maximum likelihood for that set of data because all of the available 
information in the data are exhausted in Equation ]. The estimated likelihood of 
Equation 2 will always he a little smaller because the trace-integrity moue] does 
not exhaust all the available information (i.e., it only has 9 degrees of freedom, 
not 15). To evaluate goodness of fit, likelihood ratio tests are used that 
determine whether or not this difference is statistically significant. The null 
hypothesis that the trace-integrity model fits the data is evaluated with the 
following test, 
X2(6) = (-21nL9)- (-2lnL15) (3) 
For the data in the present analysis refer to Tables 3 and 4 for the numerical 
results of these goodness of fit tests, where the data were scored with strict and 
lenient methods, respectively. Because there was close agreement with the model 
and the d&lta for both scoring methods (there were only two rejections in Table 3 
and no rejections in Table 4), the model provided an acceptable account of th::-se 
data. 
Table 2 




















( 1-:S)( 1-R )I~:i3 
(1-.S)(1-R).r~2( 1-.r3) 
( 1-..S)( 1-_R).rr(l·.rz)fr 
(1-..S)( 1-R)( 1-r1 }.fj.(, 
Sa(1-R).r~2 + ( 1-.S)Rf ~~1 
(1-..S)( 1-R).r1( l-r2)(1-.fr) 
(1-..S)( 1-R)( 1-r, ).f1( t-.rr) 
Sa(1-R).r1(l-r2) + (1-.S)Rf~ 1 (1-r2) 
(1-.S)( 1-R)( 1-.r1 )( 1-fr).fz 
Sa( 1-R )( 1-r1).f, + ( 1-.S) Rf1 ( 1-r, ).f1 
..5.(1-l!)a( l-R).r1 + SaRf ~~ + ( 1-S)R( 1-.f1 )Lr1 
(1-.S)(1-R)(l-.r1)( 1-f1)( 1-£2) 
Sa(l-R)( l-.r1)(1-£1) + ( l-.S)Rf1( 1-.r,)( 1-£1) 
..S.(1-_i!)a(l-R)(1-.r1) + SaRf1(1-.r1) + (I-S)R(I-_f1)_f2(1-.r1) 
.S(l-.!!)2.!!(1-R) + .S{l-_i!)aRf1 + SaR(l-.f1)_f2 + (I-.S)l~(l -_f 1 )(1-J2)J1 
.S(l-.llf + .S(l-.ll)2aR + .S(I-J!)aR(I-.f1) + SaR(l-.f1)(1-.f2) + 
(1-.S)R( 1-.f1 )(1-_f2)( 1-£3) 
Note. C = correct response; E = incorrect response. Each probahility in the left 
column appears in the empirical likelihood function. In the likelihootl function 
for the trace-integrity model, these probabilities arc replaced by the corresponding 
expression in the right column. Adapted from I lowe ( 1991 ). 
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Testing hypotheses about the theoretical processes underlying memory is 
carried out in the fifth and final step. Due to their identifiability (see Howe & 
Brainerd, 1989), the model's parameters can he used to test hypotheses involving 
between-condition and within-condition differences in forgetting and reminiscence 
rates, as well as the storage and retrieval loci of these differences. The statistical 
process for testing hypotheses is simple and consists of a series of ~ikelihood-ratio 
tests referred to as an experimentwise test, conditionwise tests, and parameterwise 
tests. Before these tests were used to examine the preschoolers' forgetting and 
reminiscence of original information, the model was used to determine whether 
the number of hypotheses to he tested could he reduced. That is, first it was 
determined whether memory impairment was more prevalent when the data were 
scored with the strict than lenient criterion (i.e., whether two sets of analyses were 
required). Then it was determined whether providing a testing opportunity during 
the retention interval benefited the recall of original information (i.e., whether 
there were differences between the two control conditions). 
The Role Played by Social Pressure: Analysis or Str:ct versus Lenient Scoring. 
Recall that the motivation for using the two scoring methods was to determine 
whether permitting two responses during question answering rather than one 
i nnucnccd the degree to which memory impairment effects were found. That is, 
previous findings of memory impairment (e.g., Ceci et al., 19R7a) may have been 
the result of the pressure young children felt to report misinformation when only 
a single response was permitted, despite the fact that they also remembered the 
original information (e.g., see Zaragoza, 19H7). If this was the case in the present 
study. then the prcschooiNs may have had a tendency to report misinformation as 
Ml 
Table 3 
Statistical Adequacy of the Trace-Integrity Model for Strict Scoring 
Condition -21nL1 -21nL15 xz( ()) 
1-Tria\ Learning 
Control-3/4 Targeted 481.56 479.22 2.34 
Non targeted 4~0.59 47S.R2 4.77 
Control-3/4 Targeted 425.82 409.41 16.41 
Non targeted 497.50 491JB 5.67 
Control-4 Targeted 481 .20 4H0.7H .42 
Nontargeted 400.63 39H.7H I.HS 
Consistent Narrative Targeted 384.91 379.0~ 5.K1 
Non targeted 446.65 440.95 5.70 
Misleading Narrative Targeted 442.90 434.H4 !Ulll 
Non targeted 49H.07 4H9.95 H-12 
Consistent Questionnaire Targeted 420. 11 403.97 I h. 14 
Nontargetcd 470.65 45K55 12.10 
Misleading Questionnaire Targeted 414.07 410. I I 3.96 
Nontargetcd 509.H6 507.43 2.43 
Criterion Learning 
Control-3/4 Targeted 243.25 215.1H 2H.07* 
Non targeted 263.7H 246.57 17.2P 
Control-3/4 1 argcted lSO.HO 150.25 .55 
Non targeted 34fi.H9 33X.41 H.4X 
Control-4 Targeted 272.33 2()9,01 3.32 
Nontargeted 311.57 304.6H 6J·W 
Consistent Narrative Targeted 284.30 270.99 13.31 
Nontarge tcd 3X0.27 379.95 .32 
Misleading Narrative Targeted 365.94 364.41 1.53 
Nontargetcd 345.22 343.34 I. XX 
Consistent Questionnaire Targeted 294.H3 2H5.24 9.5lJ 
Nontargetcd 325.53 325.25 .2X 
Misleading Questionnaire Targeted 449.23 445.79 3.44 
Nontargeted 41 3.HO 413.09 .71 
Note. In order to demonstrate goodness of fit the X2(l!) value must not exceed 
16.81, *.n < .01. 
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TaoJe 4 
Statistical Adequacy of the Trace-Integrity Model for Lenient Scoring 
Condition -21n~ -21nL15 X2(6) 
1-Trial (..earning 
Control-3/4 Targeted 469.76 462.53 7.23 
Non targeted 467.71 462.96 4.75 
Control-3/4 Targeted 418.91 404.99 13.92 
Non targeted 469.33 461.12 8.21 
Contro!-4 Targeted 478.18 476.26 1.92 
Nontargeted 392.14 390.45 1.69 
Consistent Narrative Targeted 366.87 366.60 .27 
Nontargeted 412.40 403.66 8.74 
Misleading Narrative Targeted 437.74 430.71 7.03 
Nontargeted 455.07 453.45 1.62 
Consistent Questionnaire Targeted 420.11 403.96 16.15 
Nontargeted 453.93 440.21 13.72 
M islcauing Questionnaire Targeted 416.38 409.44 6.94 
Non targeted 488.50 478.87 9.63 
Criterion Lcmning 
Control-~.'4 Targeted 173.07 160.16 12.91 
Nontargeted 194.56 185.49 9.07 
Control-3/4 Targeted 125.02 124.69 .33 
N ontargcted 297.25 289.72 7.53 
Controt-4 Targeted 240.97 237.68 3.29 
Nontargetcd 263.18 254.40 8.78 
Consistent Nmrative Targeted 248.64 247.57 1.07 
Nontargeted 348.64 346.79 1.85 
Misleading Narrative Targeted 321.13 315.90 5.23 
Nontargetc<.J 268.29 259.11 9.18 
Consistent Questionnaire Targeted 249.83 239.93 9.90 
N ontargeted 253.92 253.1~ .80 
Misleading Questionnaire Targeted 414.79 411.74 3.05 
N ontargeted 338.85 330.90 7.95 
Note. In order to demonstrate goodness of fit the X2{6) value must not exceed 
16.81. *n < .o1. 
their first response rather than originnl information. Recall of original 
information, then, should have been poorer when the data were scored with the 
strict rather than the lenient criterion. 
A conditionwise test, which is similar to a 1-tcst, was used to cv;.1luatc the null 
hypothesis that the parameters' numerical values did not vary between the strict 
and lenient scoring methods. The numerical results of these X2(9) tests. which 
are provided in Table 5, indicated that the results did no! vary with scoring 
method. Therefore, the original information was not merely considered a sct·oru.l 
choice by preschoolers; when they reported original information. they gave it as 
their first response. This indicated that the preschoolers, probably hecause they 
were given two opportunities to respond, did not feel pressured to report 
misinformation before original information. 
The data obtained with the lenient scoring were chosen for further analysis 
because there were no rejections when the model's fit was evaluated, and because 
it provideu a more conservative test of the hypotheses examined in this 
dissertation. The numerical estimates of the model's parameters ohlaincd with 
lenient scoring are displayc;d in Tuble 6. llypothcscs testing of these data began 
with the experimentwise test, which is similar to the omnihus F-tcst. The 
experimentwise test is used to examine the null hypothesis that. on average, the 
model's parameters do not differ hctween conditions. The result of this X2 tc-;t 
revealed that the null hypothesis could he rejected [X2(243) = J27HJH, n < .01 ). 
Because the experimentwise hypothesis was rejected, a series of conditionwi~c 
tests was used to determine which pair(s) of conditions differed with respect to 
the model's parameters. Due to the large numher of comparisons of interc~t and 
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the conseq'JCntly large number of conditionwise tests, the next series of analyses 
determined whether it was necessary to include both control groups (i.e., control-
3/4 and cnntrol-4) in all subsequent conditionwise comparisons. 
l,rior Tests and the Alleviation of For"cltin~:. Recall that one of the reasons 
for including the control-3/4 condition was to determine whether a testing 
opportunity during the retention interval aided preschoolers' reca11 of the original 
event, as has been reported in past studies (e.g., Howe, Kelland et al., 1992; see 
Hichardsnn, 1985 for a review). Additional interests were to determine the state 
of memory when postevent information was given at three weeks, as well as to 
<:nmpare the effects of pievious testing with any effects arising from the 
presentation of postevent information. 
J\ total of 12 X2(9) conditionwisc tests were used to evaluate whether the 
numerical values of the parameters differed between the control conditions. Fot1r 
tests were used to compare the three week retention performance with the four 
week performance of control-3/4 subjects. Four tests were used to compare the 
three week performance of CO'itrol-3/4 subjects with the performance of subjects 
in the contrnl-4 condition. As well, 4 tests were used to compare the control-3/4 
subjects' retention at four weeks with the retention of subjects in the control-1 
condition. All comparisons were insignificant (refer to Table 7). Because there 
were no difrcrences between the control conditions, the traditional control, 
<:ontrol-4, was used in the subsequent conditionwise and parameterwise tests. To 
reiterate, retention performance at four weeks did not differ from performance a 
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Table 5 
Conditionwise Test Results For Strict Versus Lenient Scoring 
Condition -21nLJ -21nL111 x' ' -~ ~ , ~~ 
l·Trial Learning 
Control3&4 Targeted 940.01 9JR32 1.69 
Non targeted 94H.73 94H.30 .43 
Control3&4 Targeted H47.03 H44.73 2.30 
Non targeted 967.69 966.H3 .Xh 
Control4 Targeted 963.50 959.3H 4.12 
Nontmgeted 793.67 792.77 .90 
Consistent Narrative Targeted 753.49 75 1.7H 1.71 
Nontargeted H61.70 HS9.05 2.hS 
Misleading Narrative Targeted HH2.72 HX0.64 2.0H 
Nontargeted 954.0H 95 I. i·l 2.94 
Consistent Questionnaire Targeted H40.22 H40.21 .01 
Nontargctcd 925.0H 924.5H . .so 
Misleading Questionnaire Targeted H33JH H30.45 2.93 
Non targeted 1002.12 <J<JH.3(> 3.7(1 
Criterion Learning 
Control3&4 Targeted 416.32 411.13 5.1 <) 
Nontargeted 463.95 4SH.34 5.61 
Control3&4 Targeted 276.H3 275.H2 1.01 
Nontargetcd 645.56 644.14 1.42 
Contro14 Targeted 516.21 513.30 2.91 
Nontargete r1 57H.H7 574.75 4.12 
Consistent Narrative Targeted 535.HH 532.94 2.94 
Nontargc ted 723.:W 721.41 1.9H 
Misleading Narrative Targeted 6H7.0H 6H4.07 3.01 
Nontargeted 620.1JK 613.51 7.47 
Consistent Questionnaire Targeted 546.75 544.M 2.09 
Nontarge ted SH7.2S 579.45 7.HO 
Misleading Questionnaire Targeted H66.31 H(,4.02 2.21) 
Nontargetcd 746.H3 742.65 4.1H 
Note. In order to reject the null hypothesis the value in the X2(1J) column must 
exceed 21.67 (12 < .01). 
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Table 6 
E!-.timatcs of the Trace-Integrity Mode~'s Theoretical Parameters for Original 
Information Recall 
Condition s R 1! .r, .[2 1::~ .fl £2 i3 
1-Trial l..carning 
Control-4 
Targeted .42 .20 .02 .90 .99 .99 .49 .26 .22 
Non targeted .3() .31 .02 .96 .99 .99 .2r .00 .03 
Consistent Narrative 
Targeted .37 .04 .05 .99 1.00 .98 .97 .03 .98 
Nontargeled .36 .17 .00 .94 .9H .99 .30 .29 .00 
Misleading Narrative 
Targeted .39 .00 .02 .H9 .9H .98 .36 .33 .96 
Nontargetcd .47 .1"1 .00 .HH .98 .96 .51 .53 .00 
Consistent Questionnaire 
Targeted .20 .21 .00 .93 .98 .99 .25 .14 .00 
Nontargdcd .29 .35 .00 .91 .94 1.00 .21 .10 .00 
Misleading Ouestiomwire 
Targeted .25 .30 .03 .90 1.00 1.00 .20 .00 .03 
Nontargeted .4H .17 .00 .8H .88 1.00 .43 .48 .00 
Criterion I .earning 
Corurol-4 
Targeted .06 .08 .00 .98 .99 1.00 .57 .14 .00 
Non targeted .07 .10 .00 .99 .99 1.00 .So .23 .18 
Consistent Narrative 
Targeted . 10 .02 .14 .99 .98 .98 .72 .00 .93 
Nontargctcd .15 .05 .I I .96 .99 .99 .82 .00 .00 
Misleading Narrative 
Targeted .08 .10 .59 .96 .99 .99 .39 .00 .00 
Non targeted .08 .07 .00 .99 .97 1.00 .79 .97 .00 
Consistent Questionnaire 
Targeted .07 .04 .27 .97 .99 .99 .58 .00 .00 
Non targeted .08 .09 .13 .98 1.00 1.00 .47 .00 .00 
Misleading Quc!'tionnaire 
Targeted .13 .07 .00 .92 .9() .98 .49 .24 .46 
Nontargeted .12 .07 .00 .96 .99 .99 .76 .44 .64 
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week earlier for control-3/4 subjects. In addition, neither the third nor fourth 
week performance of control-3/4 subjects differed from the performance of 
control-4 subjects. Interestingly, these results appear inconsistent with previous 
studies (e.g., Howe, Kelland eta!., 1992; sec Rich<mlson, 19X5 for a review) 
because an interpolated test during the retention interval did not lead to 
abatement in forgetting. That is, preschoolers' fourth week performance in the 
control-3/4 condition was not significantly different from preschoolers' 
performance in the control-4 condition. However, there was no evidenn~ 1 hat a 
prior test attenuated forgetting because there was little forgetting of story tktails 
between the third and fourth week of retention (i.e., there was little forgetting to 
alleviate). Despite the insignificant outcome, recall th:tt there was a tendency 
(refer to the previous ANCOVA results) for preschoolers who received a 
retention test at three weeks to recall more story details at four weeks ( M = 
17.39) than preschoolers who received no subsequent information or testing 
during the retention interval (M = 16.62). 
Not only was there little forgetting of story details from the third to fmtrth 
week of retention, there was very little forgctt;ng three weeks after acquisition. 
The one-trial subjects recalled an average of 14.2H story details at acquisition and 
15.58 details during the third week of retention, and the criterion subjects recalled 
19.22 details at three weeks (of course, they recalled all 20 story details at 
acquisition). If the memory-impairing effects of misinformation depend upon the 
forgetting of original story details (i.e., a poor or weak trace of the original event), 
then the preschoolers' lack of forgetting of story details would explain the 
apparent absence of memory impairment effects obtained with the ANCOVA. 
Precis of the Conditionwise Test Results. As for the next step in the analysi~. 
conditionwisc tests were used to examine the preschoolers' forgetting and 
reminiscence of the original information. A total of 52 X 2(tJ) conditionwisc tc~ts 
were used to locate the origin of the cxpcrimcntwisc dilfcrcncc, 10 for the 
potential initial learning effects, 32 for the potential condition effects, anu 10 for 
Table 7. 
Comlitionwise Tests Used to Compare Control-3/4 and Control-4 
Comparison 
1-Trinl Lcnrning 
Controi-J/4 vs. Control-3/_4 
Controi-J/4 vs. Control-4 
Control-3/..1 vs. Control-4 
Crilcl"ion Learning 
Controi-.J/4 vs. Control-3/_4 
Controi-:J/4 vs. Control-4 

















Note: In order to reject the null hypothesis the values in the targeted 
details anu nontargetcd details columns lthe X2(9) statistics] must exceed 
21.67, *n < .o 1. 
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the potential postevent reference to story details effects. The numeri<.·al results of 
these tests are given in Tables 8a and 8h. 
The results of the tests revealed that the experimcntwisc difference was due 
primarily to initial learning, in which all lO wmparisons were signifkant. That is, 
the effects of condition and postcvcnt reference to story details were quite small. 
In terms of the condition effects, recall that more forgclling. less reminiscence, or 
both was expected in the misleading information conditions than in the control-4 
condition, if misinformation impaired memory for the targeted details. or the 
eight possible comparisons, only one was significant, namely the comparison 
involving the recall of nontargcted details in the one-trial misleading 
questionnaire condition. Thus, the destructive effects of misinformation on 
original information were rare. 
Also expected were reinstating effects of providing postcvent information, 
particularly when the information was consistent with the original information. 
That is, the alleviation of storage-based forgetting was anticipated when recalling 
nontargeted details in the inconsistent information conditions and when recalling 
targeted and possibly nontargeted details in the consistent information conditions. 
Although there were no significant positive effects of providing inconsislent 
information for the recall of targetc<l details as expected, there was a significant 
difference in the forgetting of nontargcted story details between the onc~trial 
misleading questionnaire condition and the control-4 condition. Only two or lhe 
possible eight comparisons concerning consistent information were significant, 
namely that involving the one-trial and criterion subject~' recall of targeted details 
that were presented in narrative form. The significant effect concerning 
Table Ha. 
Conditionwise Tests for Initial Learning, Condition, and Postevent Reference to 


















Misleading Information Effects (vs. Control-4) 
1-Trial Learning 
Misleading Narrative 16.51 
Misleading Questionnaire 10.72 
Criterion Learning 
Misleading Narrative 8.36 
Misleading Questionnaire 18.31 
Consistent Information Effects (vs. Control-4) 
1-Trial Lemni ng 
Consistent Narrative 21.74* 
Consistent Questionnaire 15.74 
Criterion Learning 
Consistent Narrative 24.49* 
Consistent Questionnaire 7.52 














































Conditionwise Tests for Initial Learning, Condition, and Postcvcnl Rcfcrcm·c to 
Story Details Effects Continued 
Effect 




















Note. Values are x~(9) statistics that arc significant at •.u < .0 I (2 1.(,7). 
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presentation of consistent information in narrative form to one~trial learners was 
responsible for the only reliable comparison between consistent and misleading 
information, that involving narrative presentation of targeted details to one~trial 
learners. 
In terms of the manipulation involving presentation method, the differences 
that had been anticipated between the narrative and questionnaire presentation 
methods were also nonexistent. The effects of presenting consistent or misleading 
information to either one-trial or criterion learners did not differ as a function of 
the type of presentation. 
As for the manipulation of referencing story details during postevent 
information, only one of the ten comparisons proved reliable, namely that 
involving the onc~trial misleading questionnaire comparison. That is, consistent 
with the ANCOVA findings, there was no difference between the recall of the 
targeted amJ nontargeted details with criterion subjects (there were, however, 
ceiling effects). Although the ANCOV A results indicated that one~trial subjects 
recalled more targeted than nontargett!d details, this effect was apparently due to 
a performance difference in the misleading questionnaire condition only. In other 
words, only one-trial subjects presented with inconsistent information in 
questionnaire form exhibited a recall difference between targeted and nontargeted 
details. This outcome was a consequence of the poorer recall of the nontargeted 
details in the one~trial misleading qucstionnnire condition than in the control~4 
comli t ion. 
Another issue of interest concerning the postevent refeience to story detail 
manipulation was whether the effects of manipulating story details, be they 
positive or negative, spread to other to-he-rcmcmh~rcd details. llowcvcr, there 
was no evidence of a spreading of such effects, probably hccausc targeting story 
details with consistent or inconsistent information had little constructive or 
destructive effects. 
7S 
To summarize the results of the conditionwisc comparisons, the Ion .. of the 
experimentwise difference was at initial learning. Although the effects of 
condition were not prevalent, there was indication that, under certain 
circumstances, both inconsistent and consistent inform,1tion may innucncc 
preschookrs' memory of the original l'!vcnt. In the last phase of this analysis, 
parameterwise tests were used to examine further the effects of providing 
misinformation in questi~>nnaire form to one-trial subjects, the effects of providing 
consistent information in narrative form to one-trial and criterion subjects, aml as 
well the effects of manipulating initial learning. Each of the pararnetcrwise tests 
evaluates the null hypothesis that a particular parameter has the same value for 
two cor-.Jitions. Because these X2( I) tests arc both space ~ind time consuming to 
report, only a summary of the significant effects is provided below. 
The Dual Effects of Misinformation. If the presentation of misinformation 
had constructive or destructive effects on original information in the present study, 
then there should have been differences in the forgetting rates, reminiscence 
rates, or both between the misled and nonmislcd conditions. llowevcr, as just 
mentioned, the only significant effect involved the recall of nontargetcd dci~Jils by 
one-trial subjects between the control-4 and misleading questionnaire conditions. 
Examination of this effect with paramctcrwisc tests revealed that, in terms or 
forgetting, there was more storage failure (as measured by the parameter S) and 
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Jess retrieval failure (as measured by the parameter R) in the misleading 
questionnaire (S = .4H, R = .17) than in the control-4 (.S = .36, R = .31) 
condition. Although the effects of misinformation on original information were 
not pervasive, misinformation may have the putential to destructively and 
constructively affect original information. That is, these results indicate that 
misleading information may alter the storage of nontargeted story details; there 
were more nontargeted story details unavailable for recu.ll in the one-trial 
misleading questionnaire condition than in the control-4 condition. Interestingly 
however, retrieval of those nontargett>d story details that were available was more 
likely in the misleading information condition than in the control-4 condition. 
Therefore, exposure to misinformation appeared to weaken the trace bonds of 
some nontargcted details to a point where they were no longer available for 
recall, as well as strengthen the bonds of some of those nontargeted details that 
were available. Thus, misleading information may have had both constructive and 
destructive effects on those story details that were not targeted by the 
mi!'information (at least for one-trial learners presented with misinformation in 
qucstiomwirc form). 
As for reminiscence, there was no difference in storage-hased reminiscence 
(as measured hy the parameter .n) of nontargeted details between the misleading 
questionnaire and control-4 conditions for one-trial learners. However, there 
were a few differences hetween the two conditions with respect to retrieval-based 
reminiscence of nontnrgctcd details. Concerning success-contingent reminiscence 
(as measured hy the Ii parameters), the average probability of retrieving 
nontargctcd details on the first trial and the average subsequent probabilitie~ in 
~0 
the control-4 and misleading questionn:tirc conditions were ( 1-R) = .69 • .r1 = .9''· 
.!2 = .99,r3 = .99, and (1-~ 1 = .83, 1 1 = .88.12 = .HH,I3 = 1.00, respectively. 
Because the probability of successful recall increased across trials, success-
contingent re"miniscence occurred in both conditions (although performance 
reached ceiling in the control-4 condition by the second trial). Thl· only 
significant difference between the two conditions concerned the parameter r~; 
there was a smaller chance of a success following two consecutive successes in the 
misleading questionnaire (.!2 = .88) than in the control-4 (r2 = .99} condition. 
In terms of error-contingent reminiscence (as measured by the L parameters). 
the average probability of failing to retrieve nontargeted details on the first trial 
and the subsequent probabilities of success following one error, and two nnd three 
consecutive errors in the control-4 and misleading questionnaire conditions were 
R = .31, i 1 = .20, i2 = .00, i3 :::: .03, and .R = .17, .f1 = .43, Jz = .48, _f3 = .00, 
respectively. Error-contingent reminiscence, then, tended to decline across tdals 
in both conditions. There were, however, a few differences between conditions. 
Specifically, there was a greater probability of success following one error and two 
consecutive errors in the misleading questionnaire <L = .43 and _(2 = .4H) than in 
the controJ.'l condition (i1 = .20 and 12 = .00). Thus, the preschoolers in the 
misleading questionnaire condition apparently learned more from previous errors 
than previous successes. 
To summarize, the locus of retention tliffercnces between the one-trial 
misleading questionnaire and the control-4 conditions was at forgetting (i.e., there 
were differences in both storage- and rctricval-hascd forgetting). There were no 
systematic differences between learning conditions with storagc-ha!-1~ d 
reminiscence. ! lowever, there was some evidence that preschoolers exposed to 
misinformation after one-trial learning wen.: more likely to learn to retrieve 
nontargctcd story details following an incorrect rather than a correct response. 
Of great interest was the lack of memory impairment of the original event; 
preschoolers appeared to he quite resistant to the memory impairing effects of 
misinformation. However, there was also some evidence that misinformation, 
under ccrt;tin circumstances, may not only impair particular features of the 
original memory trace, hut may also simultaneously enhance retrieval or other 
features in that trace. That impairment of the original memory may have 
occurred in the present study is consistent with the trace-blending hypothesis 
discussed earlier. Recall that according to this hypothesis, both storage- and 
retrieval-based forgetting and reminiscence can occur, but that the magnitude of 
the differences should he larger at storage. Although there was no evidence of 
retrieval-based forgetting, the results are most consistent with the trace-blending 
theory. Thus, when preschoolers with one-trial learning were asked questions 
containing misinformahon, the misleading information may have been 
incorporated into the trace containing original information, with the result that 
some of the nontargcted details underwent st()rage-based forgetting. 
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That storage-based forgetting as well as the alleviation of retrieval-based 
forgetting occurred in a misled condition is consistent with the thesis proposed 
earlier concerning the potential of misinformation to have dual effects on 
memory. What was somewhat surprising, however, was that these effects involved 
the recall or nontargeted rather than targeted details. That is, there were no 
constructive or destructive memory effects for those details that were targeted by 
the misinformation. To summarize, the effects thai mi~information had on 
original memory were small. However, misinformation may possess the ability to 
constructively and destructively affect particular details of un event (i.e., those 
details that are not encountered again during the retention interval). 
To understand why performance was inferior with only the recall of the 
nontargeted story details in the one-trial misleading <}ucstinnnairc condition, it 
was important to know whether there were differences across conditions in the 
degree to which misinformation was rcprcscnte<l in memory. Before I turn to the 
analysis of misinformation recall, a discussion nf the effects concerning the 
presentation of consistent information and the manipulution of initial learning is 
presented. 
Rcinstatin&: Effects of Consistent Information, If providing consistent 
postevent information reinstated the original event and thereby enlwnccd the 
recall of original information, then there should have hcen either greater 
alleviation of forgetting, more reminiscence, or hoth in these conditions as 
compared to the control-4 condition. Recall however, that such effects were rare. 
The only significant differences found were between the control-4 anti the 
consistent narrative conditions with both one-trial and criterion recall of targeted 
details. 
With one-trial learning, pre!'droolers experienced less retricvaf·hased 
forgetting of targeted story details (as measured hy the parameter .B.) in 1he 
consistent narrative (R = .04) than in the control-4 lli = .20) condition. In terms 
of reminiscence, there were no systematic differences between conditions in either 
storage-based or success-contingent rctricval-hascd reminiscence (as measured hy 
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the parameters 1! and Ii• respectively). Although learning to retrieve targeted 
tlctails hftcr previous succes!-:es increasetl across the first three trials in the 
control-4 condition (1-R = .80, Lt = .90, 12 = .99, .r3 = .99), this was not the case, 
because of ceiling effects, in the consistent narrative condition (1-R = .96 r 1 = 
.<J9, r2 = 1.00, r 3 = .98). 
Error-contingent retrieval-based reminiscence tended to decline across trials in 
the control-4 contlition ill. = .20, f 1 = .49, f 2 = .26, .f.~ = .22). Such a decline was 
also evident in the consistent narrative condition until the last trial, at which there 
was a significant increase in reminiscc:1ce (R = .()4, it = .97, f2 = .03, f 3 = .98). 
There was a greater chance of a sucress following one error and three consecutive 
errors in the consistent narrative than in the control-4 condition (f1 = .97 and .49, 
respectively; f3 = .98 and .22, respectively). Thus, providing consistent 
information in narrative form to preschoolers with one-trial learning appeared to . 
help alleviate retri ial-hased forgetting of targeted story details as well as to aid 
error-contingent retrieval relearning of those details. 
Differences between the consistent narrative and the control-4 conditions "R 
tat·•· ·ted detail recall by the preschoo'zrs who had learned to criterion were 
confined to reminiscence. Restorage of story details was more likely when the 
preschoolers received consistent information during the retention interval U! = 
.14) than when they received no information at all U! = .00). In terms of success-
contingent reminiscence, because performance was so high on the first trial, there 
wns little evidence of this type of reminiscence in either the control·4 ( l·R = .92, 
It = .tJH. r 2 "" .99, .r3 = 1.00) or the consistent narrative condition (1-R = .98, .r1 "" 
.99, J: :-:: .98, 1:3 = .98), and consequently th,~re were no diiTcrcnccs he tween 
conditions. 
Error-contingent reminiscence tc,H.Icd to decline across trials with the 
preschoolers in the control-4 condition (R = .OR • .(1 = .57, .f2 = .14, .f_, = .00). 
Although there was also a tendency for reminiscence to decline across trials in the 
consistent information condition, there was a large increase in errnr-contingcnt 
reminiscence from the third to the fourth trial (R = .02, .f1 = .72, .f2 ~ .00, ! 1 = 
.93). Because of this, the only systematic difference between conditions involved 
the parameter .f3• Suhjects were more likely to respond correctly following three 
errors with the consistent narrative presentation than with no postcvent 
presentation (f3 = .93 and .00, respectively). Therefore, providing cousi:;tent 
information in narrative form to preschoolers who had learned to ,.:ritcrion 
basically helped maintain targeted story details in memory, :1s well as enhance 
retrieval of those details after previous errors. 
To summarize the effects of providing consistent infmmation, exposure to the 
original story details that were presented in narrative form to one-trial lcamers 
appeared to nelp alleviate retrieval-based forgetting and to aid error-contingent 
retrieval relearning. Consistent information in narrative form ~tlso helped 
preschoolers who had learned to criterion maintain targeted story details in 
memory as well as retrieve these story details after previous errors. The locu~ of 
the effects of providing consistent information in narrative forrr• ms, therefore, at 
retrieval. 
The Effects of De(:rce of Initial Lcarnin&! on Retention. Recall that the 
primary reason for manipulating initial learning Wt:'\ to determine whether 
differences in the degree of learning produced differences in the degree of 
reinstatement, memor~: impairment and crron~:ous reportmg dkcts obst'r\'t'.l. 
Interestingly, there was no interaction between initial learning and condition with 
the recall of t>riginal information. That is, potential differences in trace :-.trL·ngth 
in and of itself l!id not appear sufficient for reinstatement or memory impairmenl. 
However, therr. wa!. indication from the results discus~cd above, that a poor or 
weak trace, although not sufficient, m;1y make memory im)airmcnt more likely. 
Despite the lack of an initial le<trning x condition interaction, tlll.'re was 
evidence, not surprisingly, that the extent of learning of the original informatinn 
influenced the retention of that information. Recall that hccau!-.e one-trial 
learning is thought to produce weaker traces than criterion learning, retention 
differences between the two learning Cl>mlitions were expected to he localized at 
forgetting, primarily stomge-hased forgelling. This was the case. /\!though 
manipulating initial learning affected both forgetting and reminiscence prm: ~.:~ses , 
forgetting, particularly storage-based !orgetting, played the primary role in thl..! 
retention differences between the one-trial and criterion <:onditions. 1\s expected, 
there was more storage failure (as mcasureu by the parameter .S.) in the one-trial 
thar .· .. iterion learning groups (all comparbon!-.), where the ave rage rate of' ~torage 
failure in rhe one-tria! :mu criterion conditions was .:1() and .OIJ, respectively. C >ne-
trial learners also experience(.) more retrieval failure (as measured hy the 
parameter R) than criterion learners (in 7 of the 10 compari~on~). where the 
average rate of retrieval failure for the seven significant compari~ons wa~ .24 and 
.07, respectively. Whereas storage failure was more common than retrieval failure 
with one-trial learning (.S = .36 and R = .19), there wa~ very little forgetting of 
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either type with criterion learning (S == .09 and R = .07). Therefore, not 
~urprisingly, the traces established with criterion learning appeared to he stronger 
(i.e., the story details appeared to be better integrateJ) compared to those formed 
with one-trial learning. 
In terms of reminiscence, there was less storage-based reminiscence (as 
measured by the parameter _g) in the one-trial than criterion conditions (in 5 of 
the 10 comparisons), where the average rate of reminiscence for thf! five 
significant comparisons was .0 I and .25, respectively. Interestingly, resturage of 
story details typically occurred whenever preschoolers who had learned to 
criterion received consistent postcvent information. Given that the event trace 
appeared to he quite strong with criterion learning, restorage of story details 
seems to he more likely if twcc details are reasonably well integrated when a 
portion of the original experience is encountered. 
Although success-contingent retrieval-based reminiscence (as measured hy the 
I. parameters) was apparent in only the one-trial condition, there were no 
consistent differences between conditions. In the one-trial condition, the average 
probability of retrieving a stored trace on trial 1 and rhe average subsequent 
probabilities were ( 1-R) = .HI, It = .92, r 2 = .97, and _r3 = .99. For criterion 
learning, the values were ( 1-R) = .93, It = .97, .r2 = .99, and _r3 = .99. The null 
result with criterion learning is ohviously confounded hy ceiling effects; the 
average retrieval pro' ,ability on the first trial was so high that it left little room for 
improvement. 
In terms of error-contingent retrieval-based reminiscence (as measured by the 
L parameters). the only systematic difference hctwcen learning conditions involved 
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the probability of success following one error (as measured by the paramctt•r J1 ). 
There was kss ch;.mce of a success following one error in the otH:-trial than 
criterion conditions (in eight of the ten comparisons), where the average ralt' of 
retrieval following one error (f1) ior the significant comparisons was .~H and .h5, 
respectively. There was a tendency for error-contingent :·cn•inisccnce to decline 
across trials in both learning conditions. With one trial lemning, the average 
probability of retrieval failure on trial t was R = .19, and the subsequent 
prohabiiities of success following one error, and two and three consecutive errors 
were i 1 = .39, i 2 = .22, and i:~ = .22, respectively. Similarly, with criterion 
learning, the average probabilities were B. = .07, 11 = .62, I~ = .20, anti_[ 1 = .22. 
To summarize the effects of manipuhtting initial learning, consistent with 
other studies (e.g., Howe, 1991, llowe et al., in press; llowc, Kelland ct al., J<N2). 
both forgetting and reminiscence processes contributed to the preschoolers' 
retention across the learning conditions. The locus of retention differences was 
also at forgetting, particularly storage-based forgetting. As for reminiscence, the 
preschoolers were more likely to restore story details after they had learned to 
criterion and received consistent postevent information. Although there wa~ 
evidence of retrieval-based reminiscence, neither success- nor error-colltingent 
rerr.!niscence differed systematically with respect to extent of learning. That i~. 
consistent with past research (e.g., Howe, 1991, 1993 ). recall performance 
increased across test trials, hut reminiscence did not differ as a function of 
learning. 
Summary of the Tracc-lntc~rity Analysis. Basically three outcomes of interest 
emerged from the trace-integrity analysis of original information recall. Fir~t. 
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difference~ in original information retention were due primarily to the initial 
learning manip11lation. Both forgetting and reminiscence processes contributed to 
the preschoolers' retention, however, the locus of retention differences was at 
forgetting, particularly storage-based forgetting. Although the recall of the 
original story details increased across test trials, reminiscence did not differ 
~ystematically as a function of the extent of learning. 
Second, the effects of exposure to inconsistent information on the recall of 
original information, both constructive and destructive, were quite rare. Of 
importance, preschoolers were quite resistant to memory impairment and they 
also appeared not to feel pressured to report misinformation hcfore original 
information. There was indication, however, that misinformation may, under 
certain circumst~mces, blend with the original information and impair portions of 
memory for the original event (i.e., the nontargeted story details). As well, 
misinformation may simultaneously enhance retrieval of the features in a trace 
(the nontargeted story details in the present case). Thus, it is possible that 
misinformation has uual effects on memory. 
Third, the benefits of providing a testing session during the retention interval 
were nonexistent and the reinstating effects of providing consistent postevent 
information were not as large as expected. However. re-exposing preschoolers to 
story details in narrative form helped restore details. as wc11 as prevented retrieval 
failure and aiding retricvul relearning. 
Surprisingly, then, there were very few significant postevent information 
effects ohtained with either the ANCOV A or the trace-integrity analysis. It was 
very obvious from the results that the preschoolers acquired the information 
readily and forgot very little of the story details over four weeks. It is quite 
possible that consistent and inconsistent information would have had much 
stronger effects on memory had there been more forgetting of story details. 
Although the effects of misinformation on tile original memory ~race wen.~ 
rare in the present study, this d(les not mean that the exposure to misleading 
information had little affect on the r.rcschoolcrs' performance. Exposure to 
misinformation can ~'lso innuence what is reported. Therefore, it was of interest 
to know whether misinformation was incorporated into preschoolers' rccolledions 
of the original event. The results of an analysis of covarian<.·c that was used to 
examine preschoolers' production of rnisinfornwtion arc reported hclow. To 
understand why performance was inferior with only the one-trial misleading 
questionnaire recall of nontargetcd uctails, it was necessary to determine whether 
there were differences across the misleading information conditions in the extent 
to which misinformation was represented in memory. To a~complish this, a trace-
integrity analysis of misinformation recall was carried out. A description of both 
analyses follows. 
Preschoolers' Rcportinl,! of Misinformation 
Because the interest was in whether preschoolers reported misinformation 
when given the opportunity, hoth responses were cxamincu for misinformation 
production (i.e., the data ohtaincd with the lenient rather than the strict scoring 
method were used). The numher of times preschoolers produced misinformalion 
was analyzed using a 2 (initial learning: one-trial vs criterion) x 6 (condition: 
control-3/4 vs control-4 vs consistent narrative vs misleading narrative vs 
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consistent questionnaire vs misleading questionnaire) x 4 (trial) analysis of 
covariance. The first two factors were between subjects, the last factor was within, 
and the covariate was the mean total numhr.r of times misinformation was 
prm.luccd per trial at acquisition. An ANCOVA, as opposed to an ANOVA, was 
carried out to control for the production of misinformation, hy chance, during 
ac(jtlisition. Both the control-3/4 condition and the lwo consistent information 
conditions were included in this analysis simply for comparison purposes. Because 
a series of _!-tests indicated no difference in long-term retention performance 
between the two control conditions, results arc reported for only the control-4 
condition. 
Not surprisingly, the covariate was insignificant; any production of 
misinformation hy chance at acquisition did not affect the frequency with which 
preschoolers produced misinformation at retention. Two main effects were 
significant, initial learning [F( 1,203) = 55.35, .Q < .01, eta2 = .21] and condition 
IF(5,203) = 9JX, n < .01, eta2 = .19]. Also significant were one first-order and 
one :oiccortd-onler interaction, condition x trial [F( 15,612) = 3.23, .Q < .01, eta2 = 
.071 and initial learning x condition x trial [F(15,612) = 2.46, ~ < .01, eta2 = .06J. 
As exllCCtctl, the preschoolers produced more misinformation in th~ one-trial 
( M = .H7) than criterion (M = .21) conditions. Post-hoc Neuman-Keuls 
examination of the condition effect revealed a larger production of misinformation 
in both the misleading conditions than in either of the consistent conditions or the 
control-4 condition [misleading questionnaire (M = .98), misleading narrative (M 
= .9S), consish!nt (Juestionnaire (M = .32), consistent narrative (M = .34), 
control-4 (M = .39)]. As can he seen in Figure I, and as Neuman-Kculs 
cxaminat:on of the condition x trial effect confirmed. all four trials in both the 
misleading narrative and misleading questionnaire conditions were significantly 
different from all four trials in the two consistent conditions and the t'ontrol-4 
condition. In addition, more misinformation was produced on trial l in the 
misleading narrative condition than on trial 4 in hoth misleading conditions, ami 
as well on trial l in the misleading questionnaire condition than on trials 2, ='· and 
4 of both misleading conditions. 
As can he seen in Figure 2, and as post-hoc examination of the initial karnin~ 
x condition x trial effect confirmed, this interaction occurred basically becau~c 
there was more misinformation produced across trials in hoth one-trial misleading 
inforr .. ation conditions than in all other one-trial and criterion conditions. 
Although there was also a tendency for criterion subjects to produce more 
misinformation across trials in the misleading conditions than in the consistent 
and control conditions, this effect was not significant. Therefore, exposure 
to misleading information increased preschoolers' tendency to erroneously repor~ 
misinformation when they witnessed a single presentation of the original event. 
The Representation of Misinformation in Memory 
The trace-integrity model was used to better understand the effect that 
exposure to misinformation had on the recall of original information as well a!-1 on 
the production :)f misleading information and other intrusions. The model helped 
determine whether there were any differences between the inconsistent 
information conditions in the retention of misleading information. Spccifie<llly, 
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Figure 2. Mean number of times misinformation was produced for the initial learning x condition x trial 
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presentation innu<:;nced forgetting and r<.•miniscence processes with respect to tb~ 
preschoolers' recall of misinformation. Responses were scored as correct if the 
preschoolers reported the misinformation, regardless c;f whether it was their first 
or sc<;ond response. 
The model provi~~c..l an adequate account of the misinformation data; the 
numerical results of these goodness of fit te!''s arc provided in Table 9. The 
numerical estimates of the parameters are given in Table 10. The experimentwise 
test was significant [X2(27) = 55.27, n < .OIJ and the results of the four X2(9) 
conditionwisc tests used to locate the source of the expcrimentwise difference 
revealed effects of initial learning only, for both the narrative (25.98) and 
questionnaire (21.94) presentation. Parametcrwise tests were f~en used to 
examine the effects of initial learning on misinformation retention. 
Recall that the initial learning variable refers to the acquisition of original 
information, no! misinformation; preschoolers in both the one-trial and criterion 
learning conditions received only a single presentation of misinformation. It is, 
therefore, interesting that there arc initial learning effects with respect to the 
retention of misinformation. Examination of the parameterwise differences (all 
were significant at n < .05 only) indicated that the most prominent effect of 
manipulating learning of original information on the retention of misinformation 
wns at forgetting. On average, there was more storage-hased forgetting (as 
measured hy the parameterS) in the one-trial than criterion conditions (S = .74 
and .61, respectively) and more retrieval-based forgetting (as measured by the 
parameter R) in the criterion than one-trial conditions (.R = .47 and .26, 
rcspt.'Ct ive ly ). 
Table 9 
Statistical Adequacy of the Trace-Integrity Model for Misinformation Data 
Condition -21nL} 
1-Trial Lcarnhtg 
Misleading Narrative 332.H5 322.2(1 10.59 
Misleading Questionnaire 297.H2 2H9.7tl KOJ 
Criterion Learning 
Misleading Narrative 130.67 12X.!J4 1.73 
Misleading Questionnaire 152.23 IJ9.22 13.01 
Note. In order to demonstrate goodness of fit the X2(6) value must not cxl'ecd 
16.81, *.l! <.01. 
Tahlc 10 




1-Trial .77 .2 1 .00 .(i5 .HO . 79 .21 .32 .00 
Criterion .00 .00 .M .9R 1.00 .00 .33 .31 
Qucstinnnnirc 
!-Trial .70 .31 .00 .M .HR .95 .09 .03 .00 
Criterion .25 .93 .59 Ji2 .H7 .H3 .00 .00 .00 
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Not surprising. the average rates of stor;•ge and retrieval failure prndlll't•d 
when preschoolers recalled misinfornwti,Ht were large with both k~arning 
conditions. No less surprising. the average rate of storagl~ failure was greatt'r than 
the average rate of retrieval failure in each condition. That is. many of till' 
misinformed details were not available for recall after the retention intnval and 
many of the details that were available were nut retrieved. Such high lcwb or 
storage and retrieval failure were expected given the single prc~cntatinn pf 
misinformation and given that this information proh:,hly coni radil'ted wlwt 
preschoolers had in memory. 
Interestingly, the average forgetting rates mask differences in storage and 
retrieval failure that l)Ccurred as a function of the po!-~tevcnt prc~cntation method. 
With narrative presentation of misir,formation. there was 111ore stor:tgc-h:N~d 
forgetting in the criterion than one-trial condition GS = .% aml .77, tl:.'.pcctively) 
but more retrieval-based forgetting in the onc-tri:.tl than criterion rondilion (R 
.21 and .00, respectively). However, the reverse was true with the quc~tionrwirc 
presentation; there was much more storage-based forgetting in the one-tria l than 
in the criterion condition (S = .70 and .25, respectively) hut more rctri•·val-ha~cd 
forgetting in the criterion than in the one-trial condition ill = .1H ~tnd 31. 
respectively). Thus, the availability and accc~sihility of mbleading informatio11 
was influenced hy the way the misinformation was presented. 
In terms of the narrative presentation, the result~ indicated that there wa~ a 
greater probability that the misinformed details were available with weaker 
encoding. Although some of availahk mi~informcd details were inaccc~sihle in 
this one-trial condition, available tlctails in the criterion cotH.Iitiot! W\...fC alw;tys 
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accc~!-!ihlc (i.e., there was no retrieval-based failure in this criterion condition). 
Therefore, when the criterion subjects incorporated misinformation (that had been 
cmhcddeJ in a rwrrntive) into their memory structure of the original event, the 
n.:prcscntation of these details was strong. Although one-trial subjec~s were more 
I ikely I<' encode misleading details, they had problems retrieving at least some ·of 
these detail!-.. llowcver, because the ANCOVA results indicated a higher 
production of misinformation in the one-trial than criterion condition for narrative 
presentation, there must have been more occasions when the targeted details were 
hotl1 available and accessible in the one-trial than criterion condition. 
The results involving the questionnaire presentation of misinformation 
indicated that there were more misinformed details t,navailable for recall in the 
one-trial than criterion condition. Based on the previous ANCOVA results, one 
would expect a grc:1ter availability, rather than unavailability, of misinformed 
details in the one-trial condition. llowcvcr, although the availability of mislead 
details m:1y have been greater in the criterion condition, one-trial subjects 
retrieved more of the available traces than did criterion subjects. That is, there 
were again more occasions in the one-trial than criterion condition when 
misinformed details were both available and accessible. 
Therefore, fewer misinformed details were reported in the criterion than one-
trial condition with both the narrative and questionnaire presentation. However, 
misinformation was more likely to he available for recall with the narrative 
presentation of misinformation when the trace containing original information was 
weak, hut was more likely to he available with stronger traces when 
misinformation was presented in questionnaire form. Therefore, the way in which 
1)1) 
the misinformation was presented interacted with the degree of initial lemning uf 
original information to determine the extent to which misinform<.,ion was stored 
in memory. It is possible that for criterion learners, the contradiction of original 
information with misinformation was more obvious with the questionnaire rather 
than the narrative prcsentatiort hecause of the attempts to access the original 
trace during question answering. Preschoolers with criterion learning, then. may 
be more likely to attend to and encode misinformation when it was presented in 
questionnaire form. However. such a difference in the availability of 
misinformation was not evi(lent with one-trial learners probably because the story 
details were not integ1 .~ted strongly enough within the trace for such a 
contradiction to be apparent. 
It is interesting that despite the greater availability of misinformation in the 
criterion than one-trial condition with questionnaire presentation. there was a 
6reater production of misinformation after one-trial learning. Recall that the 
original trace appeared to he stronger in the criterion than one-trial condition 
(refer to the trace-integrity analysis of original information recall). It appcms, 
then, that regardless of the presentation method, the strength of the original 
information obviously influenced whether the misleading information was 
accessible. Therefore, ~\ .. eschoolers with criterion learning may have been more 
confident that the original information was correct than preschoolers in the one-
trial conditions, with the result that the misleading information was either not 
encoded into memory or was not accessed during recall in those conditions. Thus, 
as expected, and consistent with the /\NCOVA results, the extent of learning of 
original information appears to influence the reporting of misleading information. 
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In terms of reminiscence, there were no systematic differences between the 
one-trial and criterion conditions with respect to storage-based reminiscence. 
There was more restorage of targeted details (as measured by the parameter .n) in 
the criterion than one-trial condition (ll = .59 and .00, respectively) with 
questionmtire presentation only. As for success-contingent reminiscence, 
performance tended to improve from the first to the last trial with both the one 
trial ( 1-R = .74, r 1 = .65, r2 = .84, r3 = .87) and criterion (1-R = .53, r 1 = .63, r 2 
== .93, .r1 = .H9) conditions. The only differences between learning conditions in 
succcss-corllingent reminiscence involve<.! narrative presentation; there was a 
greater chance of success following two and three consecutive successes in the 
criterion tllan one-trial condition (!2 = .98 and .80, respectively; r 3 = 1.00 and .79, 
respectively). There was very little error-contingent reminiscence with either one-
trial ili = .26, L = .15, .f2 = .18, .f3 = .00) or criterion learning (R = .47, .f1 = .00, 
1'2 = .17,13 = .16) ~md there were no differences between the learning conditions 
with either presentation method. 
To summarize the analyses of misinformation production an<.! retention, the 
availability and accessibility of misleuding information were influence<.! by the way 
the mbinformation was presented. However, regardless of the presentation 
method, misinformation was more likely to be both available and accessible when 
initial encoding was weak than when it was strong (i.e., with one-trial rather than 
criterion learning). That is, exposure to misleading information increased the 
preschoolers' ~cndency to erroneously report this information after they witnessed 
a single presentation of the original event. However, differences in the retention 
of misinformation did not appear to produce the effect found with the recall of 
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the nontargeted story det3ils in the one-trial misleading <tucstionnaire condition: 
there were no significant differences in the retention of misinformation between 
the one-trial misleading narrative and questionnaire conditions. 
It would have been informative to know the status of the misinformation in 
memory. That is, it was not possible to determine whether misinformation was 
very well represented in memory and simply not reported (possibly hccaust.~ the 
preschoolers knew it was incorrect) or whether, hecausc of the small degree of 
forgetting of story details, that misinformation was not incorporated ~It all. It is 
possible that directly a:-,;~ing the children about the status of misinformation in 
memory might have revealed this. (Thanks to Dr. Mary Courage for this 
suggestion). 
Preschoolers' Production of Intrusions 
Exposure to misinformation may not only increase the likelihood that 
preschoolers report misinformation, it may also encouruge the reporting of otllcr 
intrusions (i.e., responses other than the original and misleading information). To 
better understand the influence that exposure to misinformation, as well as the 
other experimental manipulations, had on erroneous reporting, an examination 
was made of the frequency with which the preschoolers produced intrusions, as 
well as how relevant these intrusions were to the original story. Because the 
preschoolers' production of intrusions was not a primary interest in this the~is, 
only a general examination of intrusions was conducted. That is, the frequency of 
intrusion production and the relevance of intrusions to the general story script and 
to the specific question asked were not analyzed using the trace-integrity model. 
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Because the interest was in whether preschoolers reported intrusions when 
given the opportunity, both responses were examined in all intrusion analyses. To 
determine whether the experimental manipulations influenced the reporting of 
intrusions, the numher of intrusions produced at retention was anHlyzed using a 2 
{initial learning: one-trial vs criterion) x 6 (condition: control-3/4 vs control-4 vs 
consistent narrative vs misleading narrative vs consistent questionnaire vs 
misleading questionnaire) x 2 (postevcnt reference to story details: targeted vs 
nontargeted) x 4 (trial) analysis of covariance. The first two factors were between 
subjects, the last two were within, and the covariate was the mean total number of 
intrusions produced per trial at acquisition. Because there were no significant 
differences between the two control conditions, as revealed by a series of .!-tests, 
only the results involving the control-4 condition arc reported. 
The covariate was significant and was adjm;tcd for both between subjects 
factors IF( 1,203) = 37.34, n < .0 I, r2 = .25, cta2 = .16) and for the within subject 
factor, postcvent reference to story details [F( 1,203) = 8.83, .12 < .01, 1.2 = .04, eta2 
= .04]. Thus, individual differences in the number of intrusions produced at 
acquh.ition influenced intrusion production at retention. After the retention 
scores were adjusted for the differences at acquisition, two of the four main 
effects were significant: (a) initial learning [F( 1,203) = 147.19, .J1 < .01, eta2 = 
.42], where one-trial subjects (M = 2.o0) produced more intrusions per trial than 
criterion subjects (M = .77); and (h) postevcnt reference to story details [F(1,203) 
= ~2.6h, .u < .0 I. eta~ = .29], where more intrusions were produced with the 
non targeted story detail recall (M = 2.11) than with the recall of details that were 
targeted in postevent information (M = 1.26). 
There was also one first order interaction, initial learning x postevcnt 
reference to story details {F( 1,203) = 42.14, .l1 < .01, eta2 = .17). Fun her 
examination of this effect revealed that more intrusions were produced when 
recalling hath targeted (M = UN) and nontargetcd (M = J.JO) story delails in 
the one·trial condition than when recalling both targeted (M = .63) and 
nontargeted (M = .91) details in the criterion condition. llowevcr. the interaction 
occurred because although there was no significant difference in intrul'iion 
production when recalling targeted and nontargetcd details with criterion lc:arning, 
more intrusions were produced when recalling nontargctcd than targeted details 
with one·trial learning. To summarize, although incorrect responses were more 
likely when story details were not directly rc·encountcrcd during postevent 
information after one·trial learning, exposure to mi~informatiott did not esH:ourage 
the reporting of intrusions. 
Because of the interest to know how relevant or irrelevant preschoolers' 
intrusions were, intrusions were analyzed in terms of their relevance to the 
particular question asked and to the story's general script. Two sets of analyst.:s 
were carried out that included the same variables as in the intrusion analysis 
above with one exception, the postcvcnt reference to story detail manipulation 
was replaced with a relevance variable. That is, intrusions were scored for their 
relevance or irrelevance to either the story's general script in one analysis or to 
the specific question asked in the other. Recause the initial learning, condition, 
and trial effects were no different from those reported above, only thl.! effects 
pertair~in': to the relevance of story details arc summarized below. The stati~tical 
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values for the question and story analyses are F(1,203) = 163.85, .12 < .01, eta2 = 
.45 and f( I ,203) = I 40.23, .u < .0 I, eta2 = .41, respectively. 
Preschoolers produced more story relevant (five times as many) and question 
relevant (three times as many) than irrelevant intrusions. Although there were 
more story relevant intrusions in the one-trial than criterion conditions, there was 
no difference between learning conditions with respect to story irrelevant 
intrusions. However, hoth question relevant and irrelevant intrusions were more 
prevalent with one-trial learning than with criterion learning. The number of 
irrelevant intrusions produced across conditions did not differ in either the story 
or question analysis. However, preschoolers in the misleading questionnaire 
condition produced more question relevant intrusions than did preschoolers in the 
consistent narrative and consistent <Juestionnaire conditions. There were also 
more question relevant intrusions produced in the control-4 and misleading 
narrative conditions than in the consistent narrative condition. Therefore, 
whenever the preschoolers produced intrusions, they were usually related to the 
specific question asked or the general script of the story. That is, whenever the 
required information was not available or accessible, the preschoolers appeared to 
provide the best answer they could based on the knowledge they had. 
Discussion 
The primary motivation for the present research was to determine what role 
(if any) memory impairment plays in misinformation effects and to explain the 
transient nature of the erroneous reporting and memory impairing effects in 
young children. I argued that the appearance and disappearance of such effects is 
likely the direct consequence of limitations in past research. To address these 
limitations, the trace-integrity framework and model were used to eliminate the 
prohlems of initial learning and analytic insensitivity so that the dual effects of 
misinformation could be examined. 
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In the following a discussion is given of the role that memory impairrncnt 
played in the preschoolers' erroneous reporting. Considered next arc how 
differences across conditions and studies in initial learning. the dual cffe, : , of 
misinformation, d iffercnces across studies in cxpc ri mental design, and ana lyt i~. ·' 
insensitivity help explain the transient effects of misinformation. The issues of 
preschoolers' reliahility as eyewitnesses in courts of law and the importance of 
examining the effects of consistent postcvent information on memory arc then 
brieny examined. The discussion ends with a description of the role that 
forgetting and reminiscence, and their storage and retrieval loci, played in the 
preschoolers' retention in general. 
The ·Ro)e of Memory Impairment in Misinformation Effects 
Before I discuss the role that memory impairment played in the reporting of 
misinformation in the present study, I will give a hricf summary of the rindings 
concerning the preschoolers' erroneous reporting and the vulnerability of their 
memories to impairment. Consistent with a large number of studies that indicate 
that adults as well as young children erroneously report misinformation (e.g., sec 
Cole & Loftus, 1987; Zaragoza, 19H7, for reviews), exposure to misleading 
information did encourage the preschoolers to report this information. In 
particular, misled preschoolers with one-trial learning reported more 
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misinformation than nonmisled preschoolers. Interestingly however, such 
exposure did not influence the reporting of other types of erroneous information. 
That is, preschoolers produced just as many intrusions (i.e., responses other than 
the original or misleading information) in the nonmisled as in the misled 
conditions. The effects of misinformation on rept.l\~,ting, then, appear to be quite 
specific; preschoolers arc more likely to produce misleading information rather 
than other types of erroneous information after they encounter misinformation 
during the retention interval. 
Although misleading information that targets peripheral event details 
encourages the reporting (If misinformation, this appears not to he the case when 
misinformation concerns central or thematic information. Recall that in Howe's 
( IW I) study the misinformation was directed at the theme of a subevent in a 
story and that although there was evidence of memory impairment, the misled 
children did not report the inconsistent information more frequently than the 
nonmisled children. Both Howe's study and the present one are consistent with 
past research that indicates that misleading information is more likely to be 
reported when misinformution concerns peripheral rather than central or thematic 
aspects of an event (e.g., Dodd & Bradshaw, 1 980; Goodman et al., 1987; King & 
Yuille, 1987; Yuille, 19RO). Importantly, such findings indicate that the central or 
thematic aspects of young children's testimony are accurate. Therefore, there is a 
need to detail which aspects of a witnessed event young children perceive as 
peripheral and arc likely to misreport and which portions of their testimony are 
likely to he reliable. For example, there is evidence that children are often 
unable to answer questions about aspects of an event such as its timing and the 
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age of the participant(s) (Rudy & Goodman. l'N I). It needs to he determined 
whether event aspects such as these arc more likely than others to he vulncrahlc 
to misinformation? 
In terms of the memory impairing effects that misinformation had in the 
present study, recall that such effects were rare. J lowcvcr, this absence of 
widespread memory impairment is consistent with previous research. Zaragoza 
and associate's (e.g., Zaragoza, 1987; 1991 ; Zaragoza ct al., 1992) :\-to 6-ycar-olds 
and Howe's (1991) 5- to 7-year-olds were quite resistant to memory impairment. 
The misinformation manipulatl\ln employed in the current study likely provided 
one of the strongest tests of the memory impairment hypothesis to date. That 1s, 
10 of the 20 to-he-remembered peripheral story details were misled cornpmcd to 
the traditional 2 of 4 items. It appears, then, that peripheral story details arc very 
resistant to memory impairment three weeks after preschoolers witness an event. 
Therefore, both peripheral and central aspects of an event appear to he 
impervious to the potential memory impairing effects of misleading information. 
Interestingly, in a recent review by Ccci and Bruck ( 1<J<JJ), it was concluded that 
there are reliable age differences in suggestibility. llowevcr, the preschoolers in 
the present study were quite resistant to memory impairment and, with sufficient 
]earning of original information, did not erroneously report misinformation. 
Of significance, however, was that despite the rarity of memory impairment, 
preschoolers who were given misieading information embedded in questionnaire 
form after one-trial learning experienced more storage failure of the nontargetcd 
story details than did preschoolers in the control-4 condition. I lowe (I 1J9 I) also 
found a higher storage failure rate in his misled than nonmisled conditions. 
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These results arc consistent with the trace-blending scenario put forth earlier; 
although only storage-based forgetting was evident in the present study, 
reminiscence, especially restorage, processes were present. It appears, then, that 
misleading and original information may he incorporated into a single trace. It 
also appears that hy blending with the original information, misinformation may 
produce such a disintegration of the features or the bonds integrating trace 
features, that some of the original information is no longer available. These 
results arc consistent with other work that has shown that children's memories are 
potentially alterable (sec Loftus et al., 1992; Toglia ct al., 1992). 
It is possible, then, that misinformation may have the potential to damage 
original information. l-lowever, the problem is that the inferior recall 
performance of the nontargctcd story details in the misleading questionnaire 
condition may instead he due to differences in initial learning, rate of forgetting, 
or both. That is, the misinformation manipulation itself may have had nothing to 
do with the storage impairment of the nontargeted details in the misled condition. 
In summary, the preschoolers presented with inconsistent information reported 
this information at retention. However, the preschoolers' memories were quite 
impervious to impairment. Although there was indication that misinformation 
may blend with information in the original trace and alter the storage of specific 
portions of that information, it is not possible to determine whether this was in 
fact the case. What role, then. does memory impairment play in preschoolers' 
erroneous repo--ting? 
According to the "no impairment" hypothesis, the reporting of misinformation 
occurs for reasons o~ · · .. r than memory impairment. In particular, Zaragoza (e.g., 
10') 
Zaragoza, 1987) claimed that misinformation effects occur solely as a conscqucrll.:c 
of both conformity on the part of subjects (i.e .• demand dmractcristics) and 
response bias. Recall that there is evidence that <..lcmand characteristics can. in 
fact, play a role in what children report conl·crning a witnessed event (e.g .• Ceci et 
al., 1987a). If demand characteristics were operating in the present study. then 
the preschoolers may have been more likely to report misinformation before 
original information, given that they were allowed two opportunities to respond to 
each question. That is, they may have felt pressure to first report what the 
experimenter said they saw, than what they he I icved they saw themselves. 
Although the reporting of both the original and misleading information was not 
common either within a test trial or acros~ test trials, in those cases where both 
were reported, misinformation was just as likely to precede as succeed original 
information.7 It appears that the preschoolers did not feel compelled to first 
recall misinformation when given the opportunity to respond twice (also refer to 
the analysis involving strict versus lenient scoring). llowcver, this docs not mean 
that there was no conformity on the pn.>··choolcrs' part. 
In terms of response bias, it is possible that the children reported the 
misinformation because it was the only response that was accessible. 
Misinformation may have heen reported either because the original information 
was forgotten (i.e., was no longer available or accessible) or because the original 
information was never encoded to begin with (sec Zaragoza, 19H7). 
Approximately half the time that the preschoolers reported misinformation, they 
failed to report original information.11 If the preschoolers reported misinformation 
in these cases merely because it was the only response that was available or 
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acccssihle, then there should have been no differences in the forgetting or 
reminiscence of original information between any of the inconsistent information 
conditions and tre control-4 condition. But this was not the situation with the 
recall of the non targeted details in the one-trial misleading questionnaire 
condition. Response bias also does not explain why the preschoolers reported the 
misinformation when the original information was accessible. Granted, 
misinformation may have hcen reported in some instances because the original 
information was not encmlcd at acquisition or because it became inaccessible or 
unavailable during the retention interval, hut this cannot explain all erroneous 
reporting. 
Assuming that the inferior recall of the nontargetcd details in the one-trial 
misleading questionnaire condition indicates memory impairment, then the ability 
of misinformation to impair memory may explain why misinformation was 
reported when the original information was, and was not, recalled. Surprisingly, 
the preschoolers did not report the misleading information because the story 
details targeted hy the misinformation had been impaired. In fact, there was an 
insignificant trend for the recall of the targeted information to be greater in the 
one-trial misleading information condition than in the control-4 condition. 
llowcvcr, this docs not imply that it was impossible for memory impairment to 
play a role in preschooler~;' erroneous reporting. To impair the storage of 
nontargctcd story details, the misinformation would likely have to blend with the 
information in the original trace. Because the misinformation would become part 
of thl' preschoolers' memory for the original event, they would include it in their 
rc<.·ollcct ions of that event. 
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One potential problem with this memory impairment explanation is that tlw 
misleading information was also reported in the conditions in which no ~Image 
impairment was observed. However, just because there was a significant amount 
of impairment with only the one-trial misleading qucs t ionna i rc wndi tit,,. docs not 
rule out the possibility that the misinformation blended with the original 
information to some extent in the other inconsistent information conditions. But 
there still may have heen sufficient trace integration in these conditions for the 
recall of nontargetetl story details. If this were the case, then more frequent 
reporting of misinformation would be expected with larger degrees of impairment 
of nontargeted information (i.e., with greater degrees of blending of 
misinformation into the original trace). In fact, there was somewhat more 
misinformation produced in the one-trial misleading questionnaire condition than 
in the other inconsistent information conditions. Thus, there is some indication 
that misinformation may blend with the original trace. damaging thai infornwtinn, 
with the result that suhjccts report misleading information. 
However, recall that although Howe ( 199 I) also found evidence that 
misinformation may blend with original information, the misled children in his 
study did not report misleading information more frequently than did the 
nonmisled children. It is possible that although blending of original and 
misleading information occurs, children arc more likely to report inconsi.'llclll 
information when they are asked specific questions ah<llll an event, rather than 
when they are asked to freely recall the event. That is, the reporting of 
misinformation may be due to hoth the blending of mbinformation into the 
original trace and the pressure felt hy subjects to provide a response. 
112 
What, then, can he said of the role that memory impairment plays in the 
reporting of misinformation? If in fact misinformation impaired the storage of 
nontargeted details in the one-trial misleading questionnaire condition, then it is 
possible that memory impairment contributed to preschoolers' reporting of 
misinformation. If this is indeed the case, then it is obvious that very little 
impairment of original information is needed for preschoolers to report 
misleading information. It is likely, then, that memory impairment was not the 
sole reason for such reporting. In addition, there arc studies that indicate that 
factors other than memory impairment contribute to misinformation effects, 
factors such as conformity on the part of subjects, response bias, an inabil ity to 
adC<JUatcly monitor the source of information, and an incongruence between the 
child 's linguistic and cognitive functioning and the type of question asked (e.g., 
Ccci ct al., J!,l~?t~: Lindsay & Johnson, 19~7a ; Saywitz ct al., 1991 ; Zaragoza et al., 
I 992). In ag.-ccmcnt with others (e.g., Loftus & Hoffman, I 9R9; Tversky & 
Tuchin, 19H9) then, many factors such as memory impairment, demand 
characteristics. and response bias possibly contribute to preschoolers' reporting of 
misinformation. 
Explainina: the Transient Effects of Misinformation 
Interestingly, the now-you-sec-it now-you-don't nature of the effects of 
misinformation were apparent in the present study. Although misleading 
information was reported in all inconsistent information conditions, the n:tmher of 
times misinformation was produced with criterion learning, unlike one-trial 
lcmning. was nor significantly greater in the misled than in the nonmisled 
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conditions. In addition, a significant degree ot storage failure was ~vidcnt in only 
one of the inconsistent information conditions. There was evidence from the 
present study that there are at least four factors that contrihutc to the appcar:mcc 
and disappearance of erroneous reporting and memory impairment effects. As 
was anticipated from previous studies, these factors arc again failure to control 
degree of learning of original information (and possibly misinformation), f<lilurl~ to 
examine the dual effects of misinformation, the use of different experimental 
designs, and the utilization of insensitive measurement and analytical techniques. 
Failure to Control Initial Learnin~:. Earlier in the thesis I argued that the 
transient effects of misinformation may he due to diffcrenn·s acrnss studies in the 
strengths of the original and misleading traer There was support for part of this 
claim in the present study. 
In terms of the strength of the original information, rec:lll that the 
preschoolers reported fewer story details at acquisition in the one-trial than in the 
criterion condition and that retention was inferior with one-t;·ial than criterion 
learning in the cnntrol-4 condition. Thus, it is likely that the integrity of the trace 
for the original event was poorer in the one-trial than criterion conditions. Also 
recall that both erroneous reporting and memory imp:tirrncnt were expected 10 he 
more likely with one-trial rather than criterion learning. In fact, the anticipated 
initial learning x condition (i.e., control vs misled) interaction was evident with the 
preschoolers' reporting of misinformation. There was more misinformation 
produced in both one-trial misleading conditions than in all other one-trial and 
criterion conditions. Although postevcnt exposure to incon~i~tcnt information did 
not influence intrusion production (i.e., rcspon~cs other than misleading or 
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original information), more intrusions were produced with one-trial than criterion 
learning. Not surprisingly, then, it appears that erroneous reporting is much more 
likely with weaker traces of the original information. Intrusion production was 
also less likely when preschoolers were exposed to story details during the 
retention interval; that i~. more intrusions were reported with nontargeted than 
targeted detail recall after one-trial learning. However, although there was a 
tendency for targeted details to he more available and accessible than nontargeted 
details in the one-trial conditions, this tendency was not significant. Nonetheless, 
because there were degree of learning effects, there is evidence that the reporting 
of both misinformation and other intrusions is influenced hy the strength of the 
original information. Differences across studies, then, in the degree to which 
subjects learn original information will influence whether, and the degree to 
which, misinformation effects arc reported. 
llowcver, can the same he said of memory impairment? As ~·:lted earlier, it 
is not possible to determine whether the inferior performance in the one-trial 
misleading questionnaire condition was actually due to impairment by 
misinformation. Therefore, it is not possible to determine whether the probability 
of such impairment was greater when the strength of original information was 
weaker. However, because the inferior recall performance in the misled condition 
would typically have hecn interpreted as memory impairment, it is possible to 
determine whether memory impairment is more likely to be reported when the 
strength of original information is weaker. Despite the fact that the initial 
learning x condition (i.e., control vs misled) interaction was not apparent with the 
preschoolers' recall of original information, there was some indication that the 
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strength of original information may influence whether memory impairment i~ 
reported. That is, the only incidence of storage failure was with one-trial learning. 
Although the only case of impairment in Howe's (1991) first experiment was with 
criterion learning, storage-failure was evident when testing occurred at 9 versus 2 
days. Consistent with the present study, the only evidence of impairment in his 
second experiment was with one-trial learning. Thus, it is more likely that 
impairment will occur, or that it will he reported to occur, when the strength of 
original information is weak, as the result of either inferior initial learning or 
longer retention intervals. 
There was also some indication that recall may he influenced by whether 
preschoolers are re-exposed or not to story details during the retention interval~ 
storage failure occurred with the recall of nontargeted, rather than targeted, 
details in the one-trial misleading questionnaire condition. llowevcr, although 
there was a tendency for story details to he more :tvailahle with wrgctcd than 
nontargeted detail recall in the inconsistent information conditions than in the 
control-4 condition, this tendency was not significant. Nonetheless, it is possible 
that the combination of one-trial learning with the lack of exposure to story 
details during the retention interval, made the portion of the original twce 
containing the nontargeted details the weakest part of the trace. There doc~ 
appear, then, to be some evidence that memory impairment is more likely to he 
reported when the original trace, or a portion of the trace, is not sufficiently 
integrated when misleading information is presented. 
To summarize, there was evidence that the strength of the original 
information influences whether erroneous reporting and memory impairment 
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effects will he reported. These results are consistent with the retroactive 
interference literature (e.g., sec Crowder, 1976; Postman & Underwood, 1973, for 
reviews) that indicates that a weak rather than a strong memory for the original 
list is more susceptihle to the interfering effects of the interpolated list(s). Thus, 
the present findings do not support claims that the effects of misinformation are 
J:.rgcr with stronger traces of original information (i.e., higher levels of control 
performance; cf. Cnandler, 1989). Importantly, then, failure to control subjects' 
acquisition of original information across conditions within a study, as well as 
across stuuies, likely contributes to the appearance and uisappearance of 
erroneous reporting and memory impairment effects. 
Although there was some indication that memory impairment is more likely to 
he reported with weaker traces of original information, storage failure was not 
found with the nontargeted detail recall in the one-trial misleading narrative 
condition. This is consistent with past studies that have found it difficult to 
demonstrate a link between trace strength and memory impairment (e.g., Howe, 
1991: Zaragoza et al., 1992). Therefore, despite the indication that the reporting 
of impairment may he more likely with smaller degrees of trace integration, it 
appears that a weak trace alone is not sufficient. Whether memory impairment 
will he reported at all, as well as the extent of this effect, must depend on more 
than the degree of trace integration at the time misinformation is presented. One 
f01ctor that nwy interact with the trace strength of original information to produce 
erroneous reporting and memory impairment effects is the trace strength of 
misleading information. 
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If the trace strengths of both the original and mislending information 
interacted to produce what appear to he memory impairment effects, then there 
should have been differences in the retention of misinformation between the one-
trial questionnaire and narrative conditions, given that inferior recall was found 
only in the former condition. (This is assuming, of course, that the integrity of 
nontargeted details was similar in the two conditions at the time of postcvcnt 
presentation.) But recall that there were no significant differences in the 
forgetting or reminiscence of misleading information between the one-trial 
narrative and questionnaire conditions. However, the lack of difference in the 
retention of misinformation between these conditions is not surprising, given that 
there was also little difference in the forgetting and reminiscence rates between 
the two conditions with the recall of nontargeted information. That is, ahhough 
the only indication of storage failure was with the questionnaire presentation, 
there appeared to be a similar effect on nontargctcd detail recall with narrative 
presentation. It is not clear why a significant amount of stomge fnilurc occurred 
in only the one-trial questionnaire condition. 
Because the manipulation of the presentation method did not influence the 
retention of misinformation, it was not possible to determine whether differences 
in the trace strength of inconsistent information also contribute to the transient 
effects of misinformation. Hnwever, because it is possible that misinformation 
blends with original information, it is plausible that differences in the extent to 
which misinformation is represented in the original trace influences whether, and 
the degree to which, erroneous reporting and memory impairment effects arc 
reported. If there had been forgetting of story details or stronger manipulations 
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of misinformation strength (e.g., one-trial versus criterion learning of misleading 
information) in the present study, then the anticipated interaction between the 
strengths of the original and misleading information may have emerged. If the 
effects of misinformation are determined hy the degree of integrity of the entire 
memory structure (i.e., the relative strengths of both the original and misleading 
information), then it is important to control the degree of learning of both types 
of information (sec also Ceci et al., 1988; Howe, 1991). 
Fnilurc to Examine the l>ual Effects of Misinformation. Recall that the 
misleading information was expected to reactivate the original trace, with the 
resuh that there would he less forgetting, more reminiscence, or both of 
nontmgcted details and more forgetting, less reminiscence, or both of targeted 
details. J-lowcvcr, as discussed earlier, there were no destructive or constructive 
effects of exposure to misinformation for targeted information. But there were 
hoth constructive (i.e., alleviation of retrieval-based forgetting) and destructive 
(i.e., storage-based forgetting) effects with the recall of the nontargeted details in 
the one-trial misleading questionnaire condition. Again what is important is that 
the effects on nontargcted detail recall occurred with only one-·trial learning. The 
dual effects of misinformation that are reported across studies, then, may differ 
depending on the extent to which original information, and possibly 
misinformation, arc learned. In order to understand the transient effects of 
misinformation, the conditions under which misinformation promotes 
reinstatement versus impairment of targeted, as well as surrounding information, 
need to he identified. Therefore, it is important that researchers examine both 
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the destructive and constructive effects of mi.:information, as well as identify and 
control those factors that influence dual effects. 
If these dual effects are indeed due to the misinformation manipulation. then 
the targeted details should have been as susceptible, if not more so, to such 
effects as the nontargeted details. However, there was instead a tendency for the 
targeted detail re.:...tll to he greater in the misled than in the control-4 condition. 
Had there been a greater degree of forgetting of original information, 
misinformation may have significantly enhanced performance or alleviated 
forgetting of targeted details. It is interesting, then, that misinformation may have 
the opposite effect on memory than that which is expected. 
Differences in Expcrimentnl Dcsii!n. I a:-gucd earlier that the constructive ami 
destructive effects of misinformation may spread from targeted tn nontargeted 
details, or vice versa, and that given the different experimental designs used across 
studies, this might contribute to the appearance and disappearance of erroneous 
reporting and memory impairment effects. Although there was no evidence of :t 
spread of either positive or negative effects between story details, there was 
indication that manipulating subjects within or between conditions can influence 
the outcome of a study. Because there was evidence of storngc failure with the 
nontargeted detail recall, the control performance in studies where within-~uhjects 
manipulations have been used, may have heen inadvertently lowered. It may not 
necessarily be the case, then, that misleading some details in an event has no 
affect on remaining event details or that it is unproblematic to usc the recall of 
nonmisled details to measure control performance. 
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Indeed, using within-subjects manipulations in studies examining the effects of 
misinformation can lead to problems with interpreting a study's outcome. For 
example, in one of Zaragoza's (1991) studies, in which a within-subjects 
manipulation was used, subjects recalled slightly more misled than control items. 
Was this because misinformation enhanced recall of misled items or weakened 
recall of control details? Thus, the type of experimental design used can 
influence the outcome of a study and differences in design across studies likely 
contribute to the transient effects of misinformation. It is also of interest to note 
that if only the targeted detail recall had been examined in the present study, it 
would have appeared ~ts if there were no differences in forgetting rates between 
misled and nonmisled conditions. It is, therefore, important that both the 
constructive and destructive effects of misinformation be examined with targeted 
as well as nontargeted information. 
_lnade<Juate Measurement and Analytical Techniques. It is quite obvious 
from the present results that inappropriate measurement and analytical techniques 
also contribute to the problems with interpreting the outcome of studies in this 
area, as well as with the transient effects of misinformation. Because the trac.:!-
intcgrity model localized effects within specific parameters, unlike the general 
purpose ANCOVA, it was possible to observe effects that were apparent with the 
former and not the latter. One such example was the dual effects on the recall of 
nontargcted details observed in the one-trial misleading questionnaire condition. 
Because the partitioning of the data was more detailed and precise with the 
model, manipulations that produced no observable differences with the recall of 
these details in the ANCOVA, had clear effects on the parameters in the model. 
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Therefore, in order tJ understand how misinformation affects prc~;dtoolcrs' 
memory and testimony, it is necessary to opcrationalizc and isolate the umkrlying 
mental variables of interest. To do so, techniques must he designed around 
particular paradigms (e.g., Ebbinghau~-1ike retention experiments) ami sets of 
theoretical issues (e.g., the contribution of storage ami retrieval factors to 
forgetting and reminiscence processes). It is, therefore. nccc.'isary to usc formal 
measurement techniques, such as the trace-integrity model, that spell out the 
relationship between visible empirical results and invi:;ililc hyj'Othetical 
subprocesses. 
Explainin~: the Inconsistencies in Children's Studies. llnw can the 
discrepancy between the Ceci and colleagues (e.g., Ceci et al., IWPa; Togli<1 cl al., 
cited in Toglia et al., 1992) and Zaragoza and colleagues (e.g., Zmagoza, 19X7; 
1991; Zaragoza et al., 1992) studies he explained? Although one-trial learning 
was used in both studies, it is very likely lhat difference~; existed in initial learning. 
In fact, Zaragoza reported a lower control performance than did Ceci and his 
colleagues. Based on the present results, the reporting of memory impairment 
should then have been more likely in Zaragoza's study. In fact, Zaragoza may 
have found impairment. Because she used a within-suhjccts manipulation, it is 
possible that the inconsistent information impaired memory for the nontargctcd 
information, the very information that was hcing used 1o indicate control 
performance. Although misinformation had no significant effect on targeted or 
nontargeted information in the narrative condition in the present study, 
Zaragoza's procedure was not identical to the present one. Therefore, there may 
have been significant destruction of the control items in her studies, hut any 
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damage that misinformation may have had on targeted (or nontargeted) 
information would not have been evident. This would also explain why Ceci et al. 
obtained a higher control performance than did Zaragoza, despite the fact that 
she used older children from higher socioeconomic classes. 
It is also possible that differences in the strength of misinformation in memory 
across the two studies contributed to the inconsistency. Regardless of the Jack of 
presentation effects in the present study, other procedural differences may have 
innuenced the degree to which misinformation was represented in memory. This, 
along with differences in the strength of original information, may have produced 
differences in the way misinformation constructively and destructively influenced 
memory across the two sets of studies. 
1•rcschoolcrs' Rr.liabilily as Witnesses 
Although it is not possible to generalize from th is study to conclusions about 
preschoolers, competency to testify ahout their experiences in courts of Jaw, the 
present results arc encouraging. The types of experiences that young children are 
frequently asked to testify about, namely physical and sexual abuse, are likely to 
he more strongly encoded in memory than the kinds of activities used to test 
children's vulnerability to inconsistent information in misinformation studies. 
Physical and sexual ahuse involves salient, traumatic, frequently occurring events 
that the child typically participates in with familiar adults, and there is plenty of 
evidence that children's memory for such events is <JUite strong. For example, 
memory for uctivities (e.g .• who did what, where did it happen, what exactly took 
place) is of particular interest in ahuse cases and young children have very good 
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memories for activities that they and others arc involved in (e.g., Fivush, Gray, & 
Fromhoff, 1987; Fivush, Hudson, & Nelson, 19H4). In fact, there is much 
empirical evidence that preschoolers', and even infants', memory for events in 
general is very accurate (e.g., Fivush et al.. 19H7; Fivush & I Iammond, 19H9; 
Nelson, 1988; Nelson & Ros~. 1980; Rovee-Collier & Shyi, 1992; Todd & 
Perlmutter, 1980; however, see Leippe, Rornanczyk. & Manion, 1'>91; Rudy & 
Goodman, 1991). Consistent with these studies, the preschoolers' memories in 
the present study were quite robust; one-trial subjects recatletl 77% of the story 
details and criterion suhjects recalled 96%. More importantly, there was very 
little forgetting of story details with either learning condition over the four week 
period. 
Typtcal abuse questions focus on activities that take place during the abuse as 
opposed to trivial background information, which is commonly examined in 
misinformation studies. We know that young children arc more accurate, and less 
vulnerable to inconsistent information, when recalling central Clspect.-; of their 
experience than when recalling peripheral details (e.g., Goodman et al., I 990). 
There is also little evidence that children arc more vulnerable to inconsistent 
information than are older children ami adults when it comes to reporting central 
(e.g., Cole & Loftus, 1987) or thematic (e.g., II owe, 199 I) aspects of an ev·· .I 
(however see Ceci & Bruck, 1993). 
In addition, participation in real-life events enhances children's memory and 
their resistance to suggestion as compared with bystanders who rncn.:ly witnc~s ill! 
event (again typical of many misinformation studies; e.g., MacWhinncy, Keenan, 
& Reinke, 1982; Rudy & Goodman, 1991 ). Physical and sexiwl ahu~c also usually 
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occur more than once and the present study showed that preschoolers' memory 
for frequently occurring events (i.e., criterion learning) is quite good and that such 
memories are very resistant to the destructive effects of misinformation. Thus, 
the experiences that your.g children are typically asked to give testimony about are 
likely to he very strongly encoded in memory, and may as a result, be quite 
resistant to misleading information. In fact, Saywitz et al. (1991) found young 
children to he especially resistant to abuse-related suggestions. 
Therefore, :,. is possible that most of the research conducted to date 
concerning children's vulnerability to misinformation has underestimated their 
ability to resist inconsistent information (see Rudy & Goodman, 1991). 
Considering this, as well as the fact that children are unlikely to falsely report 
physical and sexual abuse (e.g., Jones, 19H5, cited in King & Yuille, 19H7), it 
would <~ppear that their competency to testify in court may he greater than 
prt!viously believed. However, despite the strong memories for story details that 
the children had in the present study and the relatively short retention interval 
(i.e., four weeks), misinformation promoted the reporting of misleading 
information and possibly impaired portions of memory for the original event for 
preschoolers with one-trial learning. What would misleading information do to 
memory and testimony when memory is months or even years old, as has been the 
case in many instances of abuse (e.g., Archdiocesan Commission, 1990)? Because 
of the concern regarding children's testimony in physical and sexual ahuse cases, 
more research is needed that examines how misinformation affects children's 
memory for ~tctivities related to actual acts of abuse (e.g., being hit, touched, 
hugged, etc.) and for activities that occurred in the distant past. 
Due to its theoretical and practical implications for the reliability of youn~ 
children's eyewitness memory and testimony, ~\swell as its rclcvanl'C to thcmil·s of 
forgetting, event representation, and integrative and constructive memory 
processes (Zaragoza et al., 1992), it is obvious that th.c study of misinfornwtion 
phenomena is of extreme importance. llowcvcr, it is c·.Jually important to 
determine how subsequent encounters with previously l.!ncodcd information affect 
memory. I turn now to a discussion of the effect that consistent information llad 
on preschoolers' recollection of story details. 
Irnprovin~: Preschooler Recollection 
Recall that it is of interest to determine whether rc-encountcring corr·ect 
portions of a witnessed event or receiving additional testing opportunilics produce 
hardier memories of that event, and whether it docs so hy affecting the cohe:-.ion 
of the trace in storage, by altering its retrievahility, or both. Although the effect!'! 
of providing consistent information were not as large as had hccn expected, likely 
uccause there was very little forgetting of story tktails, there was evidence that 
such information reinstated/reactivated preschoolers' memories. 
Consistent information emhc<.ldell in narratives alleviated retricval-ha~cd 
forgetting and enhanced error-contingent retrieval relearning of targeted detail~ iu 
the one-trial conditions and as well aided restorage and error-contingent retrieval 
relearning of targeted details in criterion conditions. It was interesting, however, 
that correct postevent information did not merely alleviate forgetting or reactivate 
the truce to its original level (because there was little forgetting to alleviate), hut 
rather improved preschoolers' retention of the \}riginal event. 
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Therefore, consistent with previous work (e.g., Howe et al., in press}, 
providing correct subsequent informo.tion ahout a witnessed event affected both 
forgetting and reminiscence processes, with the result that long-term retention for 
directly re-experienced details WHS improved. Howe et al. found that re-
cncountering consistent information durhg the retention interval significantly 
decreased the rate at which originally encoded information was lost from storage 
and lead to hetter redintcgrated traces on test trials. However, the effects of 
correct postevcnt information on preschoolers' memory in the present study 
appeared to he localized at retrieval. Had there heen forgetting of original 
information, providing consistent postevent information may have affected the 
storage of the trace. 
Also consistent with past research (e.g., Howe et al., in press; Slamccka & 
Katsaiti, llJHH). reinstating a portion of an original event (i.e., mentioning only 
some of the to-be-remembered details) did not spread reactivation to the entire 
event (i.e., to the to-be-remembered details that were not re-encountercd). That 
is, there was no difference in nontargeted detail recall between the control-4 and 
t'onsistcnt information conditions. Tllll~, as Howe et al. (in press) pointed out, it 
is important not to presume that re-experiencing part of an original event 
reactivates or redintegratcs the entire trace. 
Interestingly, unlike providing consistent information, giving an additional 
testing opportunity did not significantly enhance preschoolers' retention. Thus, 
t'onsistcnt with I lowe et al. (in press), providing correct suhsequent information 
had greater reinstating power than did providing an additional testing opportunity. 
This is expected given that providing consistent information permits a more 
1.27 
complete re-cncounter with the originally learned information than does pr<H:tirl' 
on test trials. 
Because potential court eyewitnesses arc likely to encounter previously 
encoded information, it is important to understand how ronsistcnt information 
influences young children's memory and testimony for a witnessed event. As 
Howe et al. (in press) pointed out. it is necessary to (a) identify those conditions 
that postpone or alleviate forgetting. (h) determine whether reinstatement can 
promote the restoration of memories for original events even after exposure lt: 
misleading information, (c) determine whether the benefits derived from 
reinstatement are as long lasting as those induced hy origina l learning, and (d) 
determine whether there is a critical time period after which rcinstatcrncnt ha~ no 
benefits. Understanding the reinstating properties of consistent postevent 
information may lead to the development of methods that enhance young 
children's recollection of experienced events. and thi.~. of coun~c. would he of 
great benefit to the judicial process. 
Preschooler Forgcttin~ and Reminiscence 
The primary motivation of the thesis was to usc the trace-integrity theory and 
model to examine not only the dual effects of misinformation and the effects of 
reinstatement, hut to examine preschoolers' retention in general. It was ohviou~ 
that forgetting and reminiscence made independent contributions to the 
preschoolers' retention. Forgetting played the larger role in the recall of hoth 
original and misleading information. In terms of original information, forgetting 
primarily served as the main locus of initial learning effects where, us expected, 
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storage failures and. to a smaller extent, retrieval failures were more frequent 
when initial learning was weak (one-trial learning) than when it was strong 
(criterion learning). Although the effects of condition and postevent reference to 
story clctails effects were infrequent, when they were observed, they tended to be 
confined to forgetting (with the exception of the consistent information effects). 
Forgetting also contributed to the retention of misinformation more than did 
reminiscence, however, localization at storage or retrieval was dependent on the 
method of misinformation presentation. 
Consistent with other research findings (e.g., Dent & Stevenson, 1979), 
although reminiscence played a role in preschooler retention, in contrast to 
forgetting, it was not systematically affected by experimental manipulation. In 
terms of the preschoolers' retention of original information, storage-mediated 
reminiscence was confined primarily to the criterion consistent information 
conditions. As for retrieval relearning, success-contingent reminiscence improved 
moderately across trials, whereas error-contingent reminiscence generally tended 
to decline. With regard to preschoolers' retention of misleading information and 
other intrusions, reminiscence contributed uniformly to performance. Restorage 
of misleading information occurred only when inconsistent information was given 
in questionnaire form after the preschoolers learned to criterion. Although 
success-contingent reminiscence increased somewhat across trials, there was a lack 
of error-contingent reminiscence. Overall, then, there was very little reminiscence 
of misinformation: as can he seen in Figure 2, misinformation production tended 
to decline across trials in the one-trial condition but remained relatively stable 
with criterion learning. Similarly, no effect of trial was ohserved with intrusions; 
J2l) 
that is, preschoolers' production of intrusions did not increase across trials. 
Enhanced recall of original information with no subsequent increase in the rcl·all 
of misinformation and other intrusions highlights the importance of providing 
multiple testing opportunities during long-term retention, particularly after 
noncriterion learning. That is, any negative effects of exposure to misleading 
information on memory are more likely to dissipate with repeated testing. 
It is obvious from the present study, as well as from previous studies (e.g., 
Howe, Kelland et al., 1992) that forgetting and reminiscence make independent 
contributions to retention. Therefore, in order to accurately interpret outconws of 
studies concerning children's long-term retention in general, and studies of 
misinformation and reinstatement effects in particular, measurement and 
analytical techniques are required that disentangle the positive nnd negative 
subprocesses involved in retention. 
ConcJudin~: Comments 
It appears that the time has come for a change in beliefs concerning children's 
memory and their competency to testify in courts of law. Based on the large 
amount of evidence indicating that children's memory for past events is accurate 
and that their memories are resistant to misleading information, it appears that 
children can be believed to a greater extent than was once thought. llowever, CIS 
enduring and as resistant to impairment a:; (;hildren's memories might be, the 
present study, along with others (e.g., Howe, 199 I), has provided evidence that 
young children's re':ollecdons can he tampered with. Importantly, despite the 
accuracy of memory for preschoolers with one-trial learni:-~g \i .e., they experienced 
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no forgetting), they still reported a significant amount of misleading informatio11. 
I agree with Ceci and his colleagues (Ceci et al., 1987b) that more research is 
necessary before the legal community can feel confident to accept or reject the 
testimony of children (and adults). 
There urc a number of avenues that future researchers can take. We can 
continue to identify those conditions that make memory impairment and 
erroneous rcporti11g more likely and to spell out those aspects of memory and 
testimony that arc most vulnerable to inaccuracies. For example, it could he 
argued that administering the memory tests one week after the misinformation 
treatment may have reduced the size of the effects of misinformation because the 
strength of misinformation in memory may have been weakened as time passed. 
Therefore, it may he the case that a shorter interval between misinformation 
presentation and retention testing will produce stronger effects of misinformation. 
As well, we also need to identify those conditions under which postevent 
information benefits children's retention. 
As our understanding of children's memory and testimony advances, so too 
will the development of interviewing techniques that improve the accuracy of what 
children report. The design of interviewing methods that are sensitive to the 
many different factors that influence children's recall is of inter1!st because what is 
retrieved from a child's memory is often dependent on factors such as who asks 
the questions (Toglia et al. 1992) as well a.s on how the questions are framed 
(Ornstein, Gordon, & Baker-Ward, 1992). 
One important outcome of the present study was the indication that 
misinformation may be incorporated into the same trace as the originul 
l~ I 
information. One would expect that if the preschoolers had been asked to report 
the source of both the misleading and original information, that they would have 
attributed both to the original event. Although there has been no examination of 
whether children believe that they actually saw story details that were suggested to 
them, there is evidence from the reality monitoring literature that indicates that 
children have problems distinguishing between perceived and imagined events 
(e.g.t Johnson & Foley, 1984). Obviously, children's source monitoring abilities 
need further examination. 
As for other avenues of research, Howe, O'Sullivan, and Marche ( 1992) 
mentioned the need to better detail the role that memory strength plays in 
misinformation effects and retention in general. It is obvious that we need a 
clearer conceptualization of the nature of trace composition. Only when we have 
some way of measuring trace durability will we be ahle to identify those 
conditions that protect traces from mutation, as well as those conuitions that 
promote changes in what has been stored in a trace. I lowe, O'Sullivan et al. also 
spoke of the need for more studies that examine what children know about 
maintaining information in memory. That is, we need to examine what children 
know about forgetting, in particular what they know about the potential sources of 
interference in memory and what they believe can he done to forestall or prevent 
forgetting. 
Another potential area of research concerns individual differences in the 
accuracy 0f young children's eyewitness memory and in their ability to provide 
reliable testimony. For the most part, the preschoolers pcrformcu quite ~irnilarly 
with respect to the reporting of both original and misleading information. 
132 
I fowcver, there were a few children who rarely provided erroneous information 
{i.e., if they <.lid not know the answer they gave no answer) and there were a few 
others who responded nearly every time<: question was asked {i.e., it appeared as 
if they always guesse<.l when they did not. know the answer). Because of the 
serious ~onscquences that such a child as the latter would have for the legal 
system, it may he necessary to develop some form of character profile that 
describes the reliable child witness. 
Therefore, although progress has been made in our understanding of 
misinformation phenomena, reinstatement effects, anti of children's retention in 
general, it is very obvious that our comprehension is far from complete. If our 
understanding is to advance, researchers must concern themselves with the 
limitations that have been inherent in past work. For example, researchers must 
be cognizant the need {a) to control the learning of original and misleading 
information, (h) to use better manipulations of misinformation (ones that 
resemble the prolonged and repeated questioning that young children likely 
experience), (c) to examine the potential constructive and destructive effects of 
misinformation, ami (d) to use retention intervals that resemble those typical of 
ahusc cases. Caution also needs to he employed when using within-subjects 
manipulations because of the potential damage that misinformation may have to 
the information used to measure control performance. As well, researchers need 
to concern themselves with ways of assessing children's mtmory and testimony 
other than the typical two-alternative forced-choice recognition test. Because it is 
of interest to know whether both original and competing information are in 
memory :md because relying on only correct responses will not give a complete 
and accurate assessment of children's vulncrahility 10 misleading information, 
response methods that permit the recall of both types of information must be 
used. In addition, because memory imp~tirmcnt is likely only one of the many 
factors that contribute to the effects of misinformation, it is impmtant that 
researchers use methods that segregate memorial and nonmemnrial factors. 
IJJ 
Of most importance for future investigations of reinstatement, erroneous 
reporting, and memory impairment effects, as well as for studies of retention in 
general, is the usc of proper measurement an<.J analytical techniques. The rime 
has come for memory to no longer be viewed as a permanent storage medium 
where forgetting is due to retrieval failure. Both storage and retrieval processes 
play a role in the development of children's long-term retention (e.g., sec I lowe, 
Kelland ct al., 1992). As in other studies (e.g., Brainerd et al., 1990; I lowe, 1991, 
Howe, Kelland ct al., 1992), changes in forgetting rarcs, pi·lrticularly storage 
failures, were the driving force in preschoolers' retention in the present study. 
Indeed, there is a growing amount of acceptance and empirical support for the 
idea that changes in 1ong~term retention arc mediated by alterations in the 
memory representation itself (e.g., I-I owe, I 99 I; Loftus ct al., 1992; Rovee-Coll ier 
& Shyi, 1992). Because it is likely that storage and retrieval represent different 
aspects of a single memory process and not two disti net processes (e.g., II owe & 
Brainerd, 1989; Howe, Kelland et a!., 1992), researchers also need to consid<.!r 
reconceptualizing their constructs of these processes. 
It is evident that theoretical advancement in this area depends on the 
development and implementation of formal measurement techniques. That is, 
techniques are required that unequivocally cxprc.'is the relationship hctween 
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empirical results and the invisible hypothetical subprocesses under study. Because 
model-based measurements were used to separate forgetting and reminiscence 
and their storage and retrieval loci in the present study, it was possible to 
determine the storage/retrieval locus of the effects of reinstatement, 
misinformation, and retention in general. 
Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Mean number of times misinformation was produced for the condition x trial 
interaction ( = control-4, = consistent narrative, = consistent questionnaire, = 
misleading narrative, = misleading questionnaire). 
Figure 2. Mean number of times misinformation was produced for the initial learning x 
condition x trial interaction ( = control-4, = consistent narrative, = consistent 
questionnaire, = misleading narrative, = misleading questionnaire). 
10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
IJ5 
Figure 1. Mean numher of times misinformation was produced for the condition x trial intcrartion ( r·l ·· 
control-4, + = consistent narrative, 0 = consistent questionnaire, * = misle:1ding narrative, x = 
misleading questionnaire). 
Figure 2. Mean number of times misinformation was produced for the initial learning x condition x trial 
interaction ( D = control-4, + = consistent narrative, [J = consistent questionnaire, • == misleading 
narrative, x = misleading questionnaire). 
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1 /\I though other explanations of the misinformation effect have been proposed 
(e.g., source misattrihution, sec Lindsay & Johnson, 19H7a, 19H7b), the concern in 
this thesis was with the role memory impairment played in the reporting of 
misinformation. 
20thcr reasons have heen given for reinstatement effeds. For example, 
consistent information available through reinstatement may couple with original 
information, making the trace stronger and less susceptible to forgetting (Howe et 
al., in press). 
3Thc terms reinstatement and reactivation are sometimes used interchangeably 
in the literature (e.g., Rovce-Collicr & Shyi, 1992). I-lcw·~·~·er, in the present 
thesis, reinstatement refers to any procedure whcrchy suhj'" :ts re-encounter some 
aspect of an original event, whereas reactivation (or redintegration) refers to the 
tlworetical mechanism proposed to account for reinstatement effects. 
Spread of reactivation is conceivable because memory traces are primarily 
viewed as unitary, holistic structures where the basic features or elements within 
them arc interconnected in some fnshion (e.g., Anderson, 19RO; Bransford & 
Franks. 1971; llowc, J9HS; Metcalfe, 1990). Although the size of the trace likely 
depends on task demands and can range from letters and numbers to propositions 
and stories, the trace serves to integrate all of the availnhle information into one 
closely knit configuration (I lowe et al., in press). The conception in the present 
thesis is that the representation of an entire event i ·. \.l>ntained in a single memory 
t r:u:e. 
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41t was not possible, for practical reasons. to counterbalance the story details 
that were targeted with those that were not targctcJ in neither the narrative at 
acquisition nor during the postevent information (i.e .• there were not enough of 
both types of details to do so). Any learning differences between targeted and 
nontargeted details were assessed and controlled with a series of t-tcsts for the 
narrative at acquisition, and with criterion learning and the analysis of covariam:c 
for the information presented during the postcvent phase. llowevcr, the 
information concerning targeted details was counterbalanced~ half of the ~;uhjects 
in the postevent information conditions received consistent information concerning 
targeted story details and the remaining half received misleading infmmation. 
5In all suhsequent analyses, separation of the details in the control conditions 
into whether they were targeted or not in postcvent information is for cnmpari~o11 
purposes only and docs not represent any actual manipulation of reference to 
story details. 
c'Due to the numerous comparisons made throughout this I hcsis and the 
consequent rise in Type I error, a significance level of .01 was adopted for all 
analyses. To calculate cta2, the following formula was used, where SS denote~ the 
eta2 = SScrrc .. JISSc~rvc• + S~., rrorl• 
sum of squares. Tabachnick and Fidel I ( 19H9) argued that for multifactorial 
designs, the size of eta2 for a specific effect is partly determined by the strength or 
the other effects in the experiment. If there arc many signific<u:t main cffcch and 
interactions, then eta2 for a certain effect will he reduced hccausc the other 
significant effects increase the size of the denominator. The denominator in the 
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present cta2 method is the adjusted sum of squares for the effect that is examined, 
plus the adjusted ~um of squares for the corresponding error term for that effect. 
70f the responses preschoolers made, hoth original and misleading information 
were reported together within a test trial 1.9% of the time with one-trial learning 
and 1.5% with criterion learning. Misinformation preceded original information 
in J2% of the one-trial and 47% of the criterion cases. Examination of the first 
test trial only revealed a similar pattern; H.7% of one-trial and 3.0% of criterion 
preschoolers' responses involved both original and misleading information. Forty-
three percent of one-trial and oO% of criterion responses involved misinformation 
preceding original information. Producing hoth original and misleading 
information on different test trials, while more common than recalling t :tern 
together within a test trial, was also an infrequent response pattern among 
preschoolers; IO.J% of one-trial subjects' and 5.2% of criterion subjects' 
responses involved recalling both original and misleading information on one or 
more of the four trials. or the times preschoolers reported hoth, misinformation 
preceded original information 47% of the time with one-trial learning and 33% 
with criterion learning. So there was little evidence that when preschoolers had 
hoth responses available they felt pressured to first report misinformation. 
sor the preschoolers who were exposed to inconsistent information, 23% of 
their responses in the one-trial condition and 8% of their responses in the 
criterion condition contained misinformation. Misinformation was just as likely to 
he reported without. as with. original information; 45% of the time one-trial 
suhjCl.·ts reported misinformation und 6fi% of the time with criterion suhjects', 
original information was also "eported. That is, misinformation was just as likely 
l."h 
to "coexist" with original information as it was to "fill-in" information that was no 
longer, and possibly never was, available. 
Appendix A 
Narrative Accompanying the Slide Sequence 
I'm going to tell you a story about a little girl named Cyndi. Cyndi had a real 
hard time falling asleep one night. She couldn't fall asleep because she was so 
excited about a llallowcen party that she was going to the next day. 
I. Finally, Cyn<.li fell asleep thinking about all the fun she will have at the 
llallowecn party. 
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2. Then Cyndi's dog/cat comes in her room, jumps on he1 bed, and wakes her 
up. 
3. She gets out of hed quickly and runs to her mom's room. She wants to find 
out if her mom finished making her Halloween costume. 
4. And there it is. Sylvester is all finished. Cyndi can't wait to try it on. 
S. Then Cyndi's mom comes in and says "Good Morning" to Cyndi. Cyndi 
keeps her Co"kie Monster /Bunny Rahhit on top of her mom's dresser. 
Cymli 's mom as!<s Cymli to get dressed and washed for breakfast. 
h. So Cymli goes to her bedroom and looks for something ·to wear. 
7. After Cyndi is dressed, she leaves her room, an<.l walks up the hallway to go 
to the bathroom. 
H. Now Cyn<.li is in the bathroom getting ready. 
9. Cyndi is really thirsty so she goes to the kitchen and pours herself something 
to drink. 
10. Then Cyn<.li and her mom look for something for Cymli to eat for breakfast. 
15~ 
11. Cyndi decides to have cereal/a boiled egg ~ she really likes this breakfast. 
12. After breakfast Cymli helps her mom clean the house. 
13. Then she looks at the clock. There's still hours left hcfore the party~ she 
can't wait! 
14. Since she has lots of time before the party, Cymli decides to play for awhik. 
15. After she's finished playing, she goes to her bedroom and waters her plant. 
16. Then Cymli and her dad make jcllo/muffins in the kitchen. 
17. Later Cyndi's mom/Cyndi's dad reads Cynlli a story. 
18. After Cyndi listens to the story, she colours for awhile; she uses the crayons 
in her favourite pink crayon box. 
19. Then she gets hungry, ::q she gets an apple, and 1 hen stops to watch her 
goldfish. While Cyndi is watching her goldfish, her mom calls out and tells 
Cyndi that it's time to get ready for the party. 
20. So Cym.li runs and gets her Sylvester costume and she starts to put it on. 
21. But then she remembers that before she leaves, she has to say "goodbye" lo 
her dog. 
22. After Cyndi has her costume on she pretends she is Sylvester the ('at - she 
crawls on the floor, meowing. 
23. Then Cyndi gets ready to go outside. 
24. She asks her mom if she can take the umbrella, hut her mom tells her to 
take her coat instead. 
25. When Cyndi is ready she is carried to the car - it's really wet outside. They 
drive to the party. 
26. Now Cyndi is at the Halloween party. You can't really sec her hut you can 
see her waving. Cyndi is playing all kinds or games and eating lots of good 
food. Is she ever happy! 
Appendix B 
Long-Term Retention Questionnaire 
I. What jumped on Cyndi's hed and woke her up? 
2. What did Cyndi keep on top of her mout 's dresser? 
3. Where did Cymli look for something to wear - what did she look in? 
4. What did Cyndi have to walk over in the hallway on her way to the 
hathroom -what was on the floor? 
5. What did Cym.li do in the hathroom? 
6. What <.lid Cyndi pour herself to drink in the kitchen? 
7. Where did Cyndi and her mom look for something for Cyndi to eat for 
hrcakfast - what did they look in? 
H. What did Cyn<.li have to cat for breakfast? 
9. What did Cyndi usc to help her mom clean the house? 
10. What did Cymli play with on the floor in the hallway? 
II. What colour was Cyndi's watering can that she used to water her plant? 
12. What did Cyndi and her dad make in the kitchen? 
13. Who read Cyndi a story? 
14. What colour was Cyndi's favourite crayon case? 
IS. What type of snack did Cyndi get just hefore she looked at her goldfish? 
l(l. Who told Cyndi it was time to get ready for the party? 
I 7. Who did Cyndi have to say goodbye to he fore she left for the party? 
IH. To get ready to go out'\ide, what did Cyndi put on her feet? 
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Jl). Before Cynlli went outside, what did Cyn<.li ask her mom if she could take? 




The last time I was here I told you a story ahout a little girl named Cymli who 
was very excited about going to a Halloween party. Let's go over what happened 
in the story to make sure you remember it. 
In the story Cyndi had a real hard time falling asleep one night. This was 
because she was so excited about a Halloween party that she was going to the 
next day. Finally, she fell asleep thinking about all the fun she would have at the 
Halloween party. Then Cyndi's dog/cat jumped on her bed and woke her up. 
She got up quickly and ran to her mom's room to sec if her mom had fintshcd 
making her Halloween costume. Her Sylvester costume was all finished and 
Cyndi couldn't wait to try it on. Then Cyndi's mom came in and said "Good 
Morning" to Cyndi, and asked her to get ready for breakfast. Cymli kept her 
Cookie Monster /Bunny Rahhit on top of her mom's dresser. After Cyn<.li got 
dressed she went to the bathroom. She hmJ to walk over a hnll/a slinky t hal was 
left on the floor. Then Cyndi went to the kitchen and poured herself some 
milk/orange juice and then Cymli and her morn looked in the cuphoard/fridgc for 
something for Cyndi to eat for breakfast. And then Cyndi :~lc her cercaljhoilcd 
egg. After breakfast, she helped her mom vacuum/sweep. Then Cyndi looked at 
the clock on the wall to see how much time there was before the party. There 
was lots of time! Later Cyn<Ji and her dad made jcllo/murt'ins in the kitchen, 
then Cyndi's mom/Cyndi's dad read her a story, and then Cyndi coloured awhile. 
A little later it was time for Cymli to get ready for the party. So Cyn<li put her 
costume on and then she crawled on the floor prctcndi ng to he Sylvester the cat. 
Then she got ready to go outside - she put on her coat and hoots/shoes. Then 
Cyndi went to the party where she was so happy because she was eating all kinds 




The last time I was here I told you a story about a little girl named Cymli who 
was very excited ahout going to a Halloween party. Remember? Let's go over 
what happened in the story to make sure you remember it. 
In the story Cyndi had a real hard time falling asleep one night. Do you 
remember what Cynlli was so excited ahout? ... She was so excited about a 
I lalloween party that she was going to the next day. 
What was Cyndi dreaming about when she finally fell asleep? ... She was 
dreaming ahou t all the fun she would have at the Halloween party. 
After Cyn<.li 's dog/ cat jumped on her hcd and woke her up, where <..lid Cyndi 
run to? ... She ran to her mom's room to see if her mom had finished making her 
llallowecn costume. 
What was Cyndi's costume? ... Was her costume finished? ... Her Sylvester 
costume was all finished and Cyndi couldn't wait to try it on. 
When Cyndi was in her mom's bedroom where she kept her Cookie 
Monster/Bunny Rabbit on top of her mom's dresser, who came in and said "Good 
Morning" to Cyndi? ... Her mom did and then her mom asked Cyndi to get 
ready for breakfast. So Cynlli went and got dressed. 
Where was Cynlli going when she walked over a ball/a slinky that was left on 
the floor? ... She was on her way to the bathroom. 
Where was Cyntli when she poured herself some milk/orange juice? ... She 
was in the kitchen. 
Who helped Cynlli look in the cuphoard/fridge for something to eat for 
breakfast'? ... Her mom helped her look. 
After Cyndi ate her cereal/boiled egg and helped her mom vacuum/sweep, 
what did she look at on the wall? ... She looked at the clock to sec how much 
time there was before ihe party. 
After Cyndi and her dad made jcllo/muffins in the kitchen and Cyndi's 
momjCyndi's dad read Cyndi a story, what did Cynui do after that? ... She 
coloured for awhile. 
lh2 
Later it was time for Cyndi to get ready for the party so she put her costume 
on. But before she put on her cf,at and hoots/shoes, what did she crawl on the 
floor pretending to he? ... She pretended to be Sylvester the cat. Then Cyndi 
went to the party. 
Was Cymli happy at the party? ... She was really happy because she was 
eating lots of good food and playing all kinds of nice games. 




